European Digital Defence

The evolving global geopolitical landscape has compelled European states to reassess and modernise their defence capabilities, with a focus on digital transformation. This paper examines the digital defence technology priorities of five key European countries – the UK, France, Germany, Poland and Spain – highlighting their current capabilities and stated priorities and the challenges for achieving their digital ambitions. The analysis is structured around several key themes, including sovereignty, interoperability, legacy system integration, digital literacy and organisational barriers to digitalisation.

Key Findings

1. UK: The UK possesses some advanced digital capabilities but struggles with integration and scalability. The Next Generation Communication Network aims to address connectivity issues. However, delays and unclear requirements have hindered progress. The UK’s hybrid cloud strategy and emphasis on “Secure by Design” principles are steps forward, but challenges in digital skills, procurement processes and legacy system integration remain significant obstacles.

2. France: France has had success in scaling its digital capabilities, driven by a strong emphasis on national sovereignty. The DESCARTES, SIA and ARTEMIS.IA programmes are enhancing connectivity and data integration, but challenges in procurement persist. France’s focus on achieving 70–80% capability rather than perfection has allowed for more efficient delivery of digital systems, but the focus on domestic solutions complicates interoperability with allies.

3. Germany: Germany has mature enterprise-level digital capabilities but faces challenges in cohering operational and enterprise efforts. The Bundeswehr’s multicloud strategy and focus on AI technologies are promising, but bureaucratic hurdles, risk aversion and a lack of digital skills hinder progress. Emphasis on NATO interoperability is strong, but internal integration across the armed forces remains a challenge.

4. Poland: Poland is digitalising its armed forces through platform-centric modernisation, with significant investments in C4ISR and air defence systems, alongside the F-35. However, the lack of an enterprise-level digitalisation strategy and digital skills within the armed forces are major constraints. Poland’s cyber-security capabilities are robust, but the country remains heavily reliant on external technology, particularly from the US.

5. Spain: Spain lags other countries in this paper in terms of digital capabilities, with limited financial resources and a lack of strategic vision for digitalisation. The Integrated Defence Information Infrastructure is a step forward, but the armed forces struggle with data integration, cloud adoption and AI deployment. Spain’s low defence spending and fragmented industrial base further complicate efforts for digital transformation.

Cross-National Analysis

• Sovereignty: Each country in this paper defines sovereignty differently, with France setting a high standard that may not be replicable in the other countries. A clear definition of digital sovereignty and a candid feasibility analysis are essential for practical implementation.

• Digital skills: Each country in this paper faces a pervasive lack of digital skills, which is a significant barrier to digitalisation. The pay gap between public and private sectors exacerbates recruitment and retention challenges, while military leaders often struggle to grasp the specific functions and limitations of digital technologies.

• Interoperability: While each country emphasises NATO inter-operability, the interpretation and implementation of standards vary. Bilateral and multilateral interoperability initiatives are beneficial, but NATO must clarify its role in standard-setting to ensure cohesive integration across the Alliance.

European armed forces face a complex landscape of digital transformation, with varying degrees of success and significant challenges. The path forward requires a clear-eyed assessment of strategic priorities, resources and political will. While ambitious goals for digitalisation are commendable, tempering these to focus on measurable, achievable objectives may offer a more realistic path to success. Defence ministries and leaders in the armed forces must navigate these challenges to ensure that digital technology aligns coherently with broader strategic modernisation frameworks, shaping Europe’s military capabilities for decades to come.

INTRODUCTION

The shifting global geopolitical landscape has forced many European countries to re-evaluate their defence capabilities as they look to procure and modernise a host of capabilities. While the armed forces have been digitalising since the introduction of Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) concepts in the 1990s, current doctrinal emphasis on multidomain operations (MDO) requires connectivity across domains through modern digital capabilities. New concepts – especially software-defined defence (SDD) which emphasises using software iteration, rather than hardware, to upgrade – have thus been introduced to aid capability development in the modern digital age.

Yet the state of digital technology across European defence ministries and armed forces differs dramatically. Such differences exist in terms of the actual infrastructure and software bought, developed and/or deployed, the methods of digitalisation, and the governance and bureaucratic processes.

This paper aims to analyse the priorities of five key European countries – the UK, France, Germany, Poland and Spain – by exploring their digital defence capabilities. It does so by evaluating stated priorities and assessing the efficacy and feasibility of their digital ambitions. Analysis of these case studies also incorporates key themes, including:

• The role of different concepts of sovereignty.

• Integration among the armed forces and interoperability with allies.

• Integration, upgrading and/or phasing out legacy technology.

• The state of digital literacy and skills.

• Organisational limitations to fielding modern digital technology.

Through this analysis, the paper offers insights to policymakers, industry and broader society about the intricacies of the relationship between Europe’s armed forces and their digital technologies.

METHODOLOGY

Five countries were selected for this paper to depict a range of digitalisation across medium-to-large countries. The UK, France and Germany were chosen due to the size of their populations and economies, as well as their politico-military and economic importance within NATO and their relatively advanced digital capabilities. Poland is rapidly expanding the size and sophistication of its armed forces and is seen as NATO’s frontline against further Russian aggression. Spain was chosen due to its relative lack of emphasis on defence spending, although it has a robust civilian digital technology sector.

While these countries differ in their approaches and priorities, they are analysed and compared largely based on their ability to:

• Produce and procure digital innovations.

• Achieve connectivity across their forces while maintaining security.

• Develop and deploy modern capabilities in data analytics and computing.

• Scale innovations across the enterprise and armed forces.

• Maintain and achieve interoperability with allies.

The research for this paper is based in part on a review of public domain ministerial and armed forces documents, alongside academic and journalistic literature published largely between 2020 and 2024. Research also included interviews with 39 individuals conducted both in-person and online between August and December 2024. The interviewees were selected for their knowledge of and proximity to the development, procurement, deployment or employment of digital defence technology. They included members of industry, academia and government from the five countries, alongside relevant individuals working in multinational organisations. The interviews were conducted on the condition of anonymity to protect identities and maximise candour.

LIMITATIONS

The research for this paper examined the state of digital defence technology within the five selected case countries, as well as the trajectory for future technological deployments. However, a repeated point across many interviews was that the technology itself is often the least important element of the technology ecosystem. Across government, industry and academia, the “people, process, technology” framework was cited as necessary to understanding the state of digital capability, with “people” being the most important, and “technology” the least. As such, while this paper outlines the technology priorities, the non-technological underpinnings of, and inhibiters to, the fielding of digital technology form a significant part.

The defence expenditure on a given area, in both absolute and relative terms, is often seen as an indicator of the commitment of both countries and ministries to invest in a certain type of capability or strategy. Yet spending on digital technology confounds simple estimates of expenditure, for several reasons.

First, budget estimates are still overwhelmingly oriented towards platform-centric procurement, even when incorporating a whole-of-life model that includes maintenance and decommissioning costs. The shift towards service deployment models (data-, infrastructure-, and software-as-a-service) requires continuous, flexible funding streams. Such an approach remains difficult for defence bureaucracies to scale and measure.

Second, countries differ in their reporting of various digital investments across budgetary categories. Enterprise-level network infrastructure, fifth- or sixth-generation aircraft and healthcare chatbots for military families would all qualify as investment in digital technology but belong to different budgetary authorities and intersect with other categories of capabilities. Countries also differ in their budgetary detail and transparency, especially when assessing whole-life costs.

Third, level of investment does not necessarily correlate with an ability to overcome the various challenges facing digital procurement and deployment detailed below. Instead, overall investment in the armed forces in recent decades, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of GDP, appears to reflect the maturity of a country’s defence ecosystem, which in turn correlates with the level of digital capabilities available to (if not necessarily fielded by) a given force.

For these reasons, this paper avoids delving into a detailed analysis of spending on digital technology, instead focusing on the many non-financial drivers and limiters of digitalisation.

STRUCTURE

The paper has six sections, one for each case study country and one providing a comparative analysis. Each case study describes broadly the state of digital technology within the country’s defence establishments, with details on networks, hosting, services, security and data-centricity at the enterprise and service levels. This includes which technology is currently deployed, which programmes of change or procurement are ongoing, and the scalability of current and future capabilities. The structures of the case studies are not uniform, to reflect the differing strategies, strengths and challenges each country faces.

THE UK

The UK’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) and armed forces possess some advanced digital capabilities but lack integration across networks and programmes and struggle with scaling innovations and addressing its legacy estate.

MIXED SUCCESS OF ONGOING PROGRAMMES

The capabilities and infrastructure provided by existing enterprise-level networks are to be replaced by the Next Generation Communication Network (NGCN), an MoD Defence Digital programme intended to allow connectivity across the enterprise and form the core of the “Digital Backbone”. Given dissatisfaction with past networking contracts, the commercial design of the NGCN is intended to disaggregate the dependence on key large network integrators by using numerous smaller bids to integrate the MoD’s disparate networks. While described as the future enabler of MDO through network integration, NGCN is best understood as a refashioning of the network procurement process.

Speaking to the specific capabilities of the NGCN remains difficult as it has yet to be delivered and has already faced several years of delays – causing expensive extensions to existing contracts. The NGCN remains rated as “Amber” (delivery feasible but facing significant issues) by the UK’s National Audit Office. Further challenges are also probable as government and industrial partners are uncertain what the NGCN will comprise. One senior MoD member mentioned that they had received at least six different descriptions of the NGCN. This failure to understand and outline the requirements for network integration has delayed the programme and sown doubt as to whether it will come to market in a form that will match ambitions.

Regardless of the NGCN, it is likely that the need for surveys and rebuilding of the digital architecture within various defence organisations will be necessary to understand and mitigate the impact of many legacy systems. For example, it was found that for one cyber operations centre, 20% of its data processes cannot be automated due to obsolete systems. Windows 98 and NT4 are still used by operators, even as the MoD is asking its employees to become “digitally native”. Yet problematic systems can only be updated or retired if they are identified. A senior official described navigating their networks as “recce by fire” due to the absence of estate planning and that therefore there was an inability to “automatically monitor, detect, respond and then pre-empt”.

The MoD has several large programmes intended to transform its core and deployed IT services – MODNet Evolve, New Style of Information Technology (Base) and New Style of Information Technology (Deployed) – which are currently rated as Red (unachievable), Amber and Amber, respectively. These large-scale procurements are dogged by many of the issues facing the broader digital defence ecosystem.

Discrete programmes across defence have led to the development of functional services, such as Defence Developer Services and Defence Data Analytics Platform, both associated with the Defence Digital Foundry. Yet these platforms and services are typically discussed as “pockets of innovation” – highly capable technology that is not scaled across the enterprise. Similar notions arise when discussing the development and deployment of AI technologies, which, while more advanced than most European peers, face challenges in scaling UK innovations.

CHANGING OPERATING PROCEDURES

While the UK has emphasised the importance of sovereignty in its digital systems and data, the MoD has chosen a mixed approach for hosting. It has adopted a hybrid “Cloud First” strategy and is in the process of shifting its systems and data to several cloud providers. Its framework and accreditation system, MODCloud, incorporates several US hyperscalers, and is the main platform for hosting at OFFICIAL level through public, private and hybrid services. The MoD is developing its SECRET and above services on MODCloud to mirror its capabilities at the OFFICIAL level and will also rely on US hyperscalers. MODCloud is intended to be the “front door” for hosting, but the MoD is also incorporating private cloud services for unique, sensitive use cases. SECRET-level cloud infrastructure was expected to be at full operating capability by the end of 2024, a target on which progress has been made, although full capability will probably be achieved in 2025. Above SECRET hosting is essentially on on-premises servers. It does not seem likely that the gap between the desire for sovereignty and reliance on hyperscalers will close, despite the increasing complexity of this mixed approach.

Much of the MoD’s cyber resilience revolves around its promotion of “Secure by Design” (SbD): the implementation of security principles from the beginning of the DevOps cycle to avoid the need for lengthy and costly security accreditation of a finished product. SbD is viewed overwhelmingly as a strong idea by both industry and government, as accreditation has been one of the largest barriers to the MoD’s procurement of digital technology. However, the implementation of SbD principles has yet to match ambitions. Defence Digital appears to lack the authority, capabilities and personnel (especially architects) to manage consistency across the many systems in development, leading to variable external accreditation. Furthermore, SbD does not apply to most systems, which were accredited prior to SbD.

OTHER CHALLENGES

The MoD lacks the specialist digital skills necessary to develop its own digital capabilities (a problem stemming from broader recruitment and retention issues, alongside public–private salary discrepancies) and it also has a risk-averse digital culture. Without an agile digital culture where leaders understand the limitations and lifecycles of technologies, not only will procurement authorities fail to outline clear requirements to industry, but the MoD will be unable to reuse and integrate its vast legacy estate. Ideally, a more digitally literate force would be more aware of the interplay between technological and socio-organisational elements that underpin continuous technological innovation cycles.

The MoD has laid out a strong digital strategy, but its ability to implement it through a coherent architecture has been impeded by the relative lack of implementation authority (budgetary and organisational) in its main digital body, Defence Digital. The independence of the armed forces relative to Strategic Command has been a key constraint for the integration of digital technology across defence for MDO, although the ongoing Strategic Defence Review is likely to restructure command relationships in the coming year.

MoD contracting challenges stem, in part, from its relatively short-term and risk-averse nature. They typically begin in the requirement-setting phase. The MoD selects solutions based on price point, instead of for a set mission and effect to be achieved. The lack of understanding about the objectives the MoD wishes its technology to meet – beyond the concepts outlined in high-level strategy – causes requirements to frequently shift, delaying delivery and increasing costs.

Despite the inclusion of small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in numerous MoD strategies, the MoD struggles to incorporate them into its innovation and procurement cycles. Typically, the MoD can only benefit from these smaller firms when they are subcontracted through primes, which serve a gatekeeping function.

Finally, there is a level of frustration in industry due to the difficulty of having consistent conversations between the MoD and industry. The MoD’s parochial structure limits coordination between its different departments, resulting in repeated discussions. Several companies mentioned that they must act as the “connective tissue” between MoD departments.

FRANCE

France has been able to scale its digital capabilities beyond other countries in this paper with (and through) its emphasis on national sovereignty. However, the country faces continued challenges in multinational interoperability and procurement complications affecting major programmes.

SOVEREIGNTY FIRST

The French Ministère des Armées (Ministry of the Armed Forces, MINARM) views the notion of sovereignty through a national lens. For a capability or technology to be considered sovereign, it must be procured from a French company, with the relevant infrastructure controlled by the state. Such a model requires much greater state involvement in the management of industry, is time and resource intensive and often does not deliver the same level of capability and affordability as via more open markets. Yet, as detailed below, the French industrial system has demonstrated its ability to develop and deliver high-tier digital capabilities more efficiently and effectively than elsewhere in Europe.

MINARM’s success stems, in large part, from its relatively modest ambitions in procurement cycles. Given the historical understanding that sovereignty comes at a cost of capability, MINARM set its sights on achieving a moderate level of capability, say 70–80%, for a given system, as long as it still meets requirements, rather than striving (and failing) to achieve perfection. France’s armed forces have faced their own difficulties with digital procurements in recent years, most notably a lack of agility in long and continuous processes to allow for flexible procurement approaches; however, this has not stunted the delivery of capabilities to the same extent as comparable countries.

SCALING ADVANCED CAPABILITIES

France’s networks should be understood through two overarching programmes: DESCARTES and the Système d’information des Armées (Armed Forces Information System, SIA). DESCARTES covers the fixed telecommunications infrastructure and services for MINARM, and has involved updating the SOCRATES IP network and rolling out a secure interconnection programme, telephony system and the air traffic control telephony system. Current DESCARTES objectives include phased obsolescence of various components and expansion of network capacity. DESCARTES delivers connectivity across the forces, but would benefit from increased automation to monitor and encrypt the massive throughput of the systems.

SIA seeks to create a single information environment for operational and command information systems, replacing 17 disparate information systems. SIA includes a number of services from the three armed forces, from command and control (C2) to logistics management, along with data integration at operational levels. SIA is an ambitious project, seeking to incorporate algorithms to aid in automating many network processes and enhancing the capability of user data services. With more than €1 billion invested over more than 12 years, some government and industry actors have begun to doubt whether SIA will be delivered with the level of integration capabilities promised. Due to the centrality of robust data sharing to AI-based processing (see below), the armed forces and industry have begun exploring contingency alternatives to SIA, in the form of operational cloud-agnostic C2 systems and PaaS (platform-as-a-service), cloud-based variants.

Relative stagnation on cloud adoption has contributed to the desire to reimagine such programmes. MINARM has maintained its dedication to using domestic hosting solutions, although the lack of a French (or even European) provider of services comparable to US hyperscalers has reduced their ability to go “cloud-native”. A hybrid-cloud system also remains the focus of the MINARM, with various French tech and defence companies – sometimes in partnership with US hyperscalers – developing and testing a variety of solutions. Migration of unclassified data and services to a sovereign, public cloud has begun, but MINARM remains in conversation with industry about how best to store data at classified level and above.

While enterprise-level cloud services are showing mixed success, there are also several combat cloud projects at different stages of completion. While not yet deployed at scale, the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), SCORPION and various naval experiments aim to create deployable, flexible cloud architectures with the aim of enabling MDO within the armed forces, with the vision of cross-domain integration to follow. However, these combat clouds are expected to integrate through SIA, making their full capability dependent on its development.

MINARM’s main digital tech programme in terms of data processing and AI technologies is ARTEMIS.IA (Architecture de Traitement et d’Exploitation Massive de l’Information Multi-Sources et d’Intelligence Artificielle [Architecture for Massive Processing and Exploitation of Multi-Source Information and Artificial Intelligence]), delivered by a joint Thales/Atos venture. ARTEMIS.IA is intended to deliver big data storage, monitoring, processing and exploiting capabilities, and originated largely due to MINARM’s decision to not buy from the US-based Palantir. The programme has yet to be fully deployed for operational use, and has faced difficulties due to the complexity of the architecture required, the challenges of incorporating startups into the contracting process, the relative sluggishness of government decision and contracting cycles, and, according to some, the lack of competitiveness of its contracts. The programme’s final rollout should be outlined in the coming months (at the time of writing), but it demonstrates MINARM’s ability to leverage an integrated data-management system into operational insights with moderate success, and has been used to demonstrate the importance of cloud migration to the armed forces more broadly.

Besides ARTEMIS.IA, AI technologies are being incorporated in nearly every French tech programme across development and deployment functions. Examples include signals intelligence analysis, cyber defence, decision support, autonomous combat functions and predictive maintenance.

The security standards maintained by France are robust. The Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d’information (the French National Agency for the Security of Information Systems, ANSSI), is the government body tasked with security IT systems across the whole of government, providing the accreditation for MINARM solutions. The French armed forces are also perceived as holding relatively restrictive data-sharing policies, which, while inhibiting advanced data-analytic functions, further improves the security of the cyber ecosystem.

The French governance structure for defence digitalisation is complex, with many agencies, directorates and programmes tasked with various elements of MINARM’s infrastructure, networks, applications and processes. This creates difficulty breaking down data siloes in a coordinated manner and reducing replication of functions and use cases. It is worth noting that despite its complexity, MINARM’s digitally relevant organisation has definitive authorities at each level and open communication between vertical and horizontal layers of the hierarchy.

OTHER CHALLENGES

While France also lacks digital skills within its ranks, arguably the largest challenge is increased strain on multinational interoperability. Maintaining France’s desired degree of sovereignty in digital capabilities means that fewer systems are procured from common vendors, which puts constraints on easy technical interoperability. Yet as with several other countries in this research, France benefits from maintaining combined units with Germany and the UK, which forces each country to ensure a degree of interoperability between national systems to permit combined operations. Such units are often jumping-off points for wider multinational interoperability initiatives, but are not a substitute for wider NATO-interoperability. MINARM emphasises NATO Federated Mission Networking (FMN) in some of its networks, especially the French Operational network up to SECRET level (FrOpS), but the sufficiency of FMN for data-centric MDO functions remains an open question.

GERMANY

While possessing mature enterprise-level capabilities and burgeoning tactical-level capabilities, Germany’s Bundeswehr (armed forces) struggle to connect operational and enterprise digital efforts, and face numerous inhibitors politically, industrially and bureaucratically, all of which complicate their ability to enable large-scale MDO.

GOVERNANCE

The Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung (Federal Ministry of Defence, BMVg) has published several policy and strategy documents outlining its perspectives on digitalisation, especially SDD, which is the key framework from the chief information officer (CIO) for advancing digitalisation. These documents demonstrate a holistic understanding of digitalisation at the enterprise level, as well as providing a detailed description of the governance mechanisms for such efforts. The focus on governance stems from historical political attitudes towards the armed forces, leading them to outline an increasing number of organisational structures to govern new capabilities. The result is a complex web of digital authorities, including: the Cyber- und Informationsraum (Cyber and Information Domain Service), a full service of the armed forces; the Digitalrat (the Federal Chancellery Digital Council); the Zentrum Digitalisierung der Bundeswehr (Digitalisation Center of the Bundeswehr); and digitalisation elements in each of the armed forces.

ENTERPRISE CAPABILITIES

Germany’s armed forces have some of the most exhaustive enterprise capabilities of the countries included in this paper. The BMVg uses SASPF as its core IT system, but is in the process of switching to SAP S/4HANA by the end of 2025. SAP S/4HANA will be used from the enterprise level to deployed platforms, and should streamline processes, enhance real-time data exploitation capabilities and create more flexible service integration.

Examples of Bundeswehr services include Groupware Bw, the collaboration platform, which provides a number of advanced IT tools to users. Such services are being scaled at a faster pace than digitalisation programmes of other countries analysed in this paper, although this may reflect government-wide departmental digitalisations, rather than an ability to specifically field digital capabilities for armed forces. These services are currently slowly shifting towards being networked and digital, focusing on operations through deployable networks and IT, although the results of these efforts remain to be seen (see below).

The BMVg has adopted a multicloud model for hosting. While less reliant on US hyperscalers, due to fear of foreign interference, the model’s cloud infrastructure is in the early stages of development. Cloud services have yet to be rolled out across the enterprise, but projects are in progress. BWI (a private company owned by the BMVg) is jointly developing a private cloud called pCloudBw for the Bundeswehr, which should be approved up to classified level, but final approval, rollout and migration of platforms and services will take years.

Cloud limitations will hinder the widespread adoption of AI technologies, which are a current focus of innovation. Ongoing AI use cases include ISR, C4/C5 connectivity and situational awareness, and augmentation of support functions, but public and military hesitation have prevented the adoption of AI technologies for any functions related to killing.

Germany has significant experience with cyber security due to frequent cyber attacks by state and non-state actors against it. Such experience is reflected in Germany’s defence cyber-security policies. There has been discussion within the defence sector of “secure by design” and “zero trust” environments, and progress on programmes such as the cryptographic modernisation of the Bundeswehr (KryptMBw), which is upgrading the encryption capabilities at SECRET and above.

ARMED FORCES

Germany’s armed forces each face different priorities and challenges into the near future.

The largest investment in a singular armament programme within a force is the Digitisation of Land Based Operations (D-LBO), which is intended to modernise C2 at the operational and tactical levels and create a core system architecture. Besides trying new contracting models that incentivise industrial cooperation, programme managers work with end-users to adapt systems throughout the programme lifecycle, instead of specifying all requirements at the beginning. D-LBO is providing badly needed capabilities to Germany’s technologically under-resourced land forces, using an open architecture (owned by the Bundeswehr) to connect radio and IT systems. However, the programme has already faced delays, and it remains to be seen how well these tactical capabilities will connect to other domains and partners. Alternatively, the Bundeswehr may see greater success with D-LBO’s basic variant, which is being rolled out to Germany’s Division 2025 as a test case.

Germany’s air force is slowly modernising its networking ability, aiming squarely at achieving interoperability with allies, especially the US. Its procurement of advanced platforms such as the F-35 and development with FCAS are sure to increase its capabilities, but it faces a number of other challenges, such as foreign dependencies, timeliness of delivery and architectural complexity.

Germany’s navy lags behind the country’s other forces, largely due to its historical underfunding, but it has set ambitious goals for its future capabilities, including better situational awareness and autonomous systems, alongside its notable German Mission Network project. While the size of the force means that progress has been modest, the navy has been searching for alternatives to its traditional cumbersome planning and procurement processes to develop new projects. Some experts believe that a programme similar to D-LBO will be necessary to meet current ambitions.

Germany’s armed forces exhibit a high degree of adherence to NATO standards, but they do not prioritise interoperability across their national forces to the same degree, instead focusing on maximising interoperability with their respective Allied forces, especially the US.

SOVEREIGNTY, INDUSTRY AND INNOVATION

Germany’s government has dedicated significant energy to promoting the concept of sovereignty across its broader digitalisation programmes, but the application of sovereignty towards the defence sector has been inhibited for several reasons.

First is the lack of a singular definition on sovereignty, which complicates any unified vision of what a “sovereign” digital system would entail. Second is the relative lack of defence industrial capacity, stemming largely from historical underinvestment in the defence sector. The Zeitenwende fund has led to increased spending across defence, with about 20% specifically allocated to digitalisation programmes, but there has been little absorption of the funds so far. As such, budgets have been primarily focused on achieving a minimum capability, typically prioritising visible platforms that have the greatest industrial impact for German constituencies instead of digitalisation. In practice, the BMVg prioritises sovereignty when possible (especially with the onset of new digital defence companies), but has been willing to accept limitations on the sovereignty of its technology due to the irreplaceable nature of certain foreign firms, such as US hyperscalers.

Besides overall industrial capacity, the BMVg has yet to lay out a comprehensive framework for cooperation with industry, especially in the digital sector. It recently outlined a new defence industry strategy, but it is light on details about implementation for industrial innovation, accreditation, procurement and sustainment processes. Many of these failures stem from the dearth of digitally knowledgeable planning, as well as a disconnect between the enterprise and military operations. The Bundeswehr has struggled to describe its objectives below strategic level, especially regarding military performance, and often lacks concrete metrics against which performance can be measured. Commercial actor interviewees also described difficulty working with the BMVg’s outdated and lengthy accreditation processes, which constrains market access to key firms and further inhibits procurement and deployment of innovations.

The BMVg does possess innovation capacity in several hubs – especially the Cyber Innovation Hub of the Bundeswehr – but struggles to scale them. While possessing the necessary technological knowledge, these hubs lack financial and bureaucratic power and are typically insufficiently “embedded … with end users”, while the broader BMVg struggles to outline requirements and deploy the technology. German bureaucracy, especially defence bureaucracy, is also considered risk averse, further inhibiting the rollout of new innovations. The relative technological stagnation of the Bundeswehr contrasts sharply with the experience and dynamism of Germany’s commercial sector, reflecting both the bureaucratic hurdles to the innovation process and general political hesitation surrounding military capabilities. Politicising certain capabilities and procurement processes has hindered both the acquisition of technology and the willingness of private firms to expand into the defence sector. SMEs and startups face significant barriers to entry, including the complex governance structures discussed above, as well as a reputational risk due to the politicised nature of the armed forces in German society.

POLAND

Poland’s armed forces are rapidly modernising but lack an enterprise-level digitalisation strategy. Instead, digitalisation is viewed through the integration of modern networked platforms, alongside tactical digital capabilities and strong cyber-security capabilities.

PLATFORM-CENTRIC DIGITALISATION

Poland’s Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej (Ministry of National Defence, MON) is in the midst of massive expansion and modernisation in its military platforms and capabilities, all of which increased in urgency following Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Instead of attempting to modernise in a whole-of-force manner, the MON drives modernisation through the procurement of advanced, largely Western systems. The purchase of C4ISR, air and missile defence systems, and the F-35 are enabling the expansion of digital capabilities, albeit in a piecemeal manner.

C4ISR systems at the tactical and operational levels, including the indigenous TOPAZ battlespace management system, provide battlefield connectivity and IT services to the end-user, alongside strike cueing and situational awareness. Such systems are necessary to achieving MDO, especially given the gradual integration of advanced algorithms for ISTAR tasks, but lack integration with higher echelons.

Poland’s purchase of the Patriot air defence system and the Integrated Battle Command System has enabled a networked air and missile defence system that integrates a number of different missile defence systems. Such a system is further spurring the standardisation of data sharing across the many sensors and shooters that can drive wider digital connectivity.

When discussing Poland’s defence digitalisation, nearly every interviewee mentioned the delivery of the F-35 as marking a step-change in the MON’s digital capabilities. Polish training on the aircraft began in 2024, with the delivery of 32 F-35As to begin in 2026. The F-35’s significant sensor and network features are expected to bring forward the development of the MON’s digital capabilities while ensuring network integration and data standardisation with the US and other F-35 NATO member users.

Poland’s navy lags the country’s other armed forces in terms of digitalisation, although its Miecznik frigate programme is set to incorporate advanced integrated combat systems that would greatly enhance its multidomain connectivity.

OTHER CAPABILITIES

The new systems procured by Poland produce vast quantities of high-fidelity data to enable operations and support, yet the MON lacks the infrastructure to exploit this at scale. Instead, it has pockets of capability, mainly clustered close to the end-users.

As the MON’s centralised network and hosting capabilities are still nascent, it is likely that further development will be forthcoming. There seems to be a consensus that a hybrid cloud model is preferable, with lower-sensitivity material hosted by hyperscalers and private, nationally located clouds (almost certainly built by a US hyperscaler) operating at the classified and above levels.

The MON provides modest enterprise-user services, including force readiness tools, collaboration platforms and even e-learning platforms. However, these solutions act more as one-off solutions to specific problem sets rather than part of a wider strategic digitalisation effort.

The most developed of the MON’s enterprise-level digital capabilities are its cyber-security services, due to Poland’s status as one of the most frequently and intensively cyber attacked countries in the world. The Wojska Obrony Cyberprzestrzeni (Cyberspace Defense Forces, WOC) were created in 2022 to consolidate military cyber security, along with other technological innovation and implementation roles. The WOC provides active security for digital military systems and infrastructure, with its cyber-security tasks viewed as a wider commitment by the government to protecting Poland’s cyberspace from malign activity.

The MON has deployed various AI technologies for specific tasks, to include battlespace management systems intelligence fusion, UAS enablement, cyber security and large language models for unnamed information analysis functions. Yet despite the MON’s creation of a ministry AI strategy, the implementation of AI technologies across defence lacks coherence and consistency. This can be attributed to many of the digitalisation challenges described below, but also to the MON’s failure to commit to a data-centric, cloud-native framework for developing, procuring and deploying digital technologies, especially AI. The lack of a “digital backbone” and supporting infrastructure exacerbates existing data siloes, preventing exploitation of the increasing number of data sources and sensors. The MON has recently announced the creation of an AI Implementation Centre under the WOC, although operational readiness dates, alongside tangible outcomes for this centre, remain uncertain.

INTEGRATION, INDUSTRY AND SOVEREIGNTY

Unlike other major NATO armed forces, Poland’s armed forces operated almost entirely Warsaw Pact-era systems and platforms prior to recent modernisation, thereby limiting the quantity of NCW-era legacy systems requiring integration. Poland has thus avoided the scale of obsolescence challenges facing the other countries in this study, despite being further behind in most digital capabilities.

The drawback to a lack of legacy technology is the absence of the industrial base that provided those capabilities. Across the defence sector, Poland struggles to produce capabilities, instead finding it easier to procure from allies and modernise over time. Polish defence companies lack the experience, investments and (according to one expert) the will to compete with international firms. The organisational and cultural resistance to change further exacerbates these barriers: the MON cannot shake the perception of being weighed down by the conservative and rigid nature of innovation and procurement processes. Poland has a developing startup tech ecosystem, but the barriers to all but the most entrenched players cast doubt on whether these smaller firms will be able to scale.

Poland’s platform-centric modernisation provides capability and interoperability with key allies, but it comes at a cost to non-hardware procurement. The political and military focus on mass, given the lessons from Ukraine, is understandable, but neglects software and infrastructure investments. Not only does this prevent the MON’s vision for MDO, but it also arrests the development of an industrial base within Poland capable of delivering SDD. While sovereignty remains an ambition, the MON appears to understand that it cannot produce all necessary capability domestically; however, this realism should not permit the ministry to neglect its domestic capacities. Overall, Poland is largely reliant on external technology and cooperation, especially from the US. Practical conversations about sovereignty aim at achieving a level of control over the country’s systems, rather than full control or sovereignty.

Decision-makers in the MON do not appear to value digitalisation by itself as a crucial military capability and enabler of modern operations. This is due, in part, to the relative lack of personnel with both digital awareness and strong digital skills. Poland has a number of relevant institutions, including military and civilian technical universities, but their graduates typically migrate to the more lucrative commercial sector.

The lack of clear, enterprise-driven digital strategies has been listed as among the most pressing challenges to the MON. Beyond enterprise digitalisation that can be attributed to government-wide digitalisation efforts, Poland’s armed forces are being pulled into digitalisation, rather than purposefully digitalising themselves. Absent a change to this policy, digitalisation is likely to continue in an ad hoc fashion, creating a patchwork of capabilities sown together that will struggle to act in an integrated fashion.

SPAIN

Of the countries in this study, Spain lags the furthest in digital capabilities. The country is still digitalising its armed forces and lacks the financial heft, strategic vision or digitalisation enablers to scale modern digital innovations.

CURRENT AND EMERGING CAPABILITIES

The digitalisation of the Fuerzas Armadas de España (Spanish Armed Forces, FAS) is rooted largely in their “digital backbone” – the Infraestructura Integral de Información para la Defensa (Integrated Defence Information Infrastructure, I3D). The I3D has been developed as a single information environment to connect the disparate networks of the Ministerio de Defensa (Ministry of Defence, MINISDEF). The I3D was expected to reach full operational capacity in December 2024, and eventually integrate with combat platforms and sensors. Although it appears as the most centralised deployed digital backbone in this paper, it bears mentioning that the FAS’s networking does not need to account for the scale of legacy estate, nor does it require the scale of capabilities, as in other countries.

The FAS are also seeking a hybrid cloud model, although enterprise capabilities are still nascent. The main applications and data used are on-premises, with cloud platforms only in pilot programmes. Many of the cloud investments are aimed towards combat clouds that are domain specific, with the vision that the various platforms will form an integrated combat environment. Combat clouds in the land domain are the closest to deployment, mainly due to the lack of technical integration with large, complex platforms in other domains. Naval cloud is in development, mainly through Navantia, although its capabilities and scalability will not be comparable to those of the US or the UK. The most significant cloud programme is FCAS, which is intended to serve as a vehicle for digitalisation and connectivity across the battlespace, although its delays indicate that cloud-enabled warfighting ability is some years away.

The MINISDEF has a unified governing body with appropriate budgetary and organisational authority for digital services and technology in the Centro de Sistemas y Tecnologías de la Información y las Comunicaciones (Centre for Information and Communications Systems and Technologies, CESTIC), a general directorate in charge of communication and information systems and technology, digital transformation, data and information security. CESTIC provides a number of digital services to the whole of the FAS, while maintaining the infrastructure for a significant legacy estate. Largely through CESTIC, MINISDEF has been able to deploy several advanced digital services, especially to streamline existing enterprise-level tasks. The most prominent example is ARGO, a harmonisation platform for the monitoring and management of processes.

In July 2023, MINISDEF published a strategy for its development, implementation and use of AI, laying out a vision of an AI-enabled ministry and armed forces. The strategy describes the need for data infrastructure to underpin the technologies and safeguards for responsible AI deployment and a list of use cases. However, the rollout of AI does not match the coherence of this strategy. The FAS lack the integrated data infrastructure to enable the AI tech at scale, and many of their systems below the I3D are from an NCW, rather than SDD, perspective. Much of the work surrounding AI remains largely conceptual, especially with the superficial focus on the role of ethics and AI, and the AI technologies currently being deployed are mainly experiments for specific use cases. Full scaling and exploitation of AI tech are far off, especially until the FAS have deployed robust cloud, networking and data services.

Incorporating AI tech into the I3D was a key objective, although the specifics of the use case and type of AI technology remain unclear. Given the I3D’s moderate success thus far, this could prove a key enterprise-level digital capability or may end up another dream without any solid plans for implementation.

CONSTRAINING FACTORS

The most glaring limitation of Spain’s digitalisation efforts stems from the scale of its overall military expenditure, which merits mention. As a share of GDP, it is among the lowest in NATO, even when considering the relative and absolute increases in spending over recent years. Lower defence spending leads to a more limited and rather consolidated military–industrial base, constraining domestic military innovation and disincentivising expansion into the military sector. Furthermore, the size of the budget prevents the FAS from investing significant capital in new technological capabilities after spending on maintaining current systems. Even while considering the caveats about calculating digital spending, Spain’s spending on digital capabilities as a proportion of overall defence spending is a fraction of other Western European NATO countries.

Even when the FAS are procuring digital capabilities, they are not considered an effective buyer. The FAS’s processes prove difficult for industrial partners to penetrate, and act as a barrier for potential forays into the defence sector by other firms. The FAS also lack the coherence in their vision to avoid tensions between short-term operational need and wider digital transformation goals.

Like the other countries in this paper, Spain suffers from a lack of digital skills across its forces. The FAS struggle to recruit, train and retain digital skills at all echelons, but especially in IT expertise. Some of this stems from a lack of IT specialists within wider society, although Spain’s society has seen a higher level of digitalisation than the EU average. The government has been working on expanding technological penetration and development across society, particularly through programmes receiving at least partial EU funding. It is likely that continued digitalisation of commercial and government sectors would benefit both the defence industry and the commercial off-the-shelf capabilities available, and also enable commanders and MINISDEF actors to be savvier buyers, developers and deployers of digital capabilities. Nevertheless, Spain has yet to translate its current civilian digital advantage to defence digitalisation, so further developments may not benefit the armed forces equitably.

Spain has committed itself to innovation and interoperability through both NATO and the EU, occasionally leading to a split focus, especially regarding funding. The government has invested significant sums in the European Defence Fund (EDF), including projects on digital transformation. The EDF might boost the strategic autonomy of Europe in defence, and is seen as offering better domestic industrial returns on investment than programmes such as NATO’s DIANA, but should ensure NATO interoperability by design.

The government has attempted to sidestep NATO criticism of its relatively low defence budget by claiming that Spain’s contributions cannot be viewed solely in monetary terms, instead pointing to the quantity of troops and platforms deployed across domains. And it is true that the FAS have benefited from their Alliance deployments to Iraq and along NATO’s eastern flank, and through hosting Allied naval and air units, leading to practical interoperability experience in deployed settings.

Similar to the other countries in this paper, Spain has emphasised the need to maintain a high level of sovereignty within its defence, and specifically digital defence, sector. Practically, such an ambition is unlikely, given the modest size of the military–industrial base and high degree of penetration by foreign companies. Focusing on a definition of sovereignty rooted in Europe would allow Spain to take advantage of wider innovation ecosystems, while leveraging its key firms (mainly Navantia, Indra and Airbus).

Spain lacks a strategic vision for the digitalisation of its defence ecosystem. While strong strategies are not necessarily correlated with a capable force, the lack of an updated digitalisation strategy inhibits the FAS’s ability to create and implement a vision of what modernised armed forces will look like. The MINISDEF publishes the occasional short strategy through its official bulletin, but does not appear to have a cohering vision of what its armed forces and defence enterprise should look like when digitalised. The MINISDEF’S 2023 document on digital transformation and MDO demonstrated a clear understanding of the doctrinal and theoretical enabler necessary for digitally enabled MDO, but did not describe how such a vision could or will be achieved.

CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS

Simple comparisons between the countries in this paper are not easy, due to the peculiarities of each country’s modernisation and/or digitalisation strategies and implementation methods, along with the state of their sovereign industrial bases.

That said, France demonstrated a higher level of scalability in its advanced digital technologies, especially for MDO enablement, while the UK, although possessing similar technologies, has struggled more to overcome its many procedural and organisational challenges to create integrated digital capabilities. Germany’s enterprise capabilities are arguably the most capable and advanced but are not mirrored in its ability – and political desire – to create an integrated, MDO-capable force. Poland’s platform-centric modernisation strategy is rapidly pulling its armed forces’ digital capabilities into the 21st century, but it will require a strong enterprise-level digitalisation vision to achieve full multidomain connectivity. While Spain has strong academic frameworks for digitalisation and MDO, it lacks strategic vision and implementation capacity, and the country is especially handicapped by the scale of defence spending and military–industrial base. Common challenges include a lack of digitally literate and skilled personnel, incompatible procurement processes, obsolescence, data silos and scalability.

SOVEREIGNTY

Each country in this paper views the concept of sovereignty differently, and even often lack a common definition of the term internally. France sets the gold standard for sovereignty, but other states cannot, and should not, attempt to replicate this, as France has invested vast sums over decades in its military–industrial base. Instead, each country (hopefully in collaboration with one another) needs to define what it means by “digital sovereignty”. For example, taking one element of the stack, data, as sovereign, could include one or more of the following:

• National data residency.

• Allied/EU/European/NATO data residency.

• Data services provided by an Allied/EU/European/NATO company.

• Data services provided by a nationally headquartered company.

• Data services created and/or owned by a national government.

Once defined, each country’s defence ministry needs to describe the feasibility of a capability to potentially achieving that definition of sovereignty, and how much this should be prioritised. Absent a definition and a candid feasibility analysis, sovereignty will continue to be banded as a rhetorical device that lacks any practical value.

DIGITAL SKILLS

The defence sector for each country described a lack of digital skills as a key inhibiter to the military’s ability to field modern digital technology. Some of these challenges cannot be divorced from broader recruitment and retention crises within European armed forces due to any number of factors. While the private digital tech sectors of some European countries face similar skills challenges, the pay discrepancy between public and private sectors was cited by interviewees as the key reason for the lack of IT specialists in the military. Each ministry is striving to upskill its overall workforce, but internal development of specialised IT skills alone cannot solve the skills gap.

Beyond skills, defence decision-makers need to be technologically literate and understand the actual function of a given technology, as well as its specific use case. Failure to grasp the limitations of digital tech leads to ill-defined requirements, slow and costly procurements and incapable users.

INTEROPERABILITY

Expert interviewees on each country described the desire to maintain NATO interoperability in their digital technology, although again, the exact meaning of this varies. Adherence to NATO standards acts as a baseline for multinational interoperability, but even they are often open to a degree of interpretation at the national level. British and French digital systems are not developed to be NATO-interoperable by design, despite neither country expecting to fight a major war on its own. The armed forces of Germany and Poland place greater emphasis on interoperability with Allies, especially the US, which is made easier by the procurement of platforms from Allied industrial bases. Due mainly to its Alliance deployments, Spain’s armed forces have been able to achieve a fair degree of interoperability with NATO, although their interoperability challenges with Allies are less due to standards, which are followed, and more due to differences in technological maturity. New concepts for modern systems have further hindered interoperability, such as the incompatibility of current security processes, with new ideas such as zero trust and software-defined cryptography making interoperable accreditation even more difficult.

Furthermore, adopting new or changing existing standards requires the acquiescence of all 32 NATO members, making compatibility with the rapid pace of digital innovations difficult. As discussed above, countries then often attempt to optimise interoperability with several key states, such as the US or countries with multinational units. This organic bilateral or multilateral interoperability is beneficial to the vision of an integrated force, but NATO must be clearer about its role in multinational standard-setting or standard-adoption. Adopting commercial standards has increased the speed of standard processes, but often still requires lengthy security verification and augmentation. The countries in this paper also often lack the political influence or desire to drive new standard-setting, leaving NATO interoperability a patchwork of integration platforms, application programming interfaces and duct tape across the Alliance.

CONCLUSION

This paper has sought to assess the digital defence priorities of five European countries – the UK, France, Germany, Poland and Spain – through their current capabilities and the challenges inhibiting their ambitions.

The results are mixed; the countries’ armed forces often possessed robust digital technologies but struggle to differing degrees on scaling and/or extending them to become genuine combat MDO enablers. Since these forces have committed themselves to MDO and SDD, requiring organic connectivity and strong digital enablers, they must either rise to the challenges posed by digitalisation or reduce their ambitions. European governments appear to be committing to investing large sums of money to mitigate such issues by stimulating domestic defence industry, but bureaucratic inhibitors, growing frictions with key allies, domestic political conflicts, and workforce skill shortages will limit any progress in achieving digital transformation. With this in mind, there appear to be three main paths forward:

1. Stay the course and continue to digitalise according to current strategies and methods. The result will be pockets of advanced capability and connectivity, but also a lack of national technological autonomy, a struggle to integrate systems domestically and multinationally, and continued difficulty scaling capabilities. The dearth of digital skills seems unlikely to be solved in the near term, along with the many bureaucratic procedural challenges stunting digitalisation.

2. Increase dependence on non-sovereign technology providers. By eschewing the need for sovereignty, countries could theoretically reduce their costs while making interoperability much more similar due to a greater number of shared systems. However, the price of strategic autonomy in losing control of data, intellectual property, system ownership and – crucially – industrial base, precludes this as a feasible option.

3. Reduce ambitions. The exact goals of digitalisation differ across governments, from enabling MDO to enhancing enterprise efficiency, but armed forces might achieve more success if they set modest, measurable objectives for their various digitalisation efforts. Ambitions for idealised notions of sovereignty, perfect connectivity, integration or interoperability and world-class capabilities may have to be tempered, with “full digitalisation” (whatever forces might mean by this) replaced by quantifiable levels of digital capabilities to be achieved by set dates. Such an approach could include European collaboration on capability development and procurement, but this alone would not close the gap between ambition and reality.

Ultimately, Europe’s path forward will depend on a clear-eyed assessment of its strategic priorities, resources and political will. The most realistic pathway, allowing armed forces to achieve focused, measurable advances, given resource constraints, may be achieved by tempering ambitions. However, such a shift will require making difficult decisions about what to prioritise, alongside a willingness to redefine success in digitalisation. Whichever path is taken, defence ministries, commanders and politicians must determine how digital technology fits coherently within their strategic modernisation frameworks. Navigating these challenges will shape Europe’s defence modernisation and potentially redefine the capabilities of its armed forces for decades to come.

Noah Sylvia is a Research Analyst for C4ISR and Emerging Technology in RUSI’s Military Sciences research group. His research focuses on technological enablers to combat operations in addition to military enterprise capabilities. Noah has a BA in International Relations and Russia & Eastern Europe from the University of Pennsylvania.