Fighting With Allies

The national security of the United States has long benefitted from its vast and unrivaled global network of allies and partners. This network will be even more important in a more competitive, multipolar world. Nowhere is this truer than in the Indo-Pacific region, where the strategic competition with China for the twenty-first century is taking shape.

This report identifies two issues that have historically undermined multinational strategic planning between the United States and its closest allies: (1) an overreliance on ad hoc bilateral frameworks, and (2) outdated, insular practices. Improving this situation will require a renewed focus on the four factors that underpin successful multinational strategic planning:

1. Strategic alignment on the purpose and priorities of a particular multinational grouping;

2. Shared institutions that allow effective communication and coordination between individuals and organizations;

3. Interoperability between partner militaries that allow them to effectively fight alongside one another; and

4. Personal factors such as a consultative leadership style and strong relationships between U.S. personnel and their counterparts.

This report applies these principles to four existing multinational frameworks: the Military Framework, AUKUS, Five Eyes, and the Quad. It argues that if these frameworks can be adapted with these four principles in mind, these bodies have plenty of unused potential to improve the United States’ approach to multinational strategic planning in the Indo-Pacific. The report ends with policy recommendations designed to help Department of Defense leaders act on these findings.

The report also features an appendix of four detailed historical case studies of multinational strategic planning. These cover planning in peace and war, including in (1) the First Gulf War, (2) NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, (3) NATO’s 1950 Medium Term Defense Plan (MTDP), and (4) the 10-nation northern European Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), established in 2014.

Introduction

“There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.”

– Winston Churchill

In the competition for the twenty-first century, the United States has a large advantage over its authoritarian rivals: its friends. Since 1945, the United States has nurtured an unprecedented and unrivaled global network of allies and partners. The second administration of President Donald J. Trump has yet to publish a defense strategy, but if the previous version is any guide, this emphasis on allies and partners will remain. As the 2017 National Defense Strategy from the first Trump administration stated: “Sustaining favorable balances of power will require a strong commitment and close cooperation with allies and partners because allies and partners magnify U.S. power and extend U.S. influence.”

An increasingly dangerous and competitive world gives U.S. political and military leaders an urgent imperative to address these issues head on. Nowhere is this truer—or more important—than in the Indo-Pacific region.

Close cooperation with allies and partners requires multinational strategic planning. This means coordinating the military lever of government power with other nations. Getting this right helps the United States make the most of its network of allies and partners to maximize its influence and address perennial issues such as burden sharing among allies. Multinational strategic planning hinges on key factors such as shared priorities, interoperability, and trust. Yet on many of these counts, the United States has been accused of being a poor partner, maintaining outdated and insular practices that have hindered multinational strategic planning. An increasingly dangerous and competitive world gives U.S. political and military leaders an urgent imperative to address these issues head on.

Nowhere is this truer—or more important—than in the Indo-Pacific region, where the United States faces a “long-term, strategic competition” with China. Washington’s network of alliances and partnerships will be a vital component of the Trump administration’s strategy to deal with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s challenge to regional stability and global order. These relationships, however, are not self-sustaining; the United States gets out what it puts in. As former Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth put it: “Alliances and partnerships are like gardens: They don’t grow overnight, they must be tended carefully to flourish, and they can wither if they are neglected.” Allies and partners can act as a force multiplier for U.S. policy, as long as the garden is regularly tended.

In recent years, U.S. leaders have engaged in plenty of gardening to strengthen America’s network of allies and partners across the region. In 2023 alone, the United States forged new force posture and basing agreements with Australia, Japan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, and South Korea. However, if Washington fails to improve how it cooperates with its closest friends, these agreements will not meet their potential. This will undermine the credibility and potency of the deterrence on which U.S. strategy is founded and degrade the United States’ global influence, reputation, and power.

This report argues that strengthening alliances by improving multinational strategic planning will require a renewed focus on the fundamentals: strategic alignment from top to bottom, institutions that are multinational by design, enhanced interoperability at all levels, and enduring investment in the personal relationships that underpin the United States’ alliances and partnerships. It examines the actions leaders in the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) can take to transform their approach to multinational strategic planning.

Allies and partners can act as a force multiplier for U.S. policy, as long as the garden is regularly tended.

The report begins by explaining key terms and concepts in the first chapter, as well as this project’s approach. The second chapter then assesses the current state of play of DOD multinational strategic planning, focusing on the Indo-Pacific region. It finds the United States relies too much on ad hoc, bilateral relations rather than multilateral frameworks designed for the job. It also suggests the United States is often a poor partner in multinational strategic planning, displaying undesirable behaviors such as unilateralism, poor communication, and overreliance on military-to-military channels and foreign liaison networks.

To help rectify this situation, the third chapter then examines best practices for successful multinational strategic planning. A literature review is complemented by four case studies of multinational strategic planning in action (with more detailed studies in Appendices A through D). The result is a framework of four key drivers for successful multinational strategic planning: strategic alignment, shared institutions, interoperability, and personal factors.

The final chapter applies these factors to four multilateral frameworks with relevance to the Indo-Pacific: the Military Framework, AUKUS, Five Eyes, and the Quad. These are existing frameworks that are either underutilized or hold broader potential to improve the United States’ approach to multinational strategic planning in the Indo-Pacific. Each framework is analyzed using a SWOT analysis—which considers strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats—based on the four key factors for successful multinational planning. Policy recommendations are then made for each framework. These are designed to help DOD leaders improve U.S. multinational strategic planning in the Indo-Pacific region by making more use of existing frameworks for this purpose.

CHAPTER 01

Key Terms and Concepts

This chapter defines the terms “allies and partners” and “multinational strategic planning.” It also explains the project methodology.

Allies and Partners

The terms “ally” and “partner” are both used by the U.S. government because they mean different things. The main distinction is whether the United States has signed—and ratified—a formal treaty of alliance with the nation in question. Being in an alliance with another nation, or group of nations, involves a mutual obligation of assistance in war.

In contrast, a partner is a state with which the United States has any sort of cooperative security endeavor. This does not require a treaty or include any mutual defense obligation. Partnerships cover a wide variety of relationships including ad hoc coalitions, security communities, and strategic partnerships. This definition reflects that an allied/non-allied binary oversimplifies the question of how states partner in the post–Cold War era.

Multinational Strategic Planning

This report is focused on improving U.S. multinational strategic planning with allies and partners. But what is multinational strategic planning? In simple terms, it is coordinating the military lever of government power with other nations. This definition is based on U.S. and NATO doctrine, which define the three key terms in this concept as follows:

• Multinational: “Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners.”

• Strategic: “The level at which a nation or group of nations determines national or multinational security objectives and deploys national, including military, resources to achieve them.”

• Planning: “[The] primary means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or designated combatant commander arranges for unity of effort and purpose and through which they guide the planning, integration, and coordination of joint operations across combatant command areas of responsibility and functional responsibilities.”

In conceptual terms, multinational strategic planning is a form of defense cooperation. This covers the full gamut of cooperation between two or more nations on defense issues. Cooperation can range from formal military planning and operations to joint procurement, security assistance, information sharing, or simply high-level coordination between political leaders on military issues. Defense cooperation is often difficult because national defense is the primary function of any government and the ultimate expression of sovereignty. This can lead to political, economic, and military barriers to cooperation. However, if such friction can be overcome, cooperation can lead to a range of important mutual political, economic, and military benefits.

The most advanced form of defense cooperation is integration. Defense integration occurs at three levels: strategic, institutional, and tactical. Multinational strategic planning spans all three levels. It is initiated and founded at the strategic level through agreement on shared priorities and threats. It is carried out at the institutional level through shared arrangements (e.g., regular meetings between senior leaders or multinational headquarters) and results in multinational initiatives at the tactical level (e.g., exercises, operations, and common equipment).

Project Approach

This project was designed to combine empirical insights from practitioners and historical case studies with the theory of multinational strategic planning and defense cooperation. It is built on three pillars of evidence gathering: interviews, discussions, and workshops with officials and experts; a literature review on the practice and theory of multinational strategic planning; and four historical case studies.

Interviews, discussions, and workshops were held between June 2024 and February 2025 with around 50 officials and experts from several European and Indo-Pacific nations, including Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Discussions ranged from formal interviews and workshops to informal meetings and conversations. Discussions were conducted under the Chatham House Rule, and all discussants remain anonymous (unless they gave permission to be named).

The state of U.S. multinational strategic planning and a framework of key factors were developed based on a literature review of contemporary and historical sources, ranging from media stories to journal articles, books, and primary source material.

To refine the framework, four case studies were developed: (1) the First Gulf War, (2) NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, (3) NATO’s 1950 Medium Term Defense Plan (MTDP), and (4) the 10-nation northern European Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), established in 2014.20 In the First Gulf War and ISAF cases, multinational planning was triggered by an armed attack, while NATO’s MTDP and the JEF provide examples of peacetime planning. All four cases exhibit different levels of success or failure from which insights and lessons are drawn.

CHAPTER 02

The State of Play

U.S. Multinational Strategic Planning Today

This chapter looks at the current state of play of multinational strategic planning, with a focus on the Indo-Pacific. This region is where much of China’s challenge to U.S. primacy will play out; it is the most important region for U.S. national security and defense. This section begins by examining a range of existing and new initiatives between the United States and its regional allies and partners related to multinational strategic planning. A more discursive take is then presented on how the United States conducts multinational strategic planning with its allies and partners. This discussion is based on research and interviews with officials and experts from allied and partner nations.

Overview of U.S. Multinational Strategic Planning Initiatives in the Indo-Pacific Region

The United States conducts multinational military planning in at least three main ways: (1) highly formalized processes that produce multinational operational plans, (2) high-level consultations aimed at coordination rather than operational plans, and (3) informal exchanges that augment national planning processes with insights into partner-nation assumptions, capabilities, and plans. Table 1 provides examples of bilateral and multilateral initiatives in each category. Some of these are long-standing, while others were established more recently (these are bolded).

▲ TABLE 1 Examples of U.S. Multinational Strategic Initiatives Focused on the Indo-Pacific. NOTE Bold = new or significantly updated since 2021; *Does not yet exist, but the intent to upgrade U.S. Forces Japan to a joint operational headquarters was announced in July 2024; **Focused on the Middle East region but includes several Indo-Pacific allies and partners; ***Formal multinational planning within AUKUS is limited to the trilateral rotational deployment of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered attack submarines under Submarine Rotational Force (SRF) West.

Formal Multinational Planning

The gold standard for institutionalized multinational defense planning between the United States and its allies is the NATO alliance, which operates two formal multinational planning processes in parallel. Formal multinational planning uses standardized planning processes like the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) that involve dedicated staff from multiple nations and result (in most cases) in written multinational plans.

There is no equivalent to the NDPP process in the Indo-Pacific—not least because there is no equivalent to NATO in the region. Neither is there likely to be, given the widespread desire within the region to avoid over-militarizing regional disputes where possible. Instead, the United States has pursued what it calls a “latticework” of bilateral and minilateral agreements in support of a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” The closest arrangements are with U.S. treaty allies including Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, and South Korea.

Few multilateral frameworks conduct formal multinational strategic planning in the Indo-Pacific. A standout example is the long-standing trilateral cooperation between the United States, Australia, and Japan, which was updated last year to include “Trilateral Defense Consultations.” This mechanism is designed “to support alignment of policy and operational objectives of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), the Australian Defense Force (ADF), and the United States forces from peacetime to contingency.” It complements activity in recent years to “trilateralize” existing U.S.-Australia planning initiatives by including Japan in activities such as amphibious training, air interoperability, and multi-domain exercises.

More limited examples include activities under AUKUS, a 2021 trilateral agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to equip Australia with a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered attack submarine and enhance cooperation on advanced capabilities. This has included limited trilateral planning through the rotational presence of U.S. and UK submarines in Australia. The United States also leads the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), a large coalition of 46 countries that includes its Indo-Pacific allies but focuses on illicit non-state actors in the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa.

On the bilateral front, the Republic of Korea/U.S. Combined Forces Command has a combined planning staff, and the two countries were engaged in deepening their bilateral strategic planning for contingencies involving North Korean nuclear use in 2024. The United States is also increasing its ability to conduct such planning with both Japan and the Philippines. In July 2024, Japan and the United States declared their intent to focus on “upgrading Alliance command and control (C2) . . . and enhancing cross-domain operations.” The United States is also upgrading U.S. Forces Japan into a joint headquarters, which would likely enhance its ability to plan with Japan’s joint command. The United States and the Philippines declared their intent to “reinvigorate bilateral planning and coordination efforts” and agree on new basing sites, before agreeing to new bilateral coordination and information-sharing initiatives in 2024. The United States and the Philippines have also recently created the Roles, Missions, and Capabilities Working Group to “ensure more frequent and regular policy and operational coordination.”

Strategic Multinational Coordination

Other important bodies are aimed at consultation and coordination rather than formal multinational planning. These initiatives do not follow formal planning processes, lack the dedicated planning staff employed by formal processes, and rarely result in written multinational plans, although they generally do involve the creation of various documents and communiqués. The coordination that occurs in these bodies is also expected to influence formal national-level planning.

A standout example is the trilateral partnership between the United States, Japan, and South Korea launched at Camp David in 2023. The partnership includes formal multinational planning activity based on a trilateral security cooperation framework, including “senior-level policy consultations, information sharing, trilateral exercises, and defense exchange cooperation.”

On the bilateral front, the 25th Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue is a regular forum for strategic coordination between the United States and South Korea that complements the formal planning mechanisms associated with the Combined Forces Command. The United States also engages in a range of cooperation initiatives with Fiji, India, Laos, Papua New Guinea, Thailand, and Vietnam.

The Quad, despite its more limited original mission, has evolved as a consultative forum for strategic coordination between the United States and three Indo-Pacific allies and partners—Australia, India, and Japan. It facilitates discussions on shared strategic challenges, particularly those posed by China, through not only summits but also ministerial and working-level meetings. Its members have conducted combined maritime security activities through the Malabar naval exercise, although the exercise is not formally linked to the Quad.

Along similar lines, the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia have also established the International Joint Requirements Oversight Council (I-JROC) as a forum for the vice chiefs of defense in the three allied countries to review joint and combined warfighting concepts as they develop.

Another example of multinational coordination in the region is the 10-nation intergovernmental group the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The United States is not a member but has been invited to attend ASEAN meetings, including those focused on defense. For example, in November 2024, former Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin attended the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) for the fourth time.

Perhaps the newest multinational body for strategic coordination is the Military Framework. This little-known forum is a U.S.-led group of 14 nations for global coordination with its allies in the strategic competition with China, Russia, and other authoritarian powers. It was established in 2016 as an informal mechanism to coordinate, at the military-strategic level, the U.S.-led coalition to counter the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, known as Operation Inherent Resolve. It has recently been repurposed to address the challenges of “great power competition” and “strategic competition,” as described in the 2017 and 2022 U.S. National Defense Strategies.

A more niche multinational framework is the Five Eyes group, an intelligence-sharing alliance among Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The group grew out of U.S.-UK intelligence cooperation after World War II and became the Five Eyes in 1956—although the agreement was not made public until 2005. Although it does not have a formal planning role, it provides a valuable platform for its five participant countries and undertakes some planning-adjacent activities like its Future Operating Environment 2040 publication.

Informal Multinational Exchange

Informal multinational exchanges help make national plans work in a multinational context. These activities give the United States insight into the plans and intent of allies and partners—and vice versa. They are not explicitly designed as planning or coordination bodies or exercises but provide important inputs into formal planning processes and strategic coordination activities. The flow of information from these exchanges into planning activities is more organic than in formal processes.

A key avenue for multinational exchange is wargaming, described by several interviewees as a valuable tool for strategic planning. Wargames allow participants to open a dialogue about assumptions and courses of action that might otherwise be untenable (e.g., due to domestic political constraints). These discussions transpose some of the benefits of multinational planning into informal national planning. This value has been demonstrated through the inclusion of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom in the U.S. Globally Integrated Wargame. For example, the United Kingdom has been able to increase its conceptual compatibility with the United States, increasing the likelihood the two countries’ militaries will be able to fight effectively alongside one another. NATO has also used wargaming to similar effect regarding future force design and strategic options.

The United States also holds an array of combined military exercises with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. The flagship exercise is the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) maritime exercise, which was established in 1971. RIMPAC 2024 featured 29 nations and included over 25,000 personnel, 40 ships, and over 150 aircraft. Other examples include the trilateral U.S-Japan-Australia Yama Sakura exercise (since 1982), Exercise Valiant Shield on maritime operations (since 2006), and the Large Scale Global Exercise for command and control for combined military activities (since 2021). These exercises provide an opportunity for strategic coordination between the United States and its allies and partners by testing concepts and doctrines against new threats, aligning procedures, and improving interoperability. Last year the U.S. Army’s Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center (JPMRC) hosted its largest Indo-Pacific exercise to date, which included Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Maldives, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand, and the United Kingdom.

The Views of U.S. Allies and Partners

An important perspective on how the United States conducts multinational strategic planning is the views of the allies and partners themselves. This section summarizes the findings of discussions and workshops with around 50 officials and experts from several European and Indo-Pacific nations.

The overall view among allies and partners was consistent: The United States is a uniquely valuable but often frustrating partner who regularly treats allies and partners as an afterthought rather than a priority. Specifically, four themes emerged:

• Theme 1: Unilateralism and dominance. Some interviewees suggested that the United States exhibits a tendency to plan unilaterally before looping in its allies and partners. The overall impression was that multinational planning is led, instigated, and dominated by the United States—a habit established and perpetuated over many years but one that needs to change soon. U.S. leadership can be overbearing and dominant in multinational forums. The United States does not make its priorities clear, with mixed signals coming from different parts of the vast U.S. system (e.g., the Joint Staff vs. the combatant commands). This ambiguity leads to indecision and gives reluctant allies an excuse to vacillate.

• Theme 2: Poor communication. Several interviewees then argued that the United States does not always clearly communicate what is needed from its allies and partners. U.S. information sharing is either nonexistent or happens at the last minute. The perception is that this is a result of bureaucratic impediments (e.g., information-sharing limits) but can also be a tactic to prevent other nations from challenging U.S. decisions. This means foreign liaison officers also lack the opportunity to consult with capitals and offer productive contributions. The United States often does little to address or allow for language barriers, particularly with Indo-Pacific nations.

• Theme 3: Overreliance on military-to-military channels. Several interviewees argued that the United States is too reliant on military-to-military channels for its strategic planning and coordination activities. This often undermines strategic alignment due to a lack of constructive dialogue at the political level. It also makes unilateral planning more difficult because allied and partner militaries can use U.S. ambiguity to their advantage in bureaucratic fights over resources. There is a broader lack of joint upstream strategic and policy analysis—as distinct from military-strategic or military-operational analysis—between the United States and other nations. Doing more of this analysis would provide myriad benefits, including strategic alignment, a shared threat picture, shared assumptions, and collective analysis of common issues.

• Theme 4: Overreliance on ad hoc cooperation and the foreign liaison network. The United States was seen by several interviewees as relying too much on makeshift or ad hoc arrangements rather than preexisting frameworks, which might allow a more systematic and routine approach to multinational planning. The only option for allies is often to use their embedded personnel, such as exchange and liaison officers. Some nations have many more of these than others, spread throughout the DOD enterprise from the Pentagon to the combatant commands. But these personnel are often seen as one of two extremes: as effectively U.S. personnel, or as foreign officers. The former means their contact with and utility to their home nation is restricted; the latter means their contact with and utility to the DOD is restricted. Both are problematic. There was a general sense among interviewees that the DOD needed to adapt its models—or introduce new ones—for the express purpose of making the most of allies and partners in the strategic competition with China.

The United States is a uniquely valuable but often frustrating partner who regularly treats allies and partners as an afterthought rather than a priority.

Summary of the State of Play

In summary, the United States has introduced plenty of new initiatives with regional allies and partners over the last four years in the Indo-Pacific—but these are chiefly bilateral and informal. There is no dedicated multinational framework for conducting formal multinational strategic planning with allies and partners in the region.

Moreover, according to its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and Europe, the United States talks the talk but does not always walk the walk when it comes to being a good partner. Its closest allies have described several endemic issues regarding U.S. conduct and institutions, including the themes described above.

The remainder of this report seeks to offer a remedy to this twin diagnosis of overreliance on bilateral frameworks and poor conduct of multinational strategic planning where it does occur. In order to improve this situation, the first task is to understand what best practice looks like. The next section does this by identifying the key factors for successful multinational planning.

The task is then to apply these factors to a multinational framework. In lieu of an obvious candidate, the literature review identified four existing frameworks involving the United States that could be adapted to this purpose. Two are broadly focused:

• The Quad, which operates at the political level and is focused on Indo-Pacific security; and

• __The Military Framework, which is focused on the military-strategic level of global strategic competition.

The other two are more narrowly focused:

• AUKUS, which is primarily focused on submarine development and deployment; and

• Five Eyes, which is focused on intelligence sharing.

The final section of the report thus applies the key factors to these four existing multinational frameworks to generate policy recommendations for developing them—and improving the United States’ approach to multinational strategic planning in the Indo-Pacific region.

CHAPTER 03

The Four Key Drivers of Successful Multinational Planning

This chapter analyses the factors that influence successful multinational strategic planning. It does so in two parts: a literature review and then four case studies.

The first part examines the existing literature to reveal the four key drivers of successful multinational planning: strategic alignment, shared institutions, interoperability, and personal factors. Each one is described in Table 2 below. Importantly, as Figure 1 illustrates, these factors are not equal: The most important factor, and the foundation of multinational strategic planning, is the need for strategic alignment.

▲ FIGURE 1 Summary of Key Factors for Successful Multinational Strategic Planning

▲ TABLE 2 Explanation of Key Factors for Successful Multinational Strategic Planning

The second part of the chapter uses four historical case studies of multinational strategic planning in action to further refine and validate the four drivers identified above. Some of the findings of these case studies are incorporated directly into the preceding analysis of the four drivers, where relevant. This section offers a summary of each case study and the key findings; a detailed version of each case study is available in Appendices A through D.

Strategic Alignment

Theory and history suggest strategic alignment is the foundation of multinational strategic planning. It reflects a mutual understanding of the broad intent and purpose of any security partnership, often but not necessarily rooted in a shard worldview and strategic culture. Alignment helps define collective obligations and caveats—such as on when and how force may be used by different nations.

In the First Gulf War, the United States did not undertake any multinational planning until it reached strategic alignment with its coalition partners on whether to pursue the defense of Saudi Arabia (Operation Desert Shield) or offensive operations to liberate Kuwait (Operation Desert Storm). The NATO mission in Afghanistan consisted of countries with decades of experience planning together through NATO mechanisms, but multinational planning grew increasingly dysfunctional as strategic alignment decreased.

The process and outcome of reaching strategic alignment depends in no small part on the preexisting threat perceptions and military preferences of the states involved: States that already share a common picture of threat and preferences for offensive or defensive use of force find it easier to reach agreement on a defense relationship. For example, the original 12 NATO members formed their alliance in 1949 based on a shared sense of the threat posed by the Soviet Union, and the need for a collective security organization to counter it. Decades later in Afghanistan, NATO consensus on the need to destroy al Qaeda, expel the Taliban, and rebuild Afghanistan, catalyzed by the shock of the September 11 attacks, obscured important disagreements. Despite agreeing on the broad intent and purpose of the war, different preferences regarding the use of military force hindered interoperability, fragmented the coalition, and pushed the war toward unilateral action. In contrast, Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm involved an effective division of labor between military contributors despite their diversity, based on a common perception of Saddam Hussein as a threat to Middle Eastern stability.

Issues of identity and culture also matter. A common political identity like the U.S.-UK “special relationship” or common perception of shared historical experiences eases the path to alignment. The 1949 North Atlantic Treaty led to an alliance based on the shared experience of World War II and a desire to avoid a sequel. It was also based on a shared conception of the Euro-Atlantic community among its members, which was part of the appeal to the 20 allies who have joined the alliance since then. Similarly, the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) is founded on a shared geography and culture, which has been referred to as the “amphibian, beer drinking nations of northern Europe.” But strategic alignment can be maintained without cultural homogeneity: Political differences caused significant friction between the United States and Saudi Arabia during the First Gulf War, but careful diplomacy and the urgency of the Iraqi threat helped overcome those frictions.

Strategic alignment is difficult to achieve and maintain given differing interests, priorities, sensitivities, risk appetite, and threat perceptions. But perfect strategic alignment is not necessary for effective multinational planning. In the First Gulf War, regional politics made a unified command structure politically impossible, so the coalition designed a bespoke institution—the coalition coordination, communication, and integration center (C3IC)—to allow for operational execution of defensive operations and the more difficult task of planning offensive operations. Equally, the creation of NATO’s 1950 Medium Term Defense Plan (MTDP) was hostage to divergence and disagreement between allies—particularly European allies and the United States. Yet allies adapted their approach, institutions, and leadership to preserve allied unity and agree to the collective plan, which resulted in the 1952 Lisbon Force Goals. These examples suggest divergent strategic preferences can be overcome through active management and institutional design.

Shared institutions reinforce habits of cooperation which in turn feed back into the sense of shared purpose and strategic alignment that birthed the institutions in the first place.

Shared Institutions

Nations often consummate strategic alignment by forming institutions, norms, and rules that inspire and regulate their cooperation. Many of these are formal organizations—such as the NATO alliance—or dedicated arrangements, such as foreign liaison officers or professional military education programs. But others are informal practices or norms that nonetheless shape and enable cooperation. The main institutions considered in this report are planning structures, command and control (C2) systems, and information-sharing systems.

History demonstrates that shared institutions are neither necessary nor sufficient on their own for effective multinational strategic planning, but they do appear impact its quality. In the First Gulf War, for example, the United States conducted strategic planning with Saudi Arabia through a relatively informal joint planning group, but building institutions like the C3IC and deepening liaison networks throughout the war seems to have dramatically improved coalition strategic planning. In Afghanistan, NATO took advantage of its well-developed institutions to ease initial planning, but the United States increasingly bypassed these institutions as they frustrated its leadership. Multinational strategic planning can occur both where institutions are lacking but strategic alignment is high and where institutions are strong but strategic alignment is low, but only the first is likely to result in sustainable, quality planning.

Shared institutions for multinational planning can work well whether designed from scratch or adapted from existing institutions. For example, the NATO MTDP process was a bespoke institution that was based on existing NATO bodies. Likewise, the JEF case study is an example of a new institution that was formed from a NATO initiative—the 2014 Framework Nations Concept, which itself was based on NATO’s original Regional Planning Groups—even though it ended up outside alliance structures.

Current and historical institutions for multinational planning exhibit great variety. Some coalitions have fully integrated their command staffs. Others have focused more on coordination of independent command and planning structures. Little work has been done on establishing which are most effective—or what factors make one type of institution more effective than others. The prevalence of tailored institutions in the cases studied here highlights the importance of adapting institutions to the specific—even unique—purposes and politics of the situation.

Shared institutions reinforce habits of cooperation which in turn feed back into the sense of shared purpose and strategic alignment that birthed the institutions in the first place.

Institutions also have utility beyond their immediate functional purposes. They create their own momentum and inertia. They reinforce habits of cooperation which in turn feed back into the sense of shared purpose and strategic alignment that birthed the institutions in the first place. Much as the value of plans is often found in the planning, the value of institutions is the institutionalization. The ultimate example might be NATO: The habits of cooperation developed over decades led to the alliance enduring and adapting even after its chief adversary and raison d’être collapsed. A more recent example is the JEF, a UK-led group of 10 northern European nations which has developed a range of institutions over the last decade (see Appendix D for details).

Effective institutions exhibit “stickiness”: They endure changes in context or politics because they prove their worth. Such stickiness has many benefits for multinational strategic planning. Another recent example where stickiness persists is the 2023 Camp David agreement between the United States, Japan, and South Korea, which has led to 80 meetings and a first trilateral military exercise. The agreement has already spanned two U.S. administrations, with the first meeting under the Trump presidency happening recently in Munich.

Interoperability

Interoperable militaries fight together more effectively because they have shared standards for tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), matériel, and information systems. Shared TTPs and doctrine allow militaries to better synchronize their efforts at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Mechanisms that facilitate the flow of information between militaries’ technical systems are also the bedrock of interoperability: Militaries that lack a shared picture of the operating environment or the ability to securely communicate on the battlefield struggle to operate alongside one another. Scholars have also emphasized the role that linguistic and cultural understanding plays in interoperability. Joint training, professional military education, and joint exercises play a major role in aligning militaries and building interoperability, but enormous challenges remain.

Achieving seamless equipment interoperability is difficult, even for NATO. U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Bill LaPlante argued in 2022 that what NATO truly requires is for its equipment to be interchangeable: for a 155 mm artillery round produced in France to work properly when fired from a U.S. howitzer. The United States is seeking to solve some of these problems by providing military equipment to allies and partners and by deepening its defense industrial integration with its most trusted and capable allies.

Informational interoperability also faces important challenges. One set of institutions that often undermines effective strategic planning is those for sharing information and intelligence. Solving these challenges involves difficult trade-offs between interoperability and security. Some challenges are technical, but others require more extensive intervention, such as linguistic and cultural education. These challenges may even be worsening in some areas. The emerging U.S. architecture for Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) could exacerbate the problem if it is not designed with partner interoperability in mind.

History suggests that a minimum level of interoperability is necessary to undertake multinational strategic planning, and that more interoperable militaries can reach greater heights of such planning. But greater interoperability does not pull countries toward greater multinational planning on its own. During the First Gulf War, interoperability problems between NATO and Arab militaries did not prevent joint operations, although multinational planning seems to have been easiest where interoperability was highest: between the U.S. and Saudi air defense commands.

Interoperability in practice is heavily influenced by strategic alignment. In Afghanistan, the NATO coalition looked good on paper, but national caveats introduced for political reasons prevented allied forces from operating effectively alongside one another. Neither does interoperability solve all problems. The commitment to interoperability by NATO allies in their first strategic concept in 1949 did not prevent the emergence of a “disembodied” approach to strategic planning which hampered the MTDP process.

Personal Factors

Individual agency and leadership seem to matter in multinational strategic planning. The vital role of personal factors was a common theme among interviewees. History suggests personal factors help reduce friction and overcome barriers to cooperation. Preexisting (and positive) working relationships between leaders at all levels seem to enable better cooperation and coordination between militaries—even if these effects are rarely definitive.

Interoperability in practice is heavily influenced by strategic alignment.

A combination of consultative and bold leadership styles also seems best suited to multinational strategic planning. For example, General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s leadership as NATO’s first supreme allied commander was critical to the MTDP process. In the First Gulf War, the strong relationships between General Norman Schwarzkopf’s team and its Saudi counterpart, combined with its “leadership by question” approach, made a big difference to the outcome. The reverse also seems to be true: Poor relationships, toxic leaders, and lack of trust constitute a barrier to more effective multinational strategic planning, as appears to have been the case during NATO’s ISAF mission in Afghanistan.

Historical Case Studies

This section uses four historical case studies of multinational strategic planning in action to further refine and validate the four drivers identified above. The case studies include: (1) the First Gulf War, (2) NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, (3) NATO’s 1950 Medium Term Defense Plan (MTDP), and (4) the 10-nation northern European Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), established in 2014. These four case studies cover multinational strategic planning in peace and at war. All four contain successes and failures from which insights and lessons are drawn. Each case study is summarized here and examined in greater detail in the Appendices A through D.

• Case Study 1: The First Gulf War. The First Gulf War was characterized by the successful execution of a plan originally designed by the United States but later adapted and adopted by coalition planners. It faced significant difficulties but overcame them by conducting unilateral planning before strategic alignment was achieved, adopting institutional designs tailored to coalition politics, and taking advantage of common language, doctrine, and equipment where possible. Coalition planners also drew significant benefits from favorable personal factors, including leadership style and personal relations, particularly between U.S. military leaders and their counterparts.

  This case study supports the finding that strategic alignment is the bedrock of multinational strategic planning. In this case, it helped the United States expand its coalition and incorporate members into a common planning process. It also points to the importance of tailoring shared institutions to the nations and circumstances involved, with a focus on interoperability to enable execution of multinational plans. This case also highlights the need to establish multinational planning structures before a crisis, where possible; doing so could have mitigated many of the planning and operational challenges experienced by the coalition.

• Case Study 2: NATO’s ISAF mission in Afghanistan. This case study highlights the challenges to multinational strategic planning faced by ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014. These occurred despite NATO’s well-established institutions and focus on interoperability. Many of these challenges were due to the pressures working against maintaining strategic alignment across such a large coalition—51 countries contributed troops—and throughout such a long, dynamic campaign. Strategic alignment in such a coalition is a vital and precious commodity that requires continuous, active efforts to maintain beyond the initial “honeymoon period” of a long campaign.

  The same goes for shared institutions: In this case, existing NATO institutions provided a strong foundation but required constant adaptation to cope with new coalition members and shifting strategic and operational imperatives. This case also reveals the challenges that arise when multinational planning is dominated by one nation (in this case, the United States). Such structural imbalance can be mitigated by personal factors such as relationships, leadership, and trust—but these tensions can also be exacerbated by the same factors.

• Case Study 3: NATO’s 1950 Medium Term Defense Plan. The 1950 MTDP was the first major instance of alliance multinational strategic planning in peacetime. As the 1949 Strategic Concept stated: “The essence of our overall concept is to develop a maximum of strength through collective defense planning.” The MTDP put this ambition into practice. While the immediate result was failure—the planning goals were too ambitious for postwar allies to meet and had to be changed—the process was ultimately successful in giving the young alliance a shared goal and project, which played a key role in transforming NATO into a functioning alliance. The formal planning process it established still exists to this day: The NDPP is the engine room of alliance strategic planning and the foundation of NATO’s collective defense.

  This case study highlights the importance of strategic alignment, which in the case of NATO laid the groundwork for the alliance based on a common view of the Soviet threat. This led to the North Atlantic Treaty, the (almost) literal foundation of NATO. It also reveals the role of shared institutions. The MTDP provided a formal process for multinational strategic planning which paid dividends: It laid the groundwork for NATO’s longevity and success. It also reveals how political tensions within coalitions are inevitable and unavoidable. The MTDP was replete with examples where fundamental tensions between allies—particularly between the United States and European allies—threatened to fracture cohesion and strategic alignment from within. Yet the same allies—aided and abetted by NATO’s own international staff and leaders like General Eisenhower—recognized these tensions and took steps to proactively manage them through new initiatives, institutions, and enlightened leadership.

• Case Study 4: The UK-Led Joint Expeditionary Force. The JEF is a multinational framework of 10 like-minded northern European nations, led by the United Kingdom. The framework was established in 2014 and over the last decade has played an increasingly important role in European security by taking collective measures to deter Russian aggression, support Ukraine, and secure critical undersea infrastructure.

  The JEF is a prime example of converting strong strategic alignment into shared institutions. This group of allies in a small but vital region shows how relatively homogenous views about common threats, identity, history, culture, and priorities can overcome traditional barriers to multinational cooperation and planning. At the same time, maintaining such an exclusive “in group” also leaves behind an “out group.” For the JEF, this has meant little cooperation with partners in the region but not “in the club,” such as Poland and Germany. The JEF experience also demonstrates how cooperation is a work in progress and takes dedicated efforts to maintain and adapt—you get out what you put in. The JEF has rapidly developed an array of shared institutions that underpin cooperation, including a joint headquarters and staff, a 10-year vision, a detailed policy directive, a constant drumbeat of activity supported by a strategic communications campaign, and a clear brand. It has also adapted its focus over its first decade to meet emerging challenges.

CHAPTER 04

Policy Recommendations for Improving U.S. Multinational Strategic Planning

This chapter concludes the report with policy recommendations for DOD leaders to put the principles identified above into practice. It focuses on four multinational frameworks relevant to the Indo-Pacific that are currently underutilized by the United States: the Military Framework, AUKUS, Five Eyes, and the Quad. Each section contains a SWOT analysis of the multinational framework in question—using the four factors for successful multinational strategic planning identified above—and several policy recommendations based on the SWOT analysis. Implementing these recommendations will help DOD leaders improve U.S. multinational strategic planning in the Indo-Pacific region by making more use of existing frameworks for this purpose.

The Military Framework: A SWOT Analysis

The Military Framework is a U.S.-led forum for global coordination with U.S. allies in the strategic competition with China, Russia, and other authoritarian powers. The framework was established in 2016 as an informal mechanism to coordinate, at the military-strategic level, the U.S.-led coalition to counter the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, known as Operation Inherent Resolve. More recently, the framework has been repurposed to address the challenges of “great power competition” and “strategic competition,” as described in the 2017 and 2022 U.S. National Defense Strategies. The motto of the framework is “Upholding Rules Based Order – Shared Strategic Understanding – Informed Military Advice – Collaboration & Integration.”

Implementing these recommendations will help DOD leaders improve U.S. multinational strategic planning in the Indo-Pacific region by making more use of existing frameworks for this purpose.

Strategic Alignment

The basis of the Military Framework, and its key strength, is the core of like-minded allies who formed the group in the first place. The recent pivot away from countering violent extremist organizations toward its new purpose of strategic competition therefore poses a potential threat to strategic alignment which requires managing.

A key weakness of the framework is its bias toward Europe (10 out of 14 members are Western European nations). The recent addition of Japan and the proposed addition of South Korea strengthen the global (and Indo-Pacific) credentials of the group. However, expanding the group is also a threat, as its established identity, cohesion, and focus could become diluted.

Another weakness of the Military Framework is the lack of a clear and compelling shared vision. This was less problematic during the framework’s early focus on countering violent extremist organizations, but the shifting focus toward strategic competition has sparked debate over the framework’s purpose and scope. Many cite China as the primary focus. However, an unclassified readout from a meeting between the participating chiefs of defense suggest a wider focus, listing not only the Indo-Pacific but also Ukraine, Russia, and the Middle East. The framework’s motto is even broader still: “upholding rules-based order.”

A final threat to strategic alignment stems from the problem of group power dynamics—a key issue in all four case studies of multinational strategic planning. Uneven influence, capabilities, resources, and national constraints (e.g., public opinion, legislative constraints, and election cycles) between members creates friction and undermines cohesion. These challenges will require active management and dedicated mechanisms to ensure transparency and maintain cohesion.

Shared Institutions

A key strength of the framework is its existing shared institutions. For example, it benefits from a small secretariat based in the Pentagon, embedded liaison officers from member nations, and regular meetings between chiefs of defense. These institutions are dedicated, but they are also minimal and light touch. This is both a strength and weakness: Flexibility comes at the expense of formality. The framework places no obligation on its members to contribute resources (e.g., staff officers, shared intelligence or plans, or even deployed forces to framework initiatives). Even the agreement signed by each member is non-binding. But interviewees raised the problem that this can lead to uneven contributions and strained relations.

Another aspect of the framework that is a both strength and weakness is its low-profile nature; interviewees described it as “discreet” and “invisible.” This approach reinforces group identity via a sense of exclusivity and enables candor between its members. But it also risks creating a sense of exclusion from non-members which could undermine wider cooperation between the United States, framework nations, and their regional partners. The lack of political awareness within member governments also weakens the framework’s utility and effectiveness. It undermines the group’s supposed commitment to a “whole-of-government” approach. For that reason, one interviewee suggested its low profile was the framework’s “single biggest issue.”

Interoperability

Military interoperability is a strength of the framework, which its members refined and proved over several years of operations in the Middle East. Most participants use NATO standards and doctrine. But interviews revealed four threats to framework interoperability: (1) language and cultural barriers; (2) a lack of shared awareness of operations, activity, and investments (OAI); (3) insufficient focus on non-state actors (despite the group’s heritage); and (4) the lack of attention paid to emerging technologies—such as artificial intelligence, cyber, and quantum technology. AUKUS provides an opportunity to address the latter, given its focus on developing emerging technologies and the fact that all three AUKUS nations—Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—are already framework nations.

Personal Factors

The trust and close personal relations between its members has been a key strength of the framework since its inception. As its official history states: “The most precious ‘product’ of the framework is neither tangible nor measurable. It is instead something elusive and sublime: trust.”

U.S. leadership of the framework has been a strength and weakness. On the one hand, by leading and hosting the framework, it has invested more than any nation. On the other, U.S. leaders have in some cases been overly demanding and dominant, especially when they saw some nations as not pulling their weight—even if this was due to sensitive national political issues or constraints. This presents an opportunity to take a more transparent and accountable approach to governance, balancing leadership with inclusivity.

Another weakness is insufficient recognition of the need for framework staff to be experts in defense diplomacy, a military profession in its own right. One opportunity to address this is to pick framework staff who have attended professional military educational institutions in the United States or other member countries.

Recommendations for the Military Framework

1. Agree on a collective vision. Military Framework participants should agree to a clear purpose and level of ambition. Doing so would address the threats posed to group cohesion and effectiveness by the lack of clarity around the purpose and focus of the framework. This should specify the unique value the group will provide the United States and its allies within the broad realm of global strategic competition. It should drive clear goals and purposeful activity. The collective vision would be strengthened by each member “renewing its vows” through a long-term commitment to the framework (e.g., 5 or 10 years). Making this vision and commitment in public would boost the low profile of the framework, which is seen as a key weakness.

2. Formalize the operating model. The framework should establish a formal operating model to match the agreed collective vision. This would institutionalize how the framework operates, maintaining flexibility, but no longer at the expense of formality. The model should identify the right decisionmaking approach for the framework (e.g., consensus, opt-in, majority, or non-binding). This should include a mechanism to proactively identify and combat the corrosive political dynamics that can undermine cohesion, such as burden-sharing debates or differing priorities and constraints among participants. The model should include a formal process to share OAI information and coordinate the efforts of framework nations.

3. Match membership to purpose. The membership of the framework should be matched to its collective vision and purpose. This must reflect an increased focus on the Indo-Pacific. If the unique value offered by the framework is coordinating the military-strategic aspects of strategic competition, the fact that the locus of this competition is in the Indo-Pacific requires nothing less. This would address a gap in the market that cannot be filled by NATO, Five Eyes, the Quad, or other groups. The framework should find the “Goldilocks” coalition size—not too big, nor too small—and a way to include partners, not just allies, through an informal “14+n” format.

4. Raise the profile. The profile of the framework should be raised. This would solve several issues related to the lack of political awareness of the framework. This would entail shifting the group’s culture from invisible to visible, discreet to overt. In more practical terms, this also would require developing a clear brand and a strategic communications campaign. A consistent drumbeat of operational activity driven and branded by the framework would make a big difference—the JEF and NATO both provide good examples to follow. This activity should be goal-based, with the goals determined by the collective vision.

AUKUS SWOT Analysis

AUKUS is a trilateral agreement between the governments of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Signed in 2021, the agreement consists of two pillars. Pillar One is an agreement to support Australia in acquiring a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered attack submarine fleet. In March 2023, the three governments announced a “pathway” toward this goal in three phases: increased visits of U.S. and UK submarines to Australia; delivery of three U.S. Virginia-class submarines beginning as early as the 2030s; and development and delivery of the SSN-AUKUS, a new class of boat based on a UK design. Pillar Two concerns the development of a wide range of emerging and advanced technologies.

Strategic Alignment

AUKUS is the perfect storm of strategic alignment: The agreement promises the holy trinity of military (capability and scale), economic (industry and exports), and political benefits (prestige and domestic jobs) to each nation. This is its core strength. However, it is also a potential weakness if it undermines broader alliances or precludes other nations from joining. The expansion of AUKUS to include new members—such as Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—under Pillar Two would offer an opportunity to add significant expertise in the critical domain of emerging technologies and build on existing bilateral cooperation, such as between the United Kingdom and Japan or the United States and South Korea. But expansion is also a threat to strategic alignment, given that cooperation in larger groups is often less successful due to additional potential points of disagreement and friction.

Shared Institutions

The ambition of AUKUS has required the development of dedicated, shared institutions. These new and novel institutions have become a core strength of AUKUS. They range from bureaucratic bodies like the Joint Steering Group to much wider shared institutions like the collective aim to “foster deeper integration of security and defense-related science, technology, industrial bases, and supply chains.” One opportunity is to expand the new initiative for coordinating submarine operations—known as Submarine Rotational Force (West)—to the broader task of multinational strategic planning within AUKUS. This would require AUKUS partners to agree to a new shared strategic and operational framework—which is exactly what the United Kingdom and Australia recently committed to do bilaterally.

Interoperability

Interoperability is the primary focus and strength of AUKUS Pillar One. This includes technical and operational aspects. Technical interoperability spans nuclear propulsion systems, sensors and weapons systems, and a common vertical launch system. It also extends to common submarine repair and maintenance facilities. One goal of AUKUS is “integrated submarine forces.” Integration is the deepest form of defense cooperation.

The technical interoperability that forms the foundation of the AUKUS agreement has also led to new operational arrangements. For example, the United Kingdom and the United States agreed to establish a rotational presence of one UK Astute-class submarine and up to four U.S. Virginia-class submarines based in HMAS Stirling in Western Australia under SRF-West. Implicit in this agreement is a need for trilateral strategic planning of submarine operations. One threat to the success of this key element of AUKUS is the emergence of the bad practices identified in Chapter 2 of this report. One opportunity would be to expand the multinational strategic planning already taking place within AUKUS beyond submarine procurement and operations to the coordination of trilateral deterrence activity in the region writ large. Another opportunity would be to include new AUKUS partners—such as Canada, Japan, and South Korea—in such an initiative.

Interoperability between advanced technologies is also a focus of Pillar Two. However, while Pillar One is narrow and well focused, the broad scope of Pillar Two is a potential weakness if it lacks focus and undermines the strong AUKUS brand. The threats to Pillar Two are similar to Pillar One, including stringent U.S. export controls and technology sharing. But some of this red tape has already been lifted in Pillar One; for example, new U.S. legislation granted AUKUS an International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) exemption, in what might be termed the “AUKUS effect.” One opportunity is to apply this model to remove known barriers to trilateral strategic planning, such as information sharing and overclassification.

Personal Factors

Another key strength of AUKUS is its members’ shared history and strategic culture. They also speak the same language. Military personnel from each nation are well acquainted: They regularly attend each other’s professional military education institutions, and the United Kingdom and Australia have the largest network of U.S. liaison and exchange officers of any ally. Under AUKUS, naval and civilian personnel will undergo an extensive program of training and deployment. Each military will also increase the number of embedded personnel and naval port visits. This strong foundation of personal relationships among the three AUKUS nations presents further opportunity to build out AUKUS as an effective trilateral strategic planning platform, beyond the current focus of submarine development and operations.

Recommendations for AUKUS

1. Broaden trilateral strategic planning within AUKUS. The narrow trilateral strategic planning that currently exists within AUKUS could be broadened to focus on coordinating regional deterrence activity. Doing so would build on the strong foundations of AUKUS (across all four factors).

2. Reduce barriers to cooperation. An AUKUS initiative focused on broadening trilateral strategic planning could also benefit from the “AUKUS effect” of reducing red tape and removing barriers to cooperation (such as information sharing and export controls).

3. Include AUKUS partners. An AUKUS initiative focused on broadening trilateral strategic planning could also benefit from the inclusion of partners to maximize coordination and effect. The AUKUS nations have already agreed to consider the addition of at least one partner (Japan) to Pillar Two. The addition of Japan and others—such as Canada, New Zealand, and South Korea—to aspects of AUKUS as partners could also take place within a broader regional deterrence initiative. Keeping any expansion well focused will help minimize any risk of derailing the wider initiative by involving too many participants.

Five Eyes SWOT Analysis

The Five Eyes is an intelligence-sharing alliance of the United States. Its members share raw and finished intelligence and have (at least tacitly) agreed not to spy on one another. The alliance is an appealing platform for multinational strategic planning due to its high levels of strategic alignment, developed institutions, significant interoperability, and history of favorable personal exchanges.

Strategic Alignment

The Five Eyes is notable for its ability to “maintain an ongoing similarity in the worldviews of its members.” This is its foundational strength that allows a global division of labor between member services. Australia and New Zealand, for example, collect intelligence in different parts of Asia; the United Kingdom monitors Europe and western Russia; Canada focuses on eastern Russia, Latin America, and the northern Atlantic and Pacific regions; and the United States collects on the Caribbean, China, Russia, the Middle East, and Africa. Five Eyes members respond to the needs of their partner governments when those partners lack the relevant coverage.

This shared similarity of worldviews creates the main opportunity to adapt the Five Eyes as a strategic planning platform. But adapting the intelligence alliance to such a purpose could represent a threat to the strategic alignment that has undergirded its success. Strategic alignment depends on a consensus on the organization’s purpose. Seeking to expand the organization’s purpose could undermine that consensus, particularly because member nations are not completely aligned on how to prioritize global threats, despite their similar worldviews.

Shared Institutions

The Five Eyes has developed a set of institutions that represent a major strength of the alliance. The Five Eyes nations exchange liaison officers, conduct joint intelligence operations, and jointly staff important facilities. The United States also has a classification label allowing release to Five Eyes nations. Unlike other intelligence partnerships, the Five Eyes do not share intelligence on a need-to-know basis or through a barter system, but rather share all intelligence they gather.

The endurance and success of Five Eyes owes something to its narrow, institutional focus on intelligence sharing. It was based on U.S.-UK intelligence cooperation during World War II, then slowly and carefully expanded over several decades, becoming the Five Eyes in the 1950s (though this was not revealed publicly until 2005). But this strength is also a potential weakness: Maintaining such a narrow focus might preclude expansion into other areas of common interest. The group has branched out into futures analysis, producing a document entitled Five Eyes Future Operating Environment 2040 in 2018. Although this stretching of its institutions suggests an opportunity for further expansion into strategic planning, adding a dedicated multinational strategic planning role to the Five Eyes group could pose a threat to its existing institutions and track record of success.

However, this does not appear to have prevented the Five Eyes nations from broadening the group in 2013 into the Five Country Ministerial, described as “a forum for the Five Eyes security ministers to meet and discuss opportunities for collaboration,” which suggests an opportunity for similar expansion to include high-level officials focused on international affairs.

Interoperability

The shared institutions of Five Eyes countries are part of what makes high interoperability a major strength. The Five Eyes intelligence services were built on British models during and after World War II, increasing both the cultural and institutional fit between organizations. The extremely high level of information sharing and common language are also strengths that drive interoperability. Together, these aspects of the alliance create the opportunity for a planning organization that would be able conduct the debates necessary for strategic planning based on a common set of facts.

The Five Eyes nations also share significant military interoperability, which is another strength. The United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom are all NATO nations, while both Australian and New Zealand are members of NATO’s Partnership Interoperability Initiative, which includes countries that have contributed to NATO operations or taken “concrete steps” toward interoperability. The five nations’ military interoperability creates the opportunity for Five Eyes nations to plan and conduct joint operations with ease relative to other, less interoperable militaries.

Personal Factors

The institutions of Five Eyes nations have generated key personal relationships, which have in turn increased trust between institutions and the opportunity for “bureaucratic work-arounds.” These relationships specific to Five Eyes build on a larger network of personnel exchange, professional military education, and liaison relationship between the countries. These factors represent another strength.

Recommendations for the Five Eyes

1. Build on the trust and interoperability of Five Eyes to create a new multinational strategic planning institution focused on the Indo-Pacific. The Five Eyes’ strong foundations of strategic alignment, institutions, interoperability, and mutual trust suggest the group is well positioned to expand its remit by developing a dedicated institution for multinational strategic planning. The group’s recent expansion into the Five Country Ministerial and Future Operating Environment work suggests that such expansion is feasible. A natural first step might be to create an equivalent of the Five Country Ministerial for the U.S. secretaries of state and defense and their foreign equivalents. Their common interest in a secure and stable Indo-Pacific would make this region a natural focus for such an institution, building on related initiatives such as AUKUS.

2. Maintain the Five Eyes’ focus on intelligence. In expanding the Five Eyes, its core value and task—intelligence sharing—should not be disrupted. This favors creating new institutions rather than adapting existing ones. Moreover, the importance of accurate intelligence for strategic planning suggests a potential symbiosis between the two.

Quad SWOT Analysis

The Quad is a diplomatic coalition made up of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States that is focused on a “shared commitment to strengthening a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” Originally established in 2007, the Quad was revived with annual foreign ministerial meetings beginning in 2019 and leader-level summits since 2021. In recent years it has emerged as a forum for high-level coordination on a broad range of issues, from pandemic and disease response to natural disasters, maritime security, infrastructure, emerging technology, and cybersecurity. Although the forum has potential for multinational strategic planning, divergent understanding of its role and limited institutionalization have, so far, constrained the Quad’s evolution beyond a forum for strategic coordination.

Strategic Alignment

The Quad is aligned on one thing: Each member agrees that a more powerful and assertive China threatens regional stability. The group is based on the shared idea that coordinated actions by the four countries can strengthen rules-based order in the region. Quad members are less aligned when it comes to the specific role of the group; this poses a threat. India’s continued reluctance to expand the Quad’s activities beyond joint statements, in particular, limits its ability to evolve beyond a coordination role. Australia’s desire to preserve economic ties with China, which led to its temporary withdrawal from the Quad in 2007, could also resurface due to domestic political priorities and hinder the Quad’s growth.

Shared Institutions

The limited institutional framework beyond regular leader-level and ministerial meetings remains a weakness of the Quad, which continues to undergo gradual institutionalization. While it began as an informal, ad hoc senior-level dialogue, in recent years the group has operated with a more regular tempo of engagements, led by the annual ministerial meetings. The Quad has a well-defined agenda and six working groups across a wide array of security and economic issues. However, these have largely acted as a coordination and deliberative body for unilateral commitments already made in other arenas. The Quad also launched the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) in 2022 as an information-sharing and training initiative for maritime domain awareness. The IPMDA presents an opportunity as a shared institution for bolstering regional information sharing for near-term law enforcement while also establishing organizational structures and surveillance practices for latent military cooperation.

Interoperability

The Quad’s multinational military exercises, in tandem with its institutional growth, are a strength and foster interoperability. After years of exclusion, Australia rejoined the Malabar naval exercise in 2020 alongside the other three Quad countries. Despite its resistance to military cooperation through the Quad, India has engaged with Quad partners in bilateral formats like the Japan-India Maritime Exercise and the Australia-India joint training exercise. Quad members have also participated in larger multinational exercises, such as RIMPAC, with more than two dozen other countries. These engagements, along with activity on maritime security and disaster response, represent an initial foray into multinational strategic planning. This groundwork presents an opportunity for the Quad to readily transform into a military cooperation framework when strategic alignment permits.

The varying levels of technological cooperation among the Quad countries, however, represent a threat. U.S. alliances with Australia and Japan have enabled advanced technology cooperation. Indian strategic orientation, however, precluded a similar partnership with the United States, leading it to maintain high-level military ties with Russia. India’s fielding of Russian equipment—which introduces security risks and is incompatible with the other Quad partners’ systems—presents an immediate challenge to interoperability and a long-term obstacle to strategic alignment.

Personal Factors

Personal factors had an outsized role in the initial gathering, dissolution, and reformation of the Quad. The late Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s active diplomacy initiated both iterations of the Quad, while his sudden resignation in 2007 contributed to its initial collapse. Australia’s withdrawal was also a leader-driven decision, as former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd chose to withdraw from the Quad soon after taking office. The Quad remains, first and foremost, a senior-level dialogue. This support has been an enduring strength of the group but raises the threat that future leadership shifts in all four capitals could hinder its evolution or lead to another dissolution

Recommendations for the Quad

1. Improve strategic alignment. If the Quad is to venture any further into the realm of multinational strategic planning, the group will need firmer foundations. The limited strategic alignment of the Quad might be its biggest weakness. A slow and steady approach over many years has seen the Quad grow its outer structures—through a proliferation of political projects—while neglecting its foundations. Bolstering strategic alignment would help the group regardless of whether it leads to more multinational strategic planning. This could be done by agreeing to a new Quad vision and launching it at the next Quad leaders’ summit in New Delhi later this year. The attendance of President Trump, his good relations with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and the recent commitment to deepen the U.S.-India defense relationship could be used to address India’s concerns and improve alignment over the Quad’s role and purpose.

2. Develop dedicated multinational strategic planning institutions. The Quad already conducts ad hoc multinational strategic planning to deliver multinational exercises involving the four nations or to deliver the Quad’s maritime domain awareness initiatives. Quad leaders have also already indicated their intent to add new activities, including “shared airlift capacity to support civilian response to natural disasters and maritime patrols to improve interoperability.” These activities would benefit from a dedicated multinational strategic planning institution. This does not have to be onerous or permanent; it could be stood up temporarily or rotated between each Quad nation. If established, these institutions would also boost habits of cooperation and strategic alignment within the Quad.

Conclusion

Over 80 years ago, on June 6, 1944, better known as “D-Day,” allied forces launched the largest amphibious assault in history, Operation Overlord. The United States and its wartime allies succeeded in planning and fighting together to achieve this monumental effort. A year later, Europe was liberated and the allies stood on the brink of victory. But another challenge was fast approaching: Toward the end of the war, Winston Churchill tried and failed to alert the United States to Stalin’s plans for the subjugation of Eastern Europe. In exasperation he exclaimed: “There is only one thing worse than fighting with Allies, and that is fighting without them!”

Churchill’s observation was the driving force behind the formation of NATO five years later in 1949. Its express purpose was to bind the allies together into an organization capable of planning together in peacetime and fighting together in wartime—and thereby deterring a Soviet invasion.

There is no “Asian NATO.” The closest historical equivalent was the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Established in 1954, SEATO lacked the equivalent formal institutions of NATO and only included two Asian members. It was disbanded in 1977. Despite the growing threat from China and efforts in the region to push back against an assertive Beijing, there is little prospect of SEATO or a modern equivalent.

However, this does not mean Washington has no mechanism for the United States to improve multinational strategic planning with its allies to buttress regional deterrence. Several frameworks already exist, many of which have been strengthened in recent years. This report identifies four such frameworks with the potential to contribute much more to the United States’ ability to plan and fight alongside its Indo-Pacific allies. Two are broader and more strategic in nature—the Five Eyes and the Quad—while two are narrower and more operational in their focus—the Military Framework and AUKUS.

At the heart of Operation Overlord, NATO and all instances of successful multinational strategic planning—whether in peace or war—are four key principles: strategic alignment, shared institutions, interoperability, and personal relationships. If U.S. leaders can keep these principles in mind as they strive to improve multinational planning with their allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, they will go a long way to realizing Churchill’s wisdom in today’s dangerous world.

There is no “Asian NATO.” . . . this does not mean Washington has no mechanism for the United States to improve multinational strategic planning with its allies to buttress regional deterrence.

Appendix A

The First Gulf War

(Case Study 1)

The First Gulf War was characterized by successful execution of a plan that was originally designed by the United States but adapted and adopted by coalition planners. It faced significant difficulties but overcame them by conducting unilateral planning before strategic alignment was achieved, adopting institutional designs tailored to coalition politics, and taking advantage of common language, doctrine, and equipment, where possible (Table A-1). Coalition planners also probably drew significant benefits from favorable personal factors. Below are three key lessons from the First Gulf War:

1. Strategic alignment is the bedrock of multinational strategic planning. In this case, it helped the United States to expand the coalition and incorporate members into a common planning process.

2. Shared institutions must be tailored to the nations and circumstances, with a focus on interoperability to enable execution of multinational plans.

3. Early planning is better than waiting for a crisis. Conducting multinational strategic planning before the invasion probably would have improved the conduct of coalition warfare.

The Planning Process

The case includes six clear planning processes under various sets of circumstances:

1. U.S. planning for the defense of Saudi Arabia: Unilateral planning without clear plans for multinational planning occurred when the United States and Saudi Arabia lacked clear strategic alignment or major relational institutions.

2. U.S. planning for offensive air operations: Unilateral planning in preparation for coalition inclusion occurred when the coalition lacked strategic alignment but had relational institutions and interoperability.

3. U.S.-Saudi planning for defensive operations: Multinational strategic planning for parallel operations occurred when the parties had strategic alignment but lacked relational institutions and interoperability.

4. U.S.-Saudi planning for offensive operations: Multinational strategic planning for parallel operations occurred when the parties had strategic alignment and relational institutions but lacked interoperability.

5. U.S.-NATO partner planning for ground operations: Multinational strategic planning for joint operations occurred when the parties had strategic alignment and interoperability but lacked relational institutions. The coalition integrated members into preexisting institutions for these operations.

6. U.S.-Saudi planning for air defense: (See previous bullet.)

For Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the United States unilaterally drafted plans through its formal planning process and then built these plans into coalition war plans through interaction with other countries’ staff. The foundation of the coalition war plan was OPLAN 1002-90 Operations to Counter an Intra-Regional Threat to Saudi Arabia, which was devised under General Schwarzkopf between 1988 and 1990 and became the operational plan for Operation Desert Shield. The draft plan was originally classified for “U.S. eyes only.” The United States planned for offensive operations unilaterally until the passage of a UN resolution, authorizing Iraq’s expulsion from Kuwait by “all necessary means,” demonstrated strategic alignment.

It is not clear why Saudi leaders were not included in the creation of OPLAN 1002-90, which could have ameliorated the significant logistics problems that occurred. The United States was not aware of the extent of Saudi logistics capability and lacked preexisting agreements for the support of U.S. forces if deployed to the region. This forced planners to confront a trade-off between accepting risk to U.S. forces or accepting inefficient movement of forces to theater with support elements that turned out to be unnecessary. It also meant that host-nation support for U.S. forces was negotiated on an ad hoc, local, and personalized basis.

The eventual inclusion of Saudi Arabia in multinational planning “forced the Saudis to plan for the reception, sustainment, and integration of coalition forces” in Saudi Arabia. Had more coalition partners been included in operational planning, the United States may not have underestimated partner capabilities and could have reached a more efficient and flexible operations plan.

One plausible explanation for Saudi Arabia’s exclusion is that the plan evolved from an organizational routine, which would not change without being forced to do so by a crisis. If this organizational explanation is correct, then the creation of more relational institutions prior to the outbreak of the crisis might have allowed the United States and Saudi Arabia to plan much more quickly while avoiding the above logistics problems through multinational strategic planning before the crisis.

Strategic Alignment

The Desert Shield/Desert Storm coalition faced important barriers to strategic alignment. Strategic alignment was made more difficult by its size: The coalition included 38 countries. These countries were also extremely diverse: 13 were NATO members, 9 were Arab states, and 16 were neither. The coalition also had to manage a potential spoiler, the Soviet Union, which could have provided material support to the Iraqi military or blocked coalition efforts at the United Nations.

Coalition members’ domestic politics also posed a significant barrier to strategic alignment. Despite Saudi Arabia’s clear interest in having the world’s most powerful military guaranteeing its security, its leader, King Fahd, was sensitive to the effects that a U.S. deployment to Saudi Arabia would have on Saudi Arabia’s domestic and international position. Saddam Hussein made these barriers a key component of his strategy, seeking to foster support for his invasion among Arab publics and divide the emerging coalition. The asymmetry between U.S. and Saudi political and military structures also risked significant friction within the coalition.

The size of the coalition and nature of strategic alignment meant that strategic alignment was built gradually and unevenly: There was no single threshold moment at which strategic alignment was “achieved.”

The coalition nonetheless exhibited a high degree of strategic alignment. Hussein’s actions represented a clear threat to the coalition’s main military contributors. The United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Kingdom all perceived Iraq’s actions as upsetting the balance of power in the Middle East and (to some contributors) the international order. Hussein’s strategy helped solidify the coalition’s strategic alignment by creating an image of Hussein as irresponsible, destabilizing, and threatening. He achieved this counterproductive task both through ecological warfare—dumping oil in the Gulf and setting oil fields ablaze—and through his Scud missile attacks against Israel, which hardened Syrian opinion toward Iraq.

Strategic alignment was not universal, however. Some states had to be persuaded to cooperate. Syria and France, for example, depended on the Gulf states and the United States for other important policy goals. Fear of the consequences of non-participation influenced their role in the coalition, a path which was smoothed by side payments.

Shared Institutions

The United States and Saudi Arabia had an institutionalized relationship before the Gulf War, but this did not include institutions for multinational planning. This lack of shared institutions caused initial problems which could have been avoided. For example, the lack or preexisting agreements for the support of deployed U.S. forces meant host-nation support had to be negotiated on an ad hoc and piecemeal basis, which often depended on personal relationships.

The U.S.-led coalition developed a purpose-built multinational planning group: the C3IC. The C3IC allowed coordination between the U.S.-led Western chain of command and the Saudi-led Arab chain of command, which was vital for operational execution and was used in the much more difficult task of planning offensive operations. The United States also created a dense network of liaisons throughout the coalition, which enabled more effective intra-coalition coordination.

The planning process that pre-dated the creation of the C3IC and the growth in liaison network institutions also seems to have been less efficient than later multinational strategic planning. The defense of Saudi Arabia took four months to plan, but the offensive operations took four weeks. Earlier efforts at multinational strategic planning would probably have ensured that coalition planners learned the lessons that eventually permitted them to produce an offensive plan in the fraction of the time it took to complete a less challenging planning task.

Interoperability

The size of the coalition also meant the potential for major interoperability problems. The coalition’s use of the same vehicles as the Iraqi military raised serious problems for battlefield identification. The main effect seems to have been to push multinational strategic planning toward different outcomes rather than serving as an obstacle to the planning as such. Where interoperability was high, as in the U.S. and Saudi air forces, the both countries integrated each other’s forces into preexisting institutions—the Saudi air defense system and the U.S. Air Tasking Order (ATO). Where interoperability was relatively low, as between NATO and Arab militaries, multinational strategic planning resulted in plans in which more interoperable militaries would act together, with NATO countries operating alongside the United States and Arab countries operating under the Saudi chain of command. This approach may have limited any issues caused by interoperability—along with the fact that the main combat effort was conducted by U.S. forces—but it comes with the opportunity cost of ruling out coalition-wide operations. That said, the ultimate success of the operation suggests that interoperability problems are often a complicating factor rather than a decisive obstacle to multinational strategic planning.

Personal Factors

Favorable personal factors may have played a role in coalition success, but the apparent ubiquity of good working relationships across the U.S.-Saudi divide makes assessing their importance extremely difficult. The commander of U.S. air forces for Desert Storm had worked with his Saudi counterpart for several years prior to the crisis. The U.S. Third Army staff exercised “leadership by question” rather than by dictate in the context of the C3IC. The education that General Schwarzkopf’s Saudi counterpart received at U.S. military institutions gave the two men a common language and understanding of doctrine.

Appendix B

NATO’s ISAF Mission in Afghanistan

(Case Study 2)

Despite NATO being an institutionalized and interoperable military alliance, it has faced challenges in successful execution of multinational strategic planning. This case study focuses on coalition planning during the operational years of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) (2003–2014), before it gave way to the Resolute Support Mission. NATO’s history of interoperability and existing relational institutions enabled it to conduct multinational planning from the early days of the NATO-led coalition in Afghanistan, but the dominant U.S. role in ISAF eventually gave way to increasingly unilateral U.S. planning of coalition activities. Below are three key lessons from ISAF:

1. Strategic alignment achieved early in a campaign can fracture and is difficult to sustain in an extended campaign without active efforts to maintain it.

2. Existing shared institutions can help establish multinational planning but require continuous adaptation to stay useful and relevant.

3. Unfavorable personal factors can exacerbate the structural tensions present in a U.S.-dominated campaign.

The Planning Process

There were at least three major phases of planning under different circumstances in the war in Afghanistan:

1. NATO planning for assumption of ISAF command: Multinational planning occurred through existing relational institutions at a time of high strategic alignment—but with limited time.

2. NATO planning for expansion of ISAF (OPLAN 10302): Multinational planning for parallel operations occurred under conditions of decreasing strategic alignment and limited relational institutions—but significant interoperability and favorable personal factors.

3. Americanization of ISAF, counterinsurgency (COIN), and transition to Resolute Support Mission: Unilateral planning occurred under conditions of low strategic alignment, strong relational institutions, significant interoperability, and unfavorable personal factors.

After its establishment under UN Security Council Resolution 1386, ISAF was initially led on a rotational basis by individual NATO countries. In August 2003, NATO formally assumed command after significant lobbying by the four original ISAF lead nations. The planning for NATO assumption of ISAF command did not begin through a formal NATO planning process. Rather, NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) officials, who had already been supporting the individual NATO countries leading ISAF, informally began planning by early 2003 through position papers.

Planning through formal NATO processes—as laid out in MC133/3 NATO Operational Planning—did not occur for two reasons. First, by the time NATO leaders decided to take command in early 2003, Canada and Germany were making troop-level decisions based on the existing structure. Second, NATO’s plan to assume command of ISAF by August of that year meant there was limited time to flow additional forces. As such, OPLAN 10419 was drawn up to reflect existing ISAF structures without the opportunity for NATO planners to conduct initial formal mission analysis to determine requirements. Broad strategic alignment gave way to informal planning, which cemented the existing ISAF structure.

Strategic Alignment

The shock of the September 11 attacks, European desire for closer defense partnership with the United States, and the search for a post–Cold War NATO mission helped form strategic alignment among coalition members. They agreed on the need to destroy al Qaeda, remove the Taliban from power, and rebuild Afghanistan, which led to multinational planning under the eventual NATO assumption of ISAF command.

Even while coalition members agreed on the broad intent and purpose of the war in Afghanistan, they faced challenges in maintaining this alignment and planning during the extended campaign. Each coalition member had a varied understanding of how to fight the war in Afghanistan. Differences in strategic culture—how each coalition member viewed using military force—led to organizational and operational variances as each coalition member took a leading role in over two dozen provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) across Afghanistan. Defensively oriented German strategic culture, for example, contributed to the German-led PRT emphasizing force protection and greater civilian involvement compared to PRTs led by other coalition members. Varied understandings of the war’s purpose in coalition states from the outset, combined with growing public perceptions of the conflict as a distant, open-ended war, further complicated strategic alignment and restricted each government’s ability to adjust to operational realities. This was reflected in each government’s ability or willingness to meet NATO’s operational demands.

Military units deployed to Afghanistan consequently received varying training, assumed different roles across regions, and operated under differing restrictions on the use of force depending on their country of origin. The United States, for example, had to stand up an army, Germany had to build up the police, the United Kingdom tamped down on narcotics trade, Italy built the judicial system, and Japan took care of disarmament.

The division of labor between the coalition led to a bifurcated strategic view as the campaign progressed. Germany, Italy, and other coalition members in the relatively peaceful northern and western provinces prioritized peacekeeping and nation-building, while the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia, operating in the more dangerous southern and eastern provinces, emphasized counterinsurgency.

Amid this intra-coalition strategic misalignment, multinational strategic planning gave way to more unilateral U.S. decisionmaking. At ISAF’s inception, the Bush administration worried that coalition-imposed constraints could mirror challenges the United States faced under NATO command in the Kosovo campaign. As then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld expressed to Zal Khalilzad in February 2001, “neither NATO, the UN or any other coalition should be in a position to control U.S. decision-making. If the U.S. needs a coalition to achieve its goals, leadership must gain prior agreement to do whatever it is it thinks may be needed to achieve the stated goals.”

In the absence of traditional U.S. leadership in the early years of ISAF, other coalition members took on key leadership roles within ISAF that permitted multinational strategic planning. Denmark, for example, initiated “comprehensive approach” planning in 2003, which influenced NATO headquarters to develop a Comprehensive Strategic Political-Military Plan (CSPMP) for stabilization efforts.

As the coalition confronted a strong insurgency, however, the American role in ISAF expanded significantly, partly driven by coalition members’ constraints in increasing troop contributions or taking part in intensive combat. With this expansion in manpower came greater U.S. control over planning. Beginning in 2006, the ISAF commander (COMISAF) was always a U.S. general who also oversaw Operation Enduring Freedom. General Stanley McChrystal introduced COIN as ISAF’s new strategy—with little NATO debate—after being appointed COMISAF in 2009, despite clashing with the NATO-developed strategy. Neither SHAPE nor the NATO Military Committee provided significant input on operational plans created by COMISAF, and plans were often implemented in Afghanistan before official NATO validation. Multinational strategic planning, however imperfect, gave way to increasingly unilateral U.S. planning.

Shared Institutions

NATO’s SHAPE was a key institution that conducted multinational strategic planning from the beginning of the NATO-led coalition in Afghanistan. Even before NATO’s assumption of ISAF command, SHAPE assisted the member states that initially commanded ISAF and prepared to assume and then expand command. Its structural weakness, however, led to force-generation problems that plagued ISAF and NATO planners. Existing alliance planning processes were unsuitable in multinational planning for a protracted, expeditionary mission. While coalition members submit annual responses to the Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) listing resources available to NATO, the DPQ does not reflect allocated or committed forces. As such, national political intent superseded alliance planning documents like the DPQ, complicating SHAPE’s efforts to resource and expand the NATO mission in Afghanistan. Further, as discussed, despite the established chain of command with COMISAF reporting to NATO, SHAPE’s influence on coalition planning fluctuated. The appointment of high-profile U.S. generals as COMISAF eventually relegated SHAPE to a largely bureaucratic function of multinational strategic planning.

ISAF structures that predated NATO’s assumption of command were relational institutions that proved to be a double-edged sword for multinational planning. As discussed, SHAPE planners had limited time to prepare for NATO’s assumption of ISAF command, so existing ISAF structures were helpful to execute OPLAN 10419. They, however, also inherited the constraints of existing force-generation structures. SHAPE officials thus struggled to fill positions not already offered by Canada, Germany, and other NATO countries. Certain positions, like helicopters or intelligence units, were never fully filled under OPLAN 10419—and the issue of force generation would never be fully resolved as the ISAF mission expanded.

In dealing with force-generation problems, existing NATO gatherings, particularly summits, and newly created ones—like the SHAPE-organized Global Force Generation Conference—proved to be helpful relational institutions. Political pressures ahead of the 2004 Istanbul summit, for example, generated additional commitments needed to execute the expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul.

Interoperability

The coalition developed new ways to improve interoperability, particularly through the Afghan Mission Network (AMN), which became the primary network for coalition command and control and information sharing. The common network—developed under the U.S. leadership of COMISAF David McKiernan and McChrystal—combined with senior leadership support to foster a “need-to-share” culture and enabled the coalition to overcome classification challenges to multinational strategic planning experienced in the First Gulf War.

Caveats—the restrictions on the use of force given by home governments—constrained coalition war efforts. For example, no NATO combat forces were immediately available to respond to a 2006 attack on the Norwegian-Finnish PRTs in Meymaneh, as nearby units were restricted from engaging in combat. Meanwhile, German advisers, in charge of training the Afghan National Police, were limited to training within the confines of bases. In this way, caveats frustrated COMISAFs, who repeatedly proposed scaling them back in NATO gatherings.

Caveats had a mixed impact on multinational strategic planning. They allowed some countries to participate in ISAF despite political sensitivities, and NATO operational plans were developed with consideration for caveats and rules of engagement, permitting states to opt out of certain operations. However, these caveats complicated planning for resourcing the combat-intensive elements of ISAF’s mission.

Personal Factors

Personal relationships exacerbated the coalition’s frustrations with the Americanization of ISAF that diminished multinational strategic planning in favor of unilateral U.S. planning. NATO member states viewed General McChrystal’s leadership—compared to Generals John Allen or David Petraeus—to be “disrespectful,” inviting greater scrutiny to operational plans drawn up by McChrystal. The formal command structure allowed NATO members to reject operational plans and provide input, even as increased American command involvement in ISAF reshaped the de facto planning process.

Appendix C

NATO’s 1950 Medium Term Defense Plan

(Case Study 3)

The 1950 Medium Term Defense Plan (MTDP) was NATO’s first strategic project and the first major instance of multinational strategic planning conducted by an alliance in peacetime. Ironically, the immediate result was failure: The planning goals were too ambitious for the postwar allies to meet. They were never attained, even with drastic increases in defense spending in the 1950s.

However, the process was ultimately successful in transforming the North Atlantic Treaty into a functioning organization—in effect putting the “O” in NATO. The formal planning process it established endured the Cold War and still exists to this day, in the form of the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP). This process is the engine room of alliance strategic planning and the foundation of NATO’s collective defense. The collective approach to planning and burden sharing that the MTDP set off imbued the young alliance with a common sense of purpose and community, which fed into the solidarity that remains NATO’s most potent asset to this day.

Below are two key lessons from the MTDP:

1. A formal process for multinational strategic planning can pay dividends. The MTDP was pivotal in laying the foundations for NATO’s longevity and success.

2. Political tensions within coalitions are inevitable and unavoidable. They must be proactively and openly managed from the start.

Strategic Alignment

Perhaps the most important factor in the conduct and (eventual) success of the MTDP—and of the NATO alliance writ large—was the fact that it was based on a formal treaty. Signed on April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty captured a common purpose and vision to which all 12 original allies—and the additional nations that joined NATO during and after the Cold War—committed at the highest levels. The foundation stone of the treaty was the commitment to mutual defense captured in Article 5. But the treaty also contained 13 other articles ranging from economic collaboration (Article 2) and consultation (Article 4) to accession (Article 10). Taken together, these articles meant allies had committed to more than a narrow deterrent to aggression: They had committed to building a common political community, “founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”

However, a common vision was often not enough to rule out divergence within the alliance. The alliance was skewed from the start, as it was based on the large asymmetry in power between postwar Europe and the United States. The North Atlantic Treaty was envisaged by its founders as an American security guarantee to Europe, and not the other way around. In practice, this power differential led to bad behaviors from both the United States—which “rejected genuine multilateral military planning, choosing instead to emphasize designated areas of [unilateral] strategic responsibility”—and European allies, who chafed at “delegating power to the governments of larger nations” and often agreed to planning targets they knew they had no chance of meeting. This problem was exacerbated by the distinct strategic cultures among allies—particularly between Europe and the United States—and the fact that it was Europe that was most vulnerable to Soviet attack.

This problem of divergence was never totally overcome, but three strategies helped mitigate it. The first was the consolidation of non-U.S. power as a counterweight. This occurred through a range of initiatives, including the European Defense Community (although it did not ultimately come to fruition); the accession of West Germany and other nations over time; the United Kingdom (and later France) acquiring nuclear weapons; and the creation of nuclear sharing arrangements. A second, more technocratic strategy was the creation of several bodies within the alliance that would operate on an equitable basis using consensus decisionmaking. These included the Standing Group, the Temporary Council Committee, and the secretary general—the figurehead of NATO—who, by convention, is never an American.

The third strategy that strengthened strategic alignment in NATO was enlightened U.S. leadership, tailored to the situation—both decisive and passive, when required. This first required farsighted U.S. political and military leaders to grasp the benefits that multinational planning could provide and support it from the top down. As the historian Andrew M. Johnston explains:

The American military gradually accepted joint planning as a kind of virtue that could actually be beneficial in resolving some of its own internal problems [such as basing and transit rights]. . . . The [U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff] saw joint planning as a strategic opportunity, believing that, with the right inducements, the Europeans would themselves fill the vacuum on the continent.

At times this required listening carefully and acceding to the demands of allies, while at others it required a stronger hand. As RAND’s Richard L. Kugler concludes: “During the 1950s, NATO performed best when the United States exercised its influence as the coalition’s strongest partner by decisively leading the alliance in sound directions.”

However, these mitigations could not prevent the MTDP (and NATO’s strategy writ large) from being hostage to divergence and disagreement between allies. As Johnston describes, the MTDP force goals were a result of political bargaining and power dynamics more than intelligent design—in particular, “the desire of the United States to maintain its autonomy over the use of atomic weapons, and its freedom from the constraints of the new alliance.”

Shared Institutions

The MTDP process itself was a collective institution developed specifically to overcome shortfalls in NATO’s ability to deliver on the promise of the North Atlantic Treaty—namely, rebuilding Europe’s armed forces and integrating NATO’s military forces in the most efficient and cost-effective way. As NATO’s 1949 Strategic Concept stated: “The essence of our over-all concept is to develop a maximum of strength through collective defense planning.” The MTDP institution also sought to address potential barriers to smooth cooperation, including through solving the tension created by the asymmetrical distribution of power and vulnerability within NATO (as above). Despite allies’ subsequent failures to resource the agreed plan and force goals, it is widely agreed by analysts and historians that the process did much to lay the foundations for NATO’s cohesion and strength, which endured through the Cold War and contributed to its end. The overall lesson of the MTDP experience is therefore clear: Multinational strategic planning can offer significant political, economic, and military benefits.

However, the experience also yields several lessons about what not to do when building multinational institutions.

One such lesson is the importance of having a strategic planning process based on clear, shared, and realistic goals. This was not the case for the MDTP, where vagueness, optimism, and incoherence took hold. Planning goals were not realistic because they were designed based on a nation-first, not NATO-first, approach. This led to targets that were highly inflated and not based on sound military logic or an informed, collective view. This was compounded by another problem: the tension between military realities and political pressures. At first, allied political leaders were hesitant to set any planning goals at all. The reason was to maximize political freedom of maneuver with regard to European military aid. But this only led to incoherence, as Johnston explains: “By not establishing a clear strategic goal, NATO opened itself up to divergent interpretations of the meaning behind its military reconstruction. This vagueness, the deliberate disengagement of national and international strategic policy-making, was what one American official called ‘disembodied military planning.’”

Another source of tension exacerbated the situation: an unspoken contradiction between U.S. and European goals. Washington wanted to maximize Europe’s level of conventional rearmament ambition to preclude its own involvement in any future ground war while maintaining a focus on nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, European allies saw agreeing to ambitious targets as a way of placating the United States into defending the continent—and had reasons to assume the United States would foot much of the bill. At some level, disembodied planning was thus a feature, not a bug, of early allied planning because it allowed the United States and Europe to operate within their own realities and meet their own political pressures. But the result of disembodied planning was bad for everyone: unrealistic targets that threatened to undermine NATO’s credibility just as the alliance was getting started. The main lesson is for coalition members to be realistic and honest with each other from the very beginning about what they are trying to achieve and the political constraints each brings to the table.

The MTDP is also instructive on institutional specialization. Just like in economics, specializing in one area over others can yield benefits in performance or efficiency. However, in multinational coalitions, focusing on one thing means giving up another—and therefore relying on other members to cover the gap. This dilemma can undermine an otherwise efficient division of labor. The MTDP process tried and mostly failed to implement such an approach to generating “collective balanced forces” based around a regional division of labor. The main reason was that smaller nations did not have sufficient confidence to commit to specialization in practice. For example, as Johnston explains: “Norway and the Netherlands feared that a unilateral reconstruction of their military to accommodate balanced collective forces might leave them stranded. The risk could only be taken if NATO provided real protection. These concerns were merely acknowledged by the Standing Group; they were not embodied in the strategic concept.” The lesson is that any division of labor within coalitions requires every member to commit to playing their part.

Interoperability

NATO leaders recognized the importance of interoperability from the beginning. The alliance’s first strategic concept made this clear in one of its key objectives: “Standardization, insofar as practicable, of military material and equipment for use in operations as developed by common defense plans.” The concept also aimed for standardization across military doctrine and procedures, information sharing, maintenance and repair. The benefits of interoperability were appreciated by all allies, particularly the United States. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff saw that the ability to operate alongside their allies, beyond the experience of the previous war, would also give them flexibility regarding bases and logistics for their strategic air power.

However, there were two key issues that undermined NATO’s interoperability goals. The first was the problem of disembodied military planning. The force planning goals that emerged from the MTDP were based on “simply amalgamating five separate regional plans” rather than a composite picture across Europe. This lack of interoperability at the level of military planning and NATO planning put the MTDP process onto the wrong track from the beginning. Second, the alliance had no means of ensuring compliance with its own goals for interoperability based on standardization. As a 1952 report by Chatham House on NATO’s progress assessesed: “NATO has the beginnings of a policy for standardization of weapons and war production, but no powers to do more than recommend action and give reminders.” Although standardization is much greater across NATO today, this problem is still apparent in the fragmented state of European allies’ forces and defense industry.

Personal Factors

Personal factors have always been central to NATO. A large part of the alliance’s history is the key figures who occupied critical roles, such as the national permanent representatives, the supreme allied commander, or the secretary general. This history is also dependent on the many allied officials and national representatives over the years who have done the work that makes NATO function. Their relationships grease the wheels of NATO. Hence, it is often said the real work of NATO is done in the corridors and canteens.

In 1949, key leaders were still very familiar with each other from working together closely in their wartime alliance just a few years before, a fact that helped NATO’s early success. For example, the relationship between General Eisenhower and Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, which was so crucial in World War II, was also important in NATO’s early years: Both men served as supreme commander and deputy supreme commander, respectively, in the early 1950s.

The leadership of one man played a key part in getting the MTDP off the ground. The appointment of General Eisenhower as NATO’s first supreme allied commander was crucial to the MTDP. His appointment was used as leverage by the United States to get its European allies to engage with the MTDP process and take on the emerging force goals. Senior U.S. military leaders looked upon Eisenhower “as a recruiter . . . who would then go over and try to push through the contributions to the MTDP.” Once in place as supreme commander, his leadership was critical; he has been described as “the MTDP’s cheerleader.”

The formation of institutions that depended on personalities and relationships also influenced the success of the MTDP, in particular the delegation of national authorities to the permanent representatives to NATO, who sit in the North Atlantic Council—the alliance’s premier decisionmaking body. Within the alliance, personal relations between key nations also mattered greatly. For example, talks between U.S. President Harry S. Truman and UK Prime Minister Clement Attlee were crucial in maintaining a unified approach to the MTDP within the “special relationship” that would lead by example: “The only way we can do anything with NATO is for the United States and the United Kingdom to go ahead and act and force the others to follow.”

Appendix D

The Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)

(Case Study 4)

The Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) is a multinational framework of 10 like-minded northern European nations, led by the United Kingdom. It includes Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. The United Kingdom provides command and control for JEF operations from its Standing Joint Force Headquarters in Northwood, London.

The JEF falls under NATO’s Framework Nations Concept, established at the 2014 Wales Summit to encourage groups of allies to develop deployable capabilities led by a “framework” nation. The concept takes advantage of the potential for small groups of like-minded nations to overcome the collective action problem that can undermine international cooperation.

Since its inception 10 years ago, the JEF has conducted a wide range of tasks in northern Europe, becoming an important layer in the European security architecture. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the JEF ramped up reassurance and deterrence missions in northern Europe. It also provided a political forum for northern European leaders to coordinate support for Ukraine. Most recently, it has led northern Europe’s response to secure critical undersea infrastructure and monitor the Russian shadow fleet.

Below are three key lessons from the JEF:

1. Small groups based on preexisting factors (e.g., identity, history, culture, and priorities) can overcome traditional barriers to multinational cooperation.

2. Cooperation is a work in progress and takes dedicated effort and adaptation to maintain: You get out what you put in.

3. Multinational cooperation based on an “in” group also leaves behind an “out” group. This can be a problem if those excluded are potential partners.

Strategic Alignment

The strategic alignment of the 10 JEF nations is based first and foremost on political factors such as like-mindedness, a common strategic culture, shared threat perception, a clear regional focus on northern Europe, shared operational experience, and common values.

This collective identity is both founded on and bolstered by existing political groups such as the Northern Group, NORDEFCO, the Baltic-3, NATO, and the European Union. It is also founded on the shared experience of the Cold War, including a military-strategic lineage in NATO’s original Northern European Regional Planning Group and its successors in NATO’s integrated command structure throughout the Cold War and today.

The JEF nations also share a clear, collective vision for their framework. The first vision was published as part of the 2014 NATO Wales summit, during which the intent to establish framework nation groups was established to provide “a rapidly deployable force capable of conducting the full spectrum of operations.” The latest 10-year vision was agreed to and published at a meeting of JEF leaders in October 2023. Beneath the high-level vision, there is also a more detailed policy direction.

One strategy employed by the JEF to develop cohesion has been through dedicated branding and public relations activity. The first vision was published as part of the 2014 NATO Wales summit, which established the intent to create the framework nation groups to provide “a rapidly deployable force capable of conducting the full spectrum of operations.” This is enabled by the commitment in the JEF Policy Direction to “a regular drumbeat of JEF exercises, table-top exercises, scenario-based discussions and other activities.” These continuous activities deliver the JEF’s vision while generating solidarity and cohesion, given every nation’s commitment to participate.

The size of cooperating groups is critical: While small groups can overcome the collective action problem that blights defense cooperation, groups that are too small lack critical mass to be effective. If groups are too large, they risk diluting their purpose and undermining agility. The trick is to find a just-right, “Goldilocks” coalition. JEF membership has grown since 2014 from 7 to 10 nations, still relatively small compared to other framework nation groups such as the 20-nation German Framework Nations Concept, which has failed to achieve very much.

The JEF operates a flexible, ad hoc model to operating that foregoes consensus in favor of a voluntary “opt-in” arrangement. This model allows the JEF to be flexible and allows each participant to tailor contributions according to available resources and political factors. However, it is not without risks. The utility of the JEF could be undermined if no participating nations are able to generate the forces required to meet its vision. If this burden continually falls on certain members, the effects could undermine solidarity.

Flexibility can be a two-sided coin: The jack of all trades is a master of none. This might be one reason why in recent years the JEF has focused on the mission of countering hybrid threats—especially threats to critical undersea infrastructure. However, if the JEF is to be credible on the demanding, high-end tasks in its vision—such as crisis response and warfighting—it may need to forego flexibility and agility for dedicated standing forces.

Finally, adaptation is a theme that runs through the history of the JEF and must take some credit for its cohesion, longevity, and utility. Initially established in 2012 by the United Kingdom to replace the Joint Rapid Reaction Force (which was disbanded in 2010), the JEF concept quickly became part of NATO’s adaptation to Russia’s aggression and invasion of Crimea in 2014. When Russia invaded the rest of Ukraine in 2022, the JEF quickly adapted again to provide a ready-made political forum for northern European nations to support Ukraine. In 2023, the JEF evolved yet again to focus more on the emerging threat to undersea infrastructure in the region. The downside of continually adapting, or changing, is the lack of stability around which to plan for and invest in collective military capabilities. This problem is at the heart of some recent analyses and critiques of the JEF.

Shared Institutions

The JEF coalition is based on preexisting institutions across three levels of integration: strategic, tactical, and institutional. Even so, it has constructed a variety of institutions designed to improve cooperation among its members. These include the following:

• A permanent operational headquarters, based in Northwood, United Kingdom, with a multinational staff from the JEF nations and a dedicated secretariat.

• A C2 model that is flexible and scalable.

• A voluntary, opt-in model for partner contributions to JEF activity.

• A bespoke JEF Operating Framework, which includes both persistent “Joint Integration Options” and proactive “Joint Response Options.” The latter was activated for the first time by JEF defense ministers in December 2023.

• A commitment to go beyond coordinated activity in the short term to coordinated long-term capability and force development.

• Regular meetings of senior JEF leaders at all levels, political and military. As the JEF Policy Direction states: “As with all successful cooperation frameworks, the JEF’s key strength is its unity and cohesion. Without it, our competitors will exploit political divergence, set conditions for strategic advantage, and reduce our response options. It is essential, therefore, that the JEF continues to facilitate regular senior political, policy and military meetings in order to maintain a shared understanding and develop a coordinated and synchronised response to evolving challenges.”

Institution building also applies to public image and self-image. Since 2018, the JEF nations have delivered both a constant drumbeat of activity and dedicated strategic communications campaigns to make sure everyone knows about it. This has the twin effect of building the group’s public image while reinforcing awareness and confidence—or self-image—among the JEF nations. This effect also applies to any would-be adversaries whom the JEF nations wish to deter from aggression.

However, several questions remain about the JEF’s institutions. First, the voluntary opt-in model sounds good on paper, but it is unclear how it might stand up in a crisis if JEF planners do not know what forces are available to them. This model could also undermine group solidarity over time if some nations consistently fail to volunteer forces. A more structured approach might therefore pay dividends—but it might also require the JEF to answer difficult questions, like whether it should maintain standing forces. A related question is about measuring impact: The JEF might conduct plenty of activity, but activity is not the same as effect. The effects that the JEF seeks to achieve—primarily to reassure regional allies and deter the Kremlin, but also second-order effects such as increased interoperability—are difficult to measure, but it will be difficult to claim success without doing so. A final question is one of leadership. The framework nation concept implies the lead nation is expected to do more. While the United Kingdom has done plenty to lead the JEF since 2014—such as hosting its headquarters and building the JEF into a heavyweight political forum following Russia’s 2022 invasion—London has come under pressure recently to show more leadership. The framework nation model puts inherent emphasis on the coalition leader, and these expectations may be difficult to meet in practice unless they are carefully managed.

Interoperability

The JEF’s commitment to interoperability is set out in its 2021 Policy Direction: “Having highly capable and interoperable forces is a critical capability for the success of the JEF; this capability underpins credible deterrence; and provides our joint contribution when we need to respond.” The same document also clarifies what this means in more detail:

Interoperable. JEF Participant forces need to be increasingly interoperable in order to be able to operate in a wide range of scenarios. This will be achieved through more regular joint activity, increased coordination at the operational level, and an improved understanding of the availability of JEF Participant capabilities.

Much of this effect is delivered through the JEF’s consistent drumbeat of activity. As Arnold and Monaghan point out, “the main benefit of doing this is to develop the interoperability and readiness of JEF forces to work together in a crisis.” Defense industrial cooperation between several JEF nations—such as NORDEFCO and Nordic-Baltic cooperation—also contributes to technical interoperability, as does operating the same equipment.

The fact that all 10 JEF partners are now NATO members means that they are all pursuing NATO standards and doctrine, which contributes to interoperability. As the JEF website states: “With NATO doctrine as its baseline, the JEF has strong working relationships with partners and provides a gearing between nations and NATO.” While some analysts have questioned whether the JEF undermines NATO by placing more demands on limited resources owned by the same nations in the same region, officials have claimed the JEF can address a critical gap in regional security by acting “while NATO is thinking.”

Personal Factors

The JEF is founded on strong personal relations between its counterparts. These are further strengthened by its institutions. The JEF nations are well aligned in terms of both strategy and strategic culture. Many of them possess advanced armed forces with an expeditionary mindset and capabilities—hence the name of the Joint Expeditionary Force. All JEF members contributed forces to NATO’s ISAF mission in Afghanistan, which ended in 2014. In fact, the JEF was established in part to help carry over and build on this experience of multinational operations among northern European nations. This includes the personal relationships developed between the military personnel of the JEF over the years of the NATO ISAF mission, many of whom are now in senior positions.

Personal relationships are also founded and developed on international professional military education courses—such as the United Kingdom’s Advanced Command and Staff College, which is attended by personnel from all 10 JEF nations—and exchange and liaison officers. The JEF headquarters itself—based in Northwood, United Kingdom—is also staffed by personnel from the JEF nations. The close ties and common strategic culture between the JEF nations can be summed up in a quip made in 2022 by Leo Docherty, a UK defense minister, that the JEF consists of the “amphibian, beer drinking nations of northern Europe.” The downside of this feature—an identity based on an “in group” and an “out group”—is the exclusivity it produces, which may prevent or undermine extending the group to nations with different outlooks or cultures. In the case of the JEF, this may include Ukraine, Poland, Germany, and other nations.

Sean Monaghan is a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he focuses on NATO, European security, and defense. His career as a civil servant in the UK Ministry of Defence has focused on international defense policy, including NATO, the European Union, and the United States.

Alexander Palmer is a fellow in the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program at CSIS. Prior to joining CSIS, he worked in Afghanistan, where he provided security analysis to humanitarian and UN staff before and after the withdrawal of international military forces in August 2021.

Chris H. Park is a research associate for the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. He previously was a majority staff intern at the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and a graduate research assistant for former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John E. McLaughlin.