UK-CN Subnational Diplomacy

This paper profiles subnational diplomacy between the UK and China, with a focus on the direct engagement of UK local authorities with Chinese diplomats and local governments. It draws on extensive interviews with these UK authorities. The paper assesses the preparedness of local authorities to capture the benefits and mitigate the risks of engaging with China and proposes actions to improve their effectiveness and resilience.

Around the world, city, state and local governments engage in subnational diplomacy to advance their policy agenda, against the backdrop of national policy and their role in their country’s overall governance. In China too, cities and provinces pursue international engagement to support trade and investment, to learn, to enhance civic pride and to project soft power on the world stage in a context where subnational diplomacy is more tightly linked to national policy objectives than in the UK. The role of the Chinese Communist Party and its United Front Work Department, which seeks to shape opinion at home and abroad, are important additional considerations that influence and, at times, constrain or determine how China’s cities and provinces engage with the UK.

Local authority engagement with China covers civic and cultural activities, trade and investment, the education sector, and some activities with local communities. Interactions are primarily with UK-based Chinese diplomats, in the context of twinning relationships with Chinese local governments and less formalised relationships with other local governments across China. Although recovering, activity remains lower than before the Covid-19 pandemic. Most of those interviewed in the research for this paper observed that, to date, civic engagement has proven more successful than trade- and investment-related activity. Educational links, especially the number of Chinese students coming to the UK, are strong and highly valued.

In engaging further with China, local authorities can draw on strengths developed in cities across the UK. These include the individuals who have developed longstanding experience with China, and the cross-sector organisational structures for engagement that some cities have developed to good effect. Cities such as Manchester, Liverpool, Sheffield, Edinburgh and Belfast have used these approaches to develop warm relationships and strong reputations in China, resulting in tangible positive outcomes.

However, China has fallen down the priority ranking for local authorities in recent years; many councils judge opportunities offered by engagement with other countries to be greater. Spending pressures have reduced resourcing, exacerbating the always-present scale mismatch with Chinese city counterparts. China-related activity has become more politically contentious; security concerns loom larger. In this context, local authorities seek greater clarity from central government on the UK’s overall China policy, on the specifics of when and where to engage or not, and greater support on how to do this.

Now, as the UK “re-engages” with China at senior political levels, local authorities have an opportunity to take a fresh look at their China-related activities. An important foundation for this effort is a more explicit articulation of the role of subnational diplomacy within the UK’s overall China policy. This can emerge from discussions between local authorities, the devolved administrations and the UK government about where they see opportunities.

At its simplest, however, the main factor holding back local authority engagement with China today is the widespread local assessment that, all things considered, the benefits do not outweigh the risks and the costs. Changing this would require clearer direction and guidance from the UK government and support to China capability-building.

There is substantial value to establishing a UK-wide framework that enables more effective local authority engagement with China. This would create an overview of activity, improve information flow, provide coordinated, granular guidance on UK–China policy and help build China capabilities locally.

There is a need to articulate more clearly for local authorities the areas where engagement is supported and where it is not. There should be clarity, without imposing or mandating, on the role that local authorities can play in UK–China relations, and where there is national-level support for local initiatives, avoiding mixed messages from different departments. There is also a need to provide and/or orchestrate the delivery of training and experience-sharing sessions across local authority leadership to strengthen China capabilities, not just among those working on a regular basis with China. Finally, those focused on China need to remember that the main priority for local authorities is naturally their own locality. Changing perceptions on the UK’s China policy and ensuring that key messages are “received” takes time, persistence and effort. Communication with local authorities thus needs to be tailored accordingly.

Local authorities should develop their own assessments of the China opportunity, relative to other opportunities, guided by the UK overall policy context. This means assessing the benefits – most likely with a focus on trade, investment and education links – as well as the risks and how to mitigate them. Where the potential for benefit is clear (which will not be in all cases), authorities should adapt the holistic, cross-sector approaches to China engagement that have worked well in cities such as Manchester and Liverpool. Structuring engagement through larger authorities offers the opportunity for broader efforts and may help to address the resourcing challenge. Setting clear priorities and making judicious use of the UK’s official presence in China is also important. This all requires experience-sharing and training that builds China capabilities among a broad base of councillors and officials.

Where the UK and China collaborate more closely on areas of mutual benefit, local authorities are well positioned to play an important role. Whether they play such a role depends on decisions and actions taken at local and central government level to identify where the benefits of engagement justify the effort involved. It also requires measures to strengthen the capabilities of local authorities to engage successfully with Chinese counterparts – in other words, their China capabilities.

Introduction

Context and Research Objectives

The UK’s relationship with China is multifaceted, presenting opportunities and risks. It has undergone significant shifts over time, most recently since the “Golden Era” announced during President Xi Jinping’s 2015 visit. Such complexity and change are unsurprising given China’s economic heft and increasing innovation: its economy is now five times larger than the UK’s and its R&D spending is eight times higher. Added to this comes China’s increasingly significant role on the world stage, its Party-state system of government under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the dynamics of US–China and transatlantic relationships, which affect the UK’s other diplomatic relationships. China’s leadership in new technologies, such as electric vehicles, solar, wind and high-speed rail, is of relevance to the UK’s own energy transition and economic growth. At the same time, there is continuing attention to the potential security and dependence risks of over-reliance on China. In common with its allies, the UK has expressed the essence of its approach to China through three words: “cooperation, competition and challenge”.

Following the period of Covid-19 travel restrictions and limited political engagement between senior British and Chinese leaders, the UK and China are now re-engaging. While national government activity receives most attention, subnational interactions between the UK and China are also important. This paper presents research on subnational diplomacy between China and local authorities across the UK, within the context of China’s overall approach to subnational diplomacy across other sectors of British society.

Five core questions are explored:

1. What are the objectives and nature of China’s subnational diplomacy in the UK?

2. What are the different structures and channels through which China conducts its subnational diplomacy?

3. What are the objectives of UK local authorities in engaging with China and what have been the outcomes to date?

4. How well positioned are local authorities in the UK to engage effectively with China, and with what benefits, risks and challenges?

5. What actions would strengthen the effectiveness and resilience of local authorities in the UK?

Research Methodology and Structure

The paper draws on an extensive series of interviews with UK local authorities on their experience with China, conducted from October 2024 to January 2025, a literature review of China’s subnational diplomacy in other countries, and open source research into China’s diplomatic objectives and activities towards the UK. The interviews were a mix of in-person and remote.

The subnational dimension examined in the paper applies primarily to the UK: the focus is on China’s diplomatic efforts at the local authority level, below the level of the UK government and that of the devolved nations. From the Chinese side, although not the only relevant actors, China’s local governments play a critical role in China’s subnational diplomacy through their extensive sister-city engagement across the UK. As such, the research covers mainland Chinese provinces and cities but does not include Hong Kong, which is under a different governance structure.

What qualifies as diplomacy – and therefore which are the relevant actors on the Chinese side – is more ambiguous. The UK, China and others have long engaged in “People to People” diplomacy. Xi has said “China is willing to … give play to the unique role of people-to-people diplomacy”. This broadens the scope of diplomacy beyond government structures. Xi has also declared that “Party, government, military, civilian and academic, east, west, south, north and centre, the Party leads everything”. This implies that any Chinese non-governmental actor may also be pursuing China’s national diplomatic objectives in line with Party goals. Research on China’s subnational diplomacy in the US has identified primary actors that “range from explicit government entities to players with mixed and hidden ownership, to private actors whose interests are bound to China’s. They include Chinese organizations dedicated to trade, investment, and technological cooperation; companies, pools of capital, and industry associations; and media and educational institutions”. One Australian researcher observed “when [Australian] subnational actors deal with Chinese entities of any kind, they can never be certain to what extent they are actually dealing with the national party-state”.

Analysis of China’s subnational diplomacy needs therefore to take a broad view. It is however fallacious to view all Chinese organisations and individuals as acting in lockstep, collectively executing a single top-down policy direction. Rather, each pursues their own objectives based on circumstances and ambitions, within the overall context of Chinese policy priorities. Martin Thorley has conceptualised this as a “latent network”. He argues that the influence of CCP direction is both over- and underestimated. It is overestimated in that companies, universities and others have the space and motivation to mostly pursue their own agendas, while communicating how these choices align with national priorities. However, it is underestimated as, when required, these same actors are ultimately subordinate to specific central CCP directives at the expense of their own interests.

It is therefore helpful to distinguish three groups of Chinese actors engaged in diplomacy at the UK subnational level:

1. Chinese national-level diplomatic activities (embassy, consulate, ministerial visits) with UK local authorities, universities, companies and others.

2. Chinese local government activities with UK local authorities and others (such as twinning arrangements and other delegations).

3. Other Chinese activities across the UK, primarily engagements with non-governmental counterparts (such as business-to-business, university-to-university and cultural).

This paper focuses on the interactions of UK local authorities with mainland Chinese actors, while placing them in the context of the three groups above. The primary research consisted of interviews with 26 persons across 21 UK local authorities and related bodies, supplemented with additional interviews with the devolved administrations and seven national organisations with differing roles in UK–China subnational engagement. Interviewees were selected to ensure geographical balance and be representative of China-related activity across the UK. Considerations included the scale, category and remit of different entities (including city and county councils, combined authorities and inward investment agencies), those with positive or less positive experiences and individuals with greater or lesser experience with China.

China-related matters are now often viewed as contentious and sensitive for both individuals and local authorities. Interviews were therefore conducted on a non-attributable, confidential basis to encourage frank and open conversation.

This paper has five chapters. Chapter I outlines the nature and objectives of China’s subnational diplomacy in the UK, while Chapter II describes the structures and channels through which it is conducted. Chapter III profiles the objectives and experience of the UK’s local authorities in their relations with China, and Chapter IV assesses the preparedness of these authorities for successful engagement with China. The final chapter presents recommendations aimed at raising the effectiveness and resilience of UK–China subnational relations.

I. The Nature and Objectives of China’s Subnational Diplomacy in the UK

China’s subnational diplomacy in the UK is best understood along three dimensions: the role that subnational diplomacy plays in China’s national diplomacy overall; the objectives of China’s national diplomacy with the UK; and the objectives that China’s cities and provinces are pursuing through engaging with their UK counterparts.

The Role of Subnational Diplomacy in China’s National Diplomacy

Subnational diplomacy has been rising in importance around the world. In the words of one researcher, “the international engagement of cities and local governments has increased and diversified recently … cities and local governments leverage international connections to access investment, share ideas and shape solutions to their local challenges”. These activities bring benefits for all involved, including employment creation and economic growth resulting from increased trade and investment, cooperation in science and technology research, and the promotion of cultural ties, people-to-people exchanges and cross-cultural understanding. China has also increased such activity; from 2000 to 2018, China’s sister-city relationships in the Asia-Pacific rose in number from 440 to 950.

Around the world, subnational diplomacy allows local governments to advance their own agenda against the backdrop of both national policy and their role in their country’s overall governance. In the US and Europe, local authorities seek at times to counteract national policy: some US states, for example, continued to advance their climate agenda during the first Trump administration, against the direction of federal policy. By contrast, China’s subnational diplomacy is more tightly tied to national foreign policy objectives. A report from the Mercator Institute for Chinese Studies (MERICS) think tank concluded that: “While in Europe subnational governance is primarily decentralized, with regions and cities acting autonomously, China’s provinces and cities are part of a highly centralized and unitary system”.

As the Research Methodology and Structure section highlighted, what this means in practice is nuanced: Chinese national policy goals are expressed in broad, ambiguous terms that frequently leave scope for local interpretation and adaptation. China’s sheer scale makes overall top-down direction impractical and ineffective. Cities and provinces generally pursue their own agendas, based on local circumstances, often in competition with one another, and they tend to interpret national directives in accordance with their aims and interests. They make sure, however, to communicate alignment with national goals, to not act explicitly to offset national-level policy and, when required, to follow specific top-down direction. This is especially true in matters related to national security, which has been defined increasingly broadly by the central authorities in recent years.

For most countries, subnational engagement can be a useful and effective channel to both support national foreign policy objectives and advance the interests of local governments. This national link is an explicit aspect of Chinese policy discourse. One Chinese academic described a theory of “parallel diplomacy”, in which subnational outreach complements national-level diplomacy to take advantage of the “autonomy of regional, subnational governments as international actors”. One Xinhua article considered how relationships with local governments in the US can act as a counterbalance to national tensions. It argued that “local governments are more ‘pragmatic’ than their federal counterparts, focused on ‘employment and economic development’ rather than security concerns”, “going against the wind” of “rising national-level tensions”.

The US State Department has also observed such behaviour, and has described how China “uses subnational relationships to influence its national political and economic interests in partner countries … This exposes local governments to growing economic dependency, industrial espionage and technology transfer, and increasing political pressure and disinformation”. There is a risk that moreover, “lower levels of experience and awareness, especially among smaller cities, can be exploited to circumvent the due diligence mechanisms of national agencies”. Both the US government and two of the interviewees in this research highlighted how China’s approach has echoes of Mao’s dictum to “encircle the cities from the countryside” or to “use the local to control the centre”.

China’s organisational structures reflect this coupling of the national and the subnational. The Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC) describes itself as “China’s lead organisation for engaging with local governments in foreign countries” and operates China’s sister-city and sister-province relationships, as specified in Article 5 of the Regulations on the Management of Friendship City Work.

The CCP’s central role also links national and subnational diplomacy via, for example, the role of the United Front Work Department (UFWD), which is one of the CCP’s six main departments. It has been the subject of increasing media attention in the West. Charles Parton has observed that while the UFWD’s main activities are within China, it has become increasingly active internationally as a result of globalisation and the desire to more actively promote CCP interests and values abroad. Efforts focus on ensuring that Chinese overseas, including students, remain in line with the CCP and “on the more general objective of ensuring that foreign countries, their governments, businesses, academia and societies are better aligned with the CCP’s world view and ambitions”. Xi has spoken of “improv[ing] and strengthen[ing] our work related to Chinese nationals overseas to give shape to a powerful joint force for advancing the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. While the CPAFFC is not a UFWD bureau, it is widely seen as an affiliated organisation, acting in line with United Front objectives.

Overall Objectives of China’s Diplomacy with the UK

China’s diplomatic objectives with the UK derive from both China’s overall foreign policy objectives – a substantial topic beyond the scope of this paper – and the distinctive attributes of the UK.

Chinese foreign policy pursues China’s declared “core interests” of sovereignty, development and security in a world that is, in Xi’s words, undergoing “great changes unseen in a century”. These changes present China with both opportunities to be seized and risks to be addressed. The stance and actions of the US dominate Chinese considerations. In 2023, Xi stated that “Western countries led by the United States have implemented all-round containment, encirclement and suppression of China which has brought unprecedented severe challenges to our country’s development”. Based on its assessment of US “containment”, China seeks to prevent or weaken alliances between the US and other countries.

As a close ally of the US and a P5 member of the UN Security Council, with significant diplomatic influence globally, the UK’s stance is of significant interest. China seeks to shape British sentiment to be at worst, not hostile, and at best, favourable to China, such that the UK concludes that its interests do not lie in aligning with the US on China policy. China is, however, uncompromising on its core interests and insists on non-interference in what it sees as “internal affairs”, including Taiwan, Xinjiang and Hong Kong. The UK’s historic role in Hong Kong is therefore especially salient.

The UK is a sizeable trading partner for China and is its 12th largest export market. British research and innovation in biotech, renewables, advanced manufacturing and other areas fit well with China’s ambitions for technology leadership. This presents opportunities for Chinese in acquisitions, investments and talent recruitment in the UK.

The City of London’s financial markets are world leading: an attractive option for Chinese finance and renminbi internationalisation. Britain’s education sector also has strong appeal to the Chinese middle class, even more as US–China tensions rise. The UK is also an attractive showcase for endorsing Chinese capabilities to others – hence China’s historical interest in nuclear power at Hinkley Point and having the UK select Huawei for its 5G network. Alongside its inherent economic benefits, increased trade and investment in both directions also opens the potential to increase the UK’s dependence on China, which could then be used coercively.

Finally, China wants to strengthen its “discourse power” – “the ability to set and shape narratives” – in the UK, as it does globally. For Xi, “telling China’s stories well” is “a glorious diplomatic mission”.

Objectives of China’s Cities and Provinces

China’s national objectives provide the context for its subnational governments’ engagement with the UK. However, cities and provinces do not, in most cases, simply execute top-down directives. As elsewhere in the world, they pursue their own interests to attract investment (in competition with other Chinese cities and provinces), support local companies in expanding overseas, and access technology and research that supports local industrial competitiveness, aligned with national policy. Chinese local governments are also keen to share experiences on economic development and other topics. Specific sectors of interest depend on local circumstance. Interviews for the research for this paper highlighted, for example, Shanghai’s interest in Liverpool’s and Manchester’s post-industrial transition and Liverpool’s maritime expertise. Shenyang, meanwhile, found value in Belfast’s port experience. In addition to the direct economic benefits, local officials benefit through positive performance evaluations and improved promotion prospects.

Historically, Chinese cities have been keen to engage across a wide range of non-economic activities. Several interviewees highlighted sister-city interest in engagement on education, health, social services, firefighting and policing, primarily for the purposes of learning and experience-sharing. However, China’s economic challenges have sharpened the focus of engagement on tangible economic benefits. Alongside the need for job creation and growth, Chinese local governments face increasing funding pressures, stemming from the declining real-estate market (the main source of local government revenue) and substantial costs incurred during Covid-19. However, several interviewees reported continued outreach in the areas of education, sports and culture.

As elsewhere, Chinese cities and provinces also pursue civic engagement for its own sake as a form of “soft power”, dovetailing with national ambitions of strengthened “discourse power”. These activities demonstrate to residents their city’s internationalisation and importance on the global stage. One interviewee in a city China partnership described a Chinese city’s pride in showcasing its achievements to representatives from all its sister-cities globally. City-to-city civic engagement contributes to explicit policy goals of becoming “international cities”. Chengdu, for example, is proud to be a “Creative City of Gastronomy” and holds the Chengdu International Food and Tourism Festival. The political priority to pursue such engagement and the funding available to do so remains higher than in the UK. Overseas initiatives that highlight the positive aspects of China’s culture and progress again contribute to career success for local officials. City-to-city engagement also opens up for local officials the attractive prospect of international travel, which is closely managed and requires specific approvals.

Importantly, however, local officials are aware of the risks (including to their own careers) that result from situations that run counter – or are perceived to run counter – to China’s core interests. These include matters related to Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Taiwan and the legitimacy of CCP rule. For Chinese local authorities, avoiding such situations is a non-negotiable aspect of engagement with the UK.

II. Structures and Channels of China’s Subnational Diplomacy in the UK

China pursues its subnational diplomacy in the UK through a range of formal and informal structures and channels. China’s formal diplomatic structure takes the form of the London embassy and consulates in Belfast, Edinburgh and Manchester. Diplomatic officials, led by current Ambassador Zheng Zeguang, engage with a wide range of institutions, communities and individuals across the UK. These include local authorities, the focus of this paper. They also include British and Chinese companies, universities, colleges and schools, Chinese community and business associations, and individuals of all nationalities, which are outside the direct scope of this paper. These interactions do, however, influence how local authorities approach their own engagement with China.

Ambassador Zheng’s activities outside London illustrate this formal subnational engagement. From 2022 to 2024, the Chinese Embassy reports 53 ambassadorial events across 25 unique locations, with repeat visits to Liverpool, Glasgow, Cardiff, Belfast and Edinburgh. There were 18 meetings with local government authorities, 16 visits to universities, nine economic and trade events, including regional forums and receptions, and seven cultural and youth engagements, including school visits, ceremonies and festivals. It is believed that China’s consuls-general undertake a similar range of activities, although details are not published.

China’s formal diplomatic structure works closely with other organisations to promote Chinese interests in the UK. The China Chamber of Commerce in the UK (CCCUK) advocates for the interests of Chinese businesses; CCCUK’s Standing Committee comprises major Chinese companies, primarily state-owned. There is also activity related to Chinese students and overseas Chinese more broadly. In its 2023 China report, Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee concluded that the UFWD is responsible for “influence and interference activities directed at the Chinese diaspora, from managing relations with prominent Chinese individuals and groups to coordinating support for Chinese positions or targeting dissident groups abroad”. There is no firm evidence on the scale of this activity in the UK. As of January 2024, the London embassy’s website listed at least one senior diplomat dedicated to Overseas Chinese Affairs (a United Front function), although this information has been subsequently removed. The same report concluded that China “seeks to monitor and control Chinese students’ behaviour – primarily via the network of Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs)”. The UK has more than 90 CSSAs, operating as branches of a central CSSAUK. Many CSSA activities are cultural and help Chinese students adjust to British life. Some CSSAs, however, describe their operations as “subordinate to” or “officially guided by” the Chinese Embassy. The Chinese government is also the main funder of 30 Confucius Institutes in universities across the UK. These institutes primarily promote Chinese language learning and cultural understanding, but research has identified more politicised activities that advance China’s policy positions and interests.

Most local authority interviewees reported that these other UK-based Chinese organisations seldom engage directly with them. In some cases, there was more regular direct interaction with Confucius Institutes – for example, in Belfast and in the Liverpool China Partnership. Interactions were partly highly positive. However, some interviewees observed that some councillors questioned the merits and appropriateness of engagement with China on civic matters.

Primarily, however, it is China’s own subnational governments – provincial, city and even district in the largest cities – that engage with local authorities.

Since Covid-19, many Chinese delegations have tightened their focus on attracting inward investment to their locality. Invest Shanghai, the Shanghai government’s investment arm, has an office in London. Consequently, according to interviewees, they more often engage directly with British businesses than with local authorities; the China-Britain Business Council and others often play a facilitating role. Whatever their origin in China, the first port of call for Chinese delegations is London. Tianjin’s Tianjin Invest delegation and a delegation from Shenzhen’s Pingshan district visited London in 2024. Many also visit Edinburgh, Liverpool and Manchester, given the strong history of China engagement in these cities.

Other delegations focus on learning and building connections across British institutions of all kinds. Some of this activity is organised by “travel agents” (individuals in the UK and China who organise the visits). For example, an Anhui province delegation visited London and Edinburgh in November 2024 to understand financial regulatory issues.

Many other forms of UK–China subnational engagement fall under the heading of “people-to-people” relations. These can, in the broadest sense, be interpreted as a form of subnational cultural diplomacy. For example, according to one interviewee from a national organisation, in 2024, the Shenzhen Symphony Orchestra toured the UK, with the help of a British company based in China. Sometimes, these activities arise from sister-city relations: the Salford–Yangzhou sister-city relationship provided the context for the China Flower Association’s collaboration with the Royal Horticultural Society, supported by philanthropic funding from the local Chinese community. Mostly, however, local authorities are not directly involved in such engagements.

Interviewees highlighted regular visits by Chinese universities and companies to meet UK counterparts and vice versa, generally without local authority involvement. Before Covid-19, delegations of Chinese entrepreneurs came regularly to the UK. These visits were typically a mix of study-tour, high-end tourism and a search for investment opportunities, especially in new technologies and real estate. Individuals – both Chinese and British – play a key organising role. M31 Capital, a Shanghai-based investment fund, organised one such post-Covid-19 visit in 2024.

III. The Objectives and Experience of UK Local Authorities in Relation to China

Against this backdrop of China’s engagement with a broad range of actors across the UK, local authorities have engaged directly with China for many years. While the state of UK–China relations at the national level has always provided important context, UK local authorities make their own choices on when, where and how to engage. In recent years, direct engagement has mostly been with Chinese cities and provinces and with China’s diplomats in the UK. Interviewees confirmed that after Xi’s 2015 state visit, there was extensive direct engagement with potential Chinese investors and businesses, mirroring receptivity at the national level. This is now much diminished. The distinctive nature of the City of London Corporation, home to more than 40 Chinese financial institutions, makes it the exception in engaging with Chinese financial institutions, ministries and regulators at the national level, as well as with Beijing and Shanghai.

Origins and Objectives of Local Authority Engagement with China

The origins of formal UK–China local authority engagement lie in twinning agreements with sister-cities and sister-provinces. According to the CPAFFC, 69 such agreements have been concluded. There is no comprehensive information on the number of dormant agreements or those terminated.

The first agreements date from the early 1980s. This was at a time of increasing government-to-government connections at the national level. In 1983, Cardiff, Birmingham, Coventry and Sheffield signed agreements with Xiamen, Changchun, Jinan and Anshan respectively. Similarly, Belfast–Shenyang and Stratford–Fuzhou signed agreements in 2016 after Xi’s 2015 UK visit. However, interviewees also highlighted the personalised, bottom-up origins of specific twinning initiatives. For example, Manchester’s 1986 Wuhan agreement was suggested by Chinatown residents, while in the cases of Leeds–Hangzhou (1988) and Essex–Jiangsu (1992), Chinese students studying locally provided the spur for the specific agreements.

Interviewees discussed the fact that, throughout China’s rapid growth and opening-up, local authority engagement has always had a range of objectives and rationales. These can be grouped into four categories. First, local authorities saw value in civic engagement to promote people-to-people relations, increased understanding and a more prominent positioning in the world. Second, they saw economic opportunity in China – initially as an export market for local business and, over time, as a source of inward investment. Third, as Chinese students increasingly studied overseas and outbound tourism increased, China became more important to local universities – as a source of students and for research cooperation – and to the local “visitor economy”. Finally, in some cities, the presence of sizeable local ethnic Chinese communities has reinforced interest in cultural understanding and economic relations.

The Changing Focus and Level of Activity

The focus and level of activity across these four categories varies between authorities and over time. This reflects changes in China and in UK–China relations; the experience of individual authorities in engaging with China; and the other opportunities and constraints that these local authorities face.

Overall, interviewees indicated that there is less activity than before Covid-19. Covid-19 travel bans halted most activity, although Zoom calls maintained some contact. There were also examples of sister-cities providing support during Covid-19. Essex County Council, for example, secured 200,000 face masks from Jiangsu.

While activity is increasing, the rebound has not been as rapid as expected. Covid-19 has not, however, been the main cause. Interviewees repeatedly stated that, on the British side, more important causes were pressures on spending, including reduced resourcing for international affairs, and the political contentiousness and uncertainty, both locally and nationally, about engaging with China. This has led local authorities to consider more explicitly what priority to place on China, relative to other countries, and what their distinctive role in China-related engagement is, relative to other stakeholders such as universities and companies. Interviewees consistently saw their role as supporting and enabling the success of the diverse stakeholders locally, rather than “doing their job for them”. This means bringing people together, identifying how the whole can be more than the sum of the parts and, according to one city council interviewee, “use the assets that one has creatively”.

Increasing Challenges and Political Contention

In the past five years, local authority engagement with China has become significantly more politically contentious. As one interviewee from a city China partnership with long China experience said, “China has dropped down the list of priorities – it’s just too complex and challenging to deal with”. Combined with continued budgetary pressures, these complexities have put all China-related spending under the spotlight. Interviewees stated that civic and cultural engagement has come under most pressure.

While economic opportunities remain highly valued, other countries are consistently seen as a higher priority and less challenging than China. “There is increasing nervousness on trade and investment [with China], although increasing exports is less sensitive than investment”, said one city council interviewee. Conversely, the importance of Chinese students for the local education sector stood out repeatedly by interviewees, although concerns and anxiety about research cooperation have risen. Finally, the community relations aspect remains important, although this engagement too has become more complicated: the arrival of British National (Overseas) (BN(O)) visa holders from Hong Kong who have left Hong Kong because of their concerns over China’s implementation of the National Security Law and tightened controls on freedom of speech has increased the differences and intensity of debate within ethnic Chinese communities on the merits or otherwise of engaging with China and on what terms.

Local politicians and officials are inevitably aware of media reports on China-related geopolitical tensions and the national debate on the UK’s approach to China. Interviewees across the UK mentioned events occurring in other local authorities. Examples included the violence against Hong Kong protesters outside the Manchester Chinese consulate in 2022 and the promptness and forcefulness with which Chinese diplomats raised Taiwan-related engagement, such as Edinburgh City Council’s initiative to sign a friendship agreement with Kaohsiung in 2024. The de-twinning movement, which advocates that cities break off relations with sister-cities primarily for reasons of human rights was cited as a further challenge. Interviewees consistently stated that “we don’t do social media” for China-related activities, even on economic cooperation, with one city council interviewee saying, “China is the only country that we handle in this way”. “Local politicians are extremely wary of any publicity that comes out of meeting with Chinese”, added another. One observed that people are cautious about being associated with the Chinese Embassy; they also do not want this caution to be communicated.

Civic and Cultural Engagement

Since the start of local authority engagement with China, civic and cultural activities have been at the core of subnational engagement with China, often reflecting the preferences and expectations of Chinese sister-cities. Over the years, there have been many activities between British and Chinese counterparts, including, according to interviewees, museum exchanges (Colchester–Nanjing), badminton and horticulture (Glasgow), a Ningbo Friendship tram bridge in Nottingham, and 200,000 children learning Mandarin across 160 schools in Northern Ireland. In a recent example, Chengdu provided funding to enable three Sheffield athletes to compete in a Chengdu half-marathon in 2024.

Although they continue, such activities are now less common. They inherently bring intangible rather than tangible benefits, and in an environment of budget cuts and political sensitivity, the spending involved has become increasingly hard for councils to justify. Several interviewees noted these pressures started around 2012, pre-dating the rise in geopolitical tensions and even the so-called “Golden Era”. One council went from having two people working on China to one person covering the world. Another removed the individual who was focused full time on its China relationships. Travel is a challenge, too: “We have to explain there is no travel budget; we can’t do the things that we would like to do”, said one interviewee.

Despite their own increased funding pressures, Chinese counterparts continue to routinely offer to pay the expenses of council-led delegations to China. However, this raises issues of potential undue influence – real or perceived – and vocal media or other local reaction. Consequently, councils repeatedly decline such offers.

Many interviewees evaluated the civic side of engagement as more successful than the economic, based on the level of activity and warmth of ties. Examples include Leeds–Hangzhou, Glasgow–Dalian, Edinburgh–Xi’an and Manchester–Wuhan. Many were frustrated by this. “We haven’t seen much tangible in 10 years. Just more continued woolly inward delegations. We don’t get much out of it and nor do our partners”, said one city council interviewee. Another said, “It all feels very ‘civic’. It has not moved to tangible outcomes.” One interviewee with long experience of China suggested that “there needs to be a clear business case if a twinning relationship is to be sustained”. Another compared his city’s experience with Chinese and German sister-cities: “With China, it all remains very vague; the Germans move much more quickly to specifics”.

Trade and Investment

Attracting Chinese inward investment and supporting local company exports to China have been – and remain – important objectives for local authorities, offering the prospect of tangible returns. Despite slower growth, China remains the world’s second-largest economy. Mainland China is the UK’s fifth-largest trading partner. A 2020 study estimated that tourism, education and trade with China support up to 129,000 jobs across the UK. Between 2000 and 2023, the UK was Europe’s largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment. Across the UK, Chinese companies play an important role in local economies, including Jingye Steel (Teesside), Envision AESC (Tyneside) and Geely (West Midlands). Financial sector links are also important, generating £1.3 billion in exports to China in 2023.

However, economic benefits have often not lived up to expectations. Interviewees reported that UK exports to China fell in 2023 and 2024, remaining below the 2019 level. China accounts for only 0.2% of the UK’s total inward investment stock. Interviewees also reported that promised investment from sister-city relations often did not materialise. Chinese business delegations would visit without substantive results, or mooted investments did not pass due diligence. Investment was more often in real estate than industry, although the West Midlands was mentioned by one interviewee from a city China partnership organisation as securing important investments. Supporting local companies with business in China has also not been straightforward. A city council interviewee stated: “Large multinationals do not need our help, and smaller businesses often struggle with the expense of getting started, which we are not able to help with”.

Several factors account for this. British sentiment towards the China business opportunity has see-sawed between excess optimism and excess pessimism. Often, those dealing with China have found it hard to distinguish between aspirational Chinese expressions of interest and specific opportunities. At times, the UK has underestimated the importance Chinese counterparts place on signing memorandums of understanding, and overestimated the importance placed on completed deals. Those involved have lacked sufficient appreciation of the divide between British and Chinese culture, in government and business, and how to bridge it. However, China’s leadership in electric vehicles and other technologies is now raising fresh hopes. An interviewee from one city talked also of tech start-ups set up by Chinese students graduating from the local university.

Given China’s economic challenges, several interviewees identified a recent increased focus by Chinese counterparts on practical commercial outcomes. There was, however, still frustration that Chinese contacts often emphasised formalism over substance: “We often find that the group photo is of the most interest”, said one interviewee working on inbound investment. Many local authorities still lack the capabilities to successfully navigate China’s distinctive context and engage with the right individuals: “Finding the right people to deal with in China is more difficult than in any other country”, said one city council interviewee. “We organised a week of activities for a visiting delegation, and they only told us at the end that the week was interesting but not really their main focus”. Conversely, at their best, twinning relations provide an invaluable way to navigate these issues: “Our close relationship meant we had access across all departments in the Chinese city, not just through the Foreign Affairs Office”, said a county council interviewee.

Opportunities with other countries have risen in priority – the result of China’s slower growth, its perceived risks and challenges, and geopolitics. “Before Covid, we saw lots of investment, but post-Covid we’ve not visited China; the focus has been on India. Companies also hesitate to emphasise exports to China – the market is intensely competitive and IP protection concerns are still there”, said one city council interviewee. Several interviewees perceived China had not ranked highly in the priorities of the Department for Business and Trade (DBT), and said companies were drawing conclusions from that, even though China remains a priority market for some (although not all) DBT sector teams.

Education and Research Cooperation

Interviewees from local authorities repeatedly mentioned the importance of Chinese students to local universities and colleges and to the local economy. There are over 150,000 Chinese studying across the UK, representing an important source of university income. Several interviewees also highlighted how Chinese university alumni help create opportunities for the future. Partnership collaboration between universities in sister-cities was another consistent theme. Some cities are home to universities with campuses in China – notably, Liverpool (Xi’an Jiaotong campus in Suzhou), Nottingham (Ningbo) and Belfast (Queen’s University CQC joint centre with China Medical University in Shenyang).

Academic links have influenced sister-city relations. Under pressure to end its twinning with Ningbo as a result of China’s implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law, Nottingham City Council voted to retain links, considering Nottingham University’s Ningbo campus. Conversely, Newcastle terminated its relationship with Taiyuan, following lobbying to de-twin over Xinjiang and China’s sanctioning of a Newcastle University academic.

However, interviewees mentioned changing attitudes towards academic research cooperation. The National Security and Investment Act 2021 and heightened media attention have both made universities “hugely hesitant” on research cooperation with China, stated one interviewee working on economic development. The perceived complexity and ambiguity of due diligence and approvals on potential security risks is discouraging engagement. Another city council interviewee mentioned a Chinese delegation that expressed interest in visiting a university’s innovation centre. The university concluded the simplest route was to host a reception in the foyer.

The Chinese Community in the UK

The 2021 census identified 445,000 people across England and Wales identifying as ethnically Chinese, with London accounting for around half, and significant Chinese communities in Edinburgh, Belfast, Cardiff, Bristol, Sheffield, Cambridge, Milton Keynes and elsewhere. Since the launch of the Hong Kong BN(O) visa scheme in 2021, around 144,000 people have arrived in the UK under the scheme.

In numerous cities, interviewees mentioned the positive, important role played by the local Chinese community in engaging with China, in suggesting and facilitating sister-city ties, and in maintaining cultural, educational and economic relations. Initiatives to mark Chinese festivals and spread awareness of Chinese culture were mentioned, as were themes of inclusion and anti-racism. These activities do not of themselves necessitate involvement from China. There are, of course, diverse perspectives within the Chinese community on China. Interviewees observed that it was for local Chinese community and welfare associations to determine how they engage with local consulates and others.

The arrival of Hong Kong BN(O) visa holders was repeatedly cited as changing how local authorities view engagement with China. A city council interviewee said, “There is an increasing diversity of views in the local Chinese community between those who have been here a long time; recent arrivals from China; and recent arrivals from Hong Kong”. For many local politicians, “there is a lack of understanding of BN(O) issues which leads to fear on how to deal with them,” observed one interviewee. He added, “Human rights are more and more the top thing in politicians’ minds re China”. Another city council interviewee observed that “there are increasing divides in the local Chinese community. Our political leaders don’t want to take sides”.

Evolution in the Role of Twinning

Twinning provided the starting point for UK–China subnational engagement, and remains important, with China as with other countries. But China and the world have changed. At one extreme, one interviewee at a large local authority observed, “we have a friendship agreement, but we don’t service it all. Engagement has moved on.” City networks such as the C40 Climate Action group and the World Cities Culture Forum offer broader-based mechanisms for sharing learning and for engaging on the global stage, including with Chinese cities.

Economic logic also leads most larger authorities to combine continued sister-city activity with an approach that takes in other major Chinese cities. Local businesses see opportunities across the whole of China, not just in one place. Inward investment agencies seek investment from everywhere. Universities want to attract students from across China, and their alumni return home to live all over China, providing a basis for future relations and economic engagement.

IV. The Preparedness of UK Local Authorities to Engage Effectively with China

Interviewees highlighted strengths and weaknesses in how well prepared local authorities are to make the most of opportunities with China, while addressing risks and managing China’s own subnational diplomatic agenda. China’s distinctive economic, cultural and political environment makes this more challenging than with many other countries.

Rather than either ignoring China or being overly enthused by warm overtures, local authorities need to assess realistically the scale and nature of their own China opportunity and the associated challenges and risks. They need to be clear about both their own objectives and those of their Chinese counterparts, separating those aspects where interests are complementary and those where they may be at odds or pose a challenge. In other words, councils need to translate the UK’s stance of “cooperation, competition, and challenge” to the local level. They then need to have the capabilities to turn this opportunity into reality.

Some local authorities have built up an extensive track record of doing this. This experience should be shared more systematically across the UK. However, historical challenges remain, and new challenges have entered the equation. Resourcing levels need to be justified by a cost-benefit analysis of the risks and returns. Concerns related to security and values need to be addressed with appropriate support. Questions about the UK’s overall China stance currently add to uncertainty and caution at local authority level.

This chapter outlines three areas of strength on which local authorities can build, and three challenges which need to be addressed to ensure effective engagement with China.

Areas of Strength

Recent decades have seen extensive local authority engagement with China, even if economic benefits have often disappointed. These efforts provide a good foundation for the future, based in: the practical experience of key individuals who have navigated the ups and downs of working with China; lessons on effective structures and ways of working; and the relationships, reputation and outcomes resulting from engagement to date.

Experience Built up Over a Long History of Relations

The depth of China-related experience that most interviewees had accumulated over many years is striking. Most too remained committed and enthusiastic about continuing involvement with China. Several had found ways to hold on to China responsibilities as their job role changed.

These individuals are well placed to judge how to realise China-related opportunities and avoid pitfalls. They understand the cultural context – for example, around meeting orchestration and gift-giving – and how to bridge different perspectives on the UK and Chinese sides. This commitment brings with it a positive belief in and enthusiasm for the benefits of engagement in business, education, sport and culture.

They are, however, far from naive about the objectives of Chinese counterparts and the context in which they are working. Interviewees raised issues of security and values. One city council interviewee queried a visiting delegation’s request to visit a semiconductor plant when bundled together with a series of otherwise civic interests. Several mentioned conducting due diligence on individuals before meeting.

Many have experience of sharp interventions by Chinese diplomats, described by one city council interviewee as “bullying”, often related to Hong Kong, Taiwan and human rights. They judge when to stand firm and push back, accepting, if necessary, when the Chinese side decides not to take part. One city council interviewee observed, “The local work with the Confucius Institute was focused on culture, art and other non-political matters and so was always very friendly. But once, the role of the Party was mentioned and the atmosphere changed sharply. Completely different tone. I realised that this was beneath the surface the whole time”.

Proven Structures and Approaches for Engaging Effectively

Sustained activity with China on a significant scale needs more than a handful of committed individuals. It requires the right organisational structures and ways of working.

The most successful approaches have been holistic in nature, making links between economic, cultural, education and other activities. Interviewees revealed a range of models, all with cross-sector participation. These include China partnerships with council involvement, working groups organised and led by the council, and membership organisations that remain in contact with council officials. In the case of Manchester, at the forefront of strong China relations, there was an explicit decision from the start to take a holistic approach rather than lead with trade and investment. This resulted in the Manchester China Forum, “the city-region’s special purpose vehicle for driving forward the Greater Manchester – Greater China relationship”. The Liverpool China Partnership (LCP), the Leeds China Task Force (mentioned by an interviewee) and the Bristol & West of England China Bureau are other examples. The LCP was set up by Liverpool City Council in 2015, as a legacy of the UK government’s 2014 International Business Festival, to expand Liverpool and the city-region’s business, academic and civic partnerships with China. It currently has more than 20 member organisations from the public, private, higher education and health sectors. In these structures, the local authority’s role is to enable and facilitate local stakeholders rather than seeking to “do” everything. Broadening activity to a wider group spreads the resource load, aligning effort and incentives.

These structures are evolving. Attracting inward investment is increasingly the remit of organisations such as MIDAS (Greater Manchester) and the West Midlands Growth Company. For these agencies, China is just one source of investment, albeit a potentially important one. Agencies require their own China capability, but benefit too from a continued holistic approach, as do city councils, which remain a key driver of civic engagement.

Local authorities have also adapted their ways of working to changing circumstances. Several interviewees noted the increased role and value of ceremonial positions in meeting with Chinese counterparts. “We arranged the meeting with the Lord Mayor when the council leader declined”, said one city council interviewee. Another city council interviewee said: “Lord Mayors are a very interesting part of our armoury. They don’t have decision-making power, but their ceremonial role fits well with Chinese expectations”.

Relationships, Reputation and Outcomes

Sustained local authority efforts have established warm relationships and strong reputations in China for those authorities and have demonstrated the ability to deliver outcomes. While Manchester receives consistent mentions, many others have also been active, including Belfast, Bristol, Cardiff, the City of London, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leeds, Liverpool and Sheffield.

Manchester’s sister-city relationship with Wuhan has served as an anchor to unlock relations with other cities, including Shanghai, Chengdu and Nanjing. The Manchester China Forum states that:

Chinese firms have invested in projects with a development value more than £6bn in the region. Notable projects include the Far East Consortium investment into the £1bn Northern Gateway project and the £1bn Airport City development involving Beijing Construction and Engineering Group as a major equity partner. … direct connectivity between Manchester and … [airports in China] allows enhanced links between the city-region as well as the wider Northwest of England and Greater China.

The Liverpool China Partnership reported that through it, Liverpool has developed partnerships in Xi’an, Kunming, Chengdu, Qingdao, Tianjin and Jinan, beyond its sister-city relationship with Shanghai. It has built on university cooperation in Suzhou, Kunming and Shanghai and in its international leadership in sports science and maritime, its football prowess and local businesses keen to expand in China.

Sheffield too has a long history with China, dating back to a sister-city agreement with Anshan in 1983. In 2010, the Sheffield–Chengdu twin city relationship was formally signed. While one high-profile investment deal fell through, there were benefits in the business and education sector. According to one city council interviewee, local universities have a disproportionately high percentage of international students from Chengdu and the wider Sichuan province.

Challenges to Address

Local authorities face evolving challenges in engaging with China. Although councils have always lacked the scale and resources of their Chinese counterparts, these constraints have become tighter. Security concerns and political and media attention have also increased. As a result, local politicians and officials are less willing to leave China matters to those few individuals with extensive China experience. However, they also lack both the security training and China-related experience to assess thoroughly the balance of opportunity and risk. In this shifting, uncertain landscape, interviewees repeatedly called for clearer direction from the UK central government on the specifics of working with China and the need to strengthen China capabilities at local authority level.

Issues of Scale and Resources

The scale imbalance between British cities and their Chinese counterparts has been present from the start. Sheffield, with a population of just over half a million, is twinned with Chengdu, with a population of nearly 10 million. British cities naturally struggle to match the resource levels of their sister-cities. While local government funding pressures date back to the early 2010s, they have continued to tighten, limiting engagement with China. China-related activities necessarily compete for resources with other calls on spending, and need to demonstrate strong, tangible expected returns based on a thorough cost-benefit analysis.

Reduced activity during and since Covid-19 has also had an impact. In the words of one city council interviewee, “there’s been a loss of institutional memory. We used to know how to do these things well [meeting with delegations from China]. We need to bring that back”. An interviewee working in a national organisation said, “We do see some loss of muscle memory [on how to engage with China]”.

Responding to the Changed Context at Local Authority and National Levels

China’s increased political and media salience has changed decision-making. Whereas many decisions were previously left to those working directly on China, typically with greater China knowledge, local political leaders and senior officials now want to be more involved. This means that the individual preferences and priorities of council leaders play a more important role in what happens regarding China; some choose to focus elsewhere. It also necessitates broader communication with and education of those with limited China experience who now make many China-related decisions. “We often don’t have enough maturity and understanding of China and of what we want to get out of it”, stated one interviewee involved in a city China partnership. An interviewee from an economic development agency said, “All too often, people don’t know what they don’t know”.

Increasing security concerns and the associated legislation have also reduced local authority appetite. While universities and companies are more directly affected, councils pick up on the sentiment around them. Simply not engaging is seen as simpler and safer than addressing actual risks and complying with security legislation. “China is often put in the ‘too difficult’ box”, said a city council interviewee. “People need some reassurance that not everything is a security risk, and it can be managed”, observed one interviewee working in a national organisation. There is a need for training on security awareness and assessment and for easy-to-access central support. While one interviewee working in a city council mentioned the usefulness of existing UK government support, another reported relying on Google and third-party software for due diligence on visiting delegations.

These concerns weigh even more heavily given China’s slower economic growth and accompanying media reports, unmet expectations in the past and the emergence of new opportunities in India, ASEAN and elsewhere.

Addressing Ambiguity About UK–China Policy

Interviewees consistently voiced a desire for greater clarity on the UK’s overall China strategy, citing two aspects: specific guidelines about where activity is encouraged and where it is not, with consistent “joined-up” messaging across departments; and easy access to “lines to take” that reflect current Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) policy positions on key themes in the UK–China relationship. Some also looked for political “cover” from ministers and support against media pressures in situations where the local authority engages with China in line with national policy.

The current climate has created a risk-averse culture at local level, such that it is likely that some attractive opportunities are being missed. Interviewees observed that local political leaders and officials often found it simpler to not pursue discussions as they could not judge what was encouraged and what was not. “We were approached by a Chinese company about investment. But is this something that central government welcomes? We just don’t know”, said one city council interviewee. Another observed, “We would like some guidance on how we do energy transition and the role of China within that”.

Those authorities with extensive China activity also called for clearer communication, apart from the City of London, which benefits from its proximity to central government. One interviewee from such an authority said: “We get mixed messages. DBT says ‘Engage!’. The security services say, ‘Don’t engage!’”. Another noted that communication takes time to have an impact: “I see a lag of months or even longer between what the UK government is saying and doing on China and what is being picked up and acted on at the local level. Maybe what we’re seeing now is the effect of the past couple of years working through locally. These things take time to shift”.

Some interviewees also called for simpler ways to get up-to-date FCDO position statements on key China matters. This helps, for example, to prepare mayoral and council leaders when speaking on China. One city council interviewee said, “People think they understand [UK China policy] but they may be a year out of date”. Others, such as interviewees from Edinburgh, Leeds and the City of London, highlighted the quality and responsiveness of existing FCDO support. Core Cities UK’s International Coordination Group also received high praise as a mechanism for sharing experience and communicating with FCDO. Beyond communication, some called for national government to provide leadership and political cover. “There is a lot more we could do with China, but we need some political cover. If we as a council do something, will any minister stand up and say that it’s OK if the media starts questioning?”, asked one county council interviewee.

Inherent geopolitical uncertainty remains a challenge. “With the current uncertainty, why would I start investment discussions with China? These can take years to come to fruition and I don’t know if UK policy will change again to line up with the Americans”, said one interviewee from an economic development agency. “Who knows where we will be in five years? China may be our new best friend again by then”, said an interviewee from a city China partnership.

V. Conclusion and Actions

Strengthening the UK’s subnational efforts needs to start with greater clarity on the objectives, scale and scope of this activity. It also requires a clear assessment of where China’s own objectives are complementary and where they pose risks. Implementation then requires a series of actions at both national and local levels.

Research on subnational diplomacy in other countries highlights the need to monitor activity, ensure coordination and consistency of approach, identify best practices and put in place national and regional support structures. For example, the US State Department established a Subnational Diplomacy Unit in 2022. Its mission is to “lead and coordinate the State Department’s engagement with mayors, governors and other local officials in the United States and around the world … to bring the benefits of U.S. foreign policy, such as jobs, investments, innovative solutions, and international experiences, to the local and state level. It supports U.S. national security priorities by integrating local ideas into foreign policy and fostering connections among cities, municipalities, and communities in the United States and abroad”.

Interviewees suggested a series of actions at local authority and UK government level to make local activity more effective and more resilient. The first step, however, is to determine and articulate the role of local authorities in the UK’s overall China diplomacy.

Today, the UK’s subnational diplomacy is almost entirely bottom-up in nature, determined by local priorities and interests, although influenced by the state of the overall UK–China relationship. Numerous interviewees requested explicit UK government guidance on the role it sees for local authority engagement with China and how it can complement and reinforce the UK’s approach to China. They argue that the UK as a whole would benefit from a more coordinated approach. “Central government needs to recognise that local government can be an effective delivery agent for its foreign policy … It can be less complicated than at the national level”, said one interviewee on a county council. Another city council interviewee stated that “there is lots of talk these days about city diplomacy. And we could play a more effective role. We need better guidance on how the FCDO sees the role of cities and where we can contribute”. A third city council interviewee argued that “major cities can play a bigger role in economic diplomacy”. These comments have echoes of China’s approach to subnational diplomacy, delineating specific areas of complementarity. This does not, however, represent a call for top-down mandated action that might itself undermine the “less complicated” nature of subnational engagement and be inconsistent with the role of different levels of government in the UK.

While interviewees seek guidance, they also seek involvement. The best approach is an interactive process where local authorities, devolved administrations and the UK government share views on the way forward. Organisations such as Core Cities UK, Key Cities and the Local Government Association can also serve as mechanisms for engaging with cities and councils. One suggestion was to translate specific sector or topic priorities agreed at a UK–China level (such as climate or renewables) into local authority initiatives with Chinese counterparts. These may then warrant central or local funding, helping address resource constraints.

The recommendations resulting from this research fall into two areas: establishing a UK-wide framework; and pursuing effective and resilient engagement at local authority level, based on local assessment.

Establish a UK-Wide Framework for Local Authority Engagement with China

At its very simplest, the main factor holding back local authority engagement with China today is the widespread judgement that, all things considered, the benefits of engaging do not outweigh the risks and the costs. Changing this would require greater clarity of direction from the UK government and increased support to the building of “China capabilities” at local level, followed by local authority action, appropriate to their own situation.

A UK-wide framework for local authority engagement with China would have substantial value. It would create an overview of activity, improve information flow, provide coordinated guidance on UK–China policy and help build China capabilities locally. This in turn will enable sustainable local authority engagement based on better local assessments of opportunities, risks and priorities and more effective implementation. There are four areas for action:

1. Establish the structure and processes for a UK-level overview of local authority engagement with China (and, potentially, other countries).

   Gaining full value from local authority engagement while remaining aware of risks requires better oversight, coordination and information; the list of UK–China twinning arrangements, for example, is currently maintained by China’s CPAFFC rather than by the UK government. There are a range of organisational forms that would achieve this: a small China-focused unit that maintains contact with major cities and city networks on specific UK–China initiatives; an actor-agnostic unit that supports local authority resilience in relations with all countries; or a unit with a broader remit similar to the US State Department’s Subnational Diplomacy Unit, playing a role in relations with all countries. This unit might also facilitate contact between local authorities and the UK government’s presence in China.

2. Provide local authorities with greater clarity and granularity on what the UK’s China policy means for the specific decisions they face.

   Guidance should articulate areas where engagement is supported and where it is not. It should provide clarity, without imposing or mandating, on the role that local authorities can play in UK–China relations and where there is UK government (or devolved administration) support for local initiatives. It should avoid mixed messages coming from different departments.

3. Provide and/or orchestrate the delivery of training and experience-sharing sessions to strengthen China capabilities across local authority leadership, not just among those working on a regular basis with China.

   Topics should include the objectives of China’s own subnational diplomacy; practical considerations in engaging and negotiating successfully with Chinese counterparts (such as conducting due diligence on visiting delegations); awareness, assessment and mitigation of potential security concerns and support available; and success stories and challenges to date. Beyond formal training, the UK government can help facilitate regular networking and experience-sharing across local authorities. While there is no one “best way” to work with China, there remains value in putting together a “playbook” that summarises local authority experiences with China, including best practice case studies and pitfalls to avoid.

4. Ensure consistent, persistent communication on all aspects of UK–China policy.

   The main priority for local authorities is naturally their own locality. Even on the international front, China does not currently rank high on the priority list. This results in large part from how local authorities judge the UK government’s own priorities. Changing perceptions and ensuring key messages are “received” takes time, persistence and effort. Communication needs to be tailored accordingly. The FCDO should also ensure there are clear rapid-response contact points that provide updated information on an as-needed basis regarding “lines to take” on key aspects of UK–China policy.

Pursue Effective and Resilient Engagement at Local Authority Level Based on Local Assessment

The current UK–China “re-engagement” presents an opportunity for local authorities to take a fresh look at China, based on local assessment and drawing on best practices and lessons learned. They can take action in seven areas:

1. Develop their own explicit case for engagement (or not) based on a cost-benefit analysis compared with alternatives.

   The core opportunities will typically be economic in nature, including benefits to the education and tourism sectors. The case should draw on local assets that are of distinctive appeal to China (including economic, educational and cultural) and previously established relationships and reputation. It should identify where sister-cities offer the most attractive route and where a broader, multi-city approach to China is appropriate.

2. Conduct a local risk and resilience assessment, drawing on UK government guidance.

   This should identify the potential risks of engaging alongside the benefits. Risks include security exposures (such as in technology) and the potential for excessive dependence on China that may be used coercively (such as in relation to Taiwan matters). Local authorities should then develop a risk and resilience plan to monitor and mitigate these risks, including through training and awareness sessions.

3. Develop structures to engage with Chinese counterparts in a holistic, cross-sector and cost-effective way (including civic, cultural and other people-to-people initiatives) while keeping a clear focus on tangible returns.

   Learn from and adapt partnership approaches that bring together local stakeholders with China-related interests and enable resource-sharing (following the model used in, for example, Manchester, Liverpool and Belfast).

4. Explore opportunities to pool efforts and/or engage with China via or in coordination with larger authorities.

   While China will always operate at a larger scale, scale also matters for the UK, enabling a critical mass of China expertise, opening new funding possibilities and allowing for larger opportunities, potentially more attractive to China. England’s combined authorities present new options for engaging with China at a larger scale, as they operate on a larger scale with larger budgets.

5. Make judicious use of on-the-ground resources in China of the UK government and devolved administrations.

   The British Embassy, consulates and representatives of the devolved administrations based in China have extensive, relevant, on-the-ground experience. Travel budget constraints increase the value of good connections between local authorities and these in-China capabilities, although here too, resources are stretched, and clear priorities are important.

6. In a resource-constrained environment, prioritise the forms of engagement with China that bring most value.

   Chinese counterparts will be focused on their objectives. Local authorities should be equally firm in pursuing theirs and not waste time out of misjudged politeness.

7. Encourage senior council officials and councillors to participate in China capability-building sessions.

   These should cover the context of China and UK–China relations, the opportunities and the risks and the lessons learned, with explicit consideration of the economic, security and values dimensions.

As the UK and China collaborate more closely on areas of mutual benefit, local authorities are well positioned to play an important role. The specifics are for local authorities to decide, drawing on experience from across the UK. But clarity is also needed on how local activity contributes to overall China policy. There is a need for enhanced communication, information-sharing, oversight and the strengthening of China capabilities across the UK. Maintaining a nuanced and current understanding of how China approaches subnational diplomacy across the UK is also important. Here, there would be value to further research the role that Hong Kong plays and how China engages with the devolved administrations. All this can help overcome current risk aversion, enable better assessment of opportunities and risks to security and values, and ensure effective implementation.

Annex

▲ Table 1: UK–China Twinning Agreements. Note: Some relationships may be inactive. Source: Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC).

Andrew Cainey has lived and worked for most of the past twenty-five years in China, Korea and Singapore advising businesses and governments, having first visited China in 1981. His particular areas of focus relate to China’s development, its growing role and influence across Asia and globally and the intersection of economic prosperity, technology and national security. He is also a founding director of the UK National Committee on China, an educational non-profit; a non-executive director of Schroder Asian Total Return Investment Company plc; and a Senior Advisor to Lumen Capital Investors in Singapore. He has also been a Senior Fellow with Fung Global Institute in Hong Kong; an Associate Fellow in Chatham House’s Asia-Pacific Programme; a Senior Fellow in the Security and Crisis Management Programme (International Centre) at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences; and a Policy Advisor in the Conservative Party’s Policy Unit.