European Economic Security

Introduction

Economic security has become a critical focus for policymakers and the private sector, driven by escalating geopolitical tensions and a growing awareness of the security vulnerabilities in global financial systems and supply chains. However, the approaches taken by individual EU member states, the EU itself, and the private sector to prioritise, manage and mitigate economic security risks remain highly fragmented. This lack of coordination has amplified strategic and financial vulnerabilities, highlighting the urgent need for unified action. To address this challenge, the Centre for Finance and Security (CFS) at RUSI established the European Economic Security Taskforce in 2024, creating a platform for collaborative and cross-sectoral discussion.

CFS is uniquely positioned to deliver this timely initiative, given its reputation as a leading research programme based in Brussels and London that specialises in the intersection of finance and global security. As part of a preeminent defence and security think tank, CFS has used its cross-disciplinary expertise and multi-jurisdictional network to convene this Taskforce. The Taskforce brings together international policymakers, geoeconomic academics and experts from security, industry and the private sector. Taskforce members contribute their expertise in a personal capacity and do not represent their organisations, which include numerous EU member state governments, the European Commission and associated institutions, NATO, and the key allies of Australia, Japan and the UK.

The inaugural Taskforce meeting was held on 9 September 2024 and focused on the concept of economic security. Taskforce members highlighted how a lack of definitional clarity had encouraged siloed thinking on economic security issues, particularly between the trade and security communities. Furthermore, Taskforce members identified that fragmentation in economic security policymaking – both at a member state and an EU level – was exacerbated by an absence of EU governance structures capable of addressing economic security in a strategic and cohesive manner. Taskforce members agreed that this fragmentation and systems failure had resulted in a less effective relationship between European policymakers and the private sector on economic security issues as compared to other regions, such as North America or Asia Pacific.

The second Taskforce meeting, held on 26 November 2024, built on these findings by examining the systems and structures necessary to develop robust European economic security priorities, policies and relationships at the member state level, across the EU, and in collaboration with international allies. The meeting featured three plenaries, each adopting a progressively broader perspective.

The first session, titled “Looking Inward”, explored current member state and EU frameworks, and considered what measures might be necessary to strengthen economic security within Europe. The second session, “Looking Outward”, examined the EU’s economic security relationships with like-minded partners and discussed the effectiveness of international platforms. The third session, “Looking Forward”, focused on the mission of the recently confirmed European Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security, Maroš Šefčovič, to develop “a new economic security doctrine”. Drawing on the discussions from the first two sessions, Taskforce members deliberated on the potential purpose and scope of this doctrine.

Given the interconnected nature of the discussions that took place, this report does not provide a strict linear summary of the matters raised. Instead, it highlights key observations that emerged from each of the three plenaries and addresses a recurring theme – the role of public–private partnerships (PPPs). At the end of each section, a bullet-pointed summary of the findings is provided. As the meeting was conducted on a non-attributable basis, the names and affiliations of participants are not disclosed.

Looking Inward – European Economic Security

The meeting began with Taskforce members from various member states sharing how their countries were developing and enacting economic security policies. While some Taskforce members commented that the European Commission’s package of measures to strengthen economic security had provided a helpful framework, others felt that most member state efforts remained incremental and reactive, instead of being based on comprehensive and forward-looking strategies. Many Taskforce members reiterated concerns raised during the first meeting – that the fragmentation of economic security policymaking across government sectors had created increased bureaucracy and hindered interagency strategies. Although many Taskforce members highlighted positive steps taken by their countries to map out national strengths and vulnerabilities, it was acknowledged that this was often conducted within the context of a broader national security strategy, as opposed to a standalone economic security policy.

One member state representative shared that their country had established a dedicated intergovernmental committee under the prime minister, involving all ministries concerned with economic security. This committee not only facilitated horizontal discussions on economic security across government portfolios, but also invited regional representatives to provide field-based insights, enabling the committee to address risks that may be developing at the local level. This Taskforce member elaborated that their government employed several instruments to further their economic security priorities, such as investment screening mechanisms, measures to protect sensitive scientific research, and a government fund to invest in companies targeted by foreign economic statecraft.

The differing approaches to economic security among member states prompted two Taskforce members – one a country representative and the other a geoeconomic expert – to suggest that the first step should be “getting our own house in order”. The country representative argued that misaligned economic security structures within member states made it premature to seek partnerships with third countries (countries that are not members of the EU), as EU-wide coordination would not be possible. The geoeconomic expert cited the recent electric vehicle tariff dispute between the EU and China as an example of how China exploits European disunity “to pick off individual member states with a carrot and stick approach”, effectively undermining broader EU objectives. Many Taskforce members felt that this example highlighted the need for economic security policies to be unified at the EU level. However, others argued that greater effort should be made to harmonise frameworks and share best practices among member states, without necessarily involving the European Commission.

Turning to the EU, one Taskforce member observed that under the new Commission, “the status of economic security has clearly reached a new level”. The Taskforce member remarked that one only has to look to the mission letters to see that nearly every Commissioner has an aspect of economic security embedded within their portfolio. This will require unprecedented interdepartmental coordination at the EU level, though what systems will be used to achieve this have yet to be determined. The Taskforce member emphasised that one of the Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security’s top priorities should be investing in governance structures. Other Taskforce members agreed that an “EU governance level” on economic security was required, though opinions differed on what form it should take.

One geoeconomic expert suggested that “the economic security conversation needed to be shifted upwards in the hierarchy”. While efforts to strengthen governance structures within the European Commission are vital, this expert argued that equal attention should be given to the role the European Council can play in facilitating horizontal conversations on economic security. Two suggestions made by the Taskforce member included creating “jumble Councils”, which bring together different Council formations, and better utilisation of the Coreper ambassadors, who already operate across Council policy areas but rarely discuss economic security issues. Another Taskforce member referenced the “2 + 2 dialogue” of the US–Japan Security Consultative Committee as a good model that could be adapted to enable interdepartmental economic security discussions across Council configurations or between European Commission Directorates-General.

Taskforce member discussions on the importance of establishing EU-level governance structures frequently referenced how recent geopolitical instability and global shocks have amplified the need to promote European coherence and coordination on economic security. The re-election of Donald Trump to the US presidency was cited by some Taskforce members as a critical challenge to transatlanticism, although others suggested that Trump’s economic proposals should be viewed primarily as a negotiation strategy. More broadly, many Taskforce members described the urgent need to address an emerging “paradigm shift” away from an open economic system and free trade, towards closed economic policies and protectionism. These Taskforce members felt that horizontal governance structures on economic security could play an important role in addressing the ideological debate over the future of the European single market. To use the words of one Taskforce member, pan-European discussions must focus on articulating “what is the EU’s offer to the rest of the world? And how does the EU communicate that to the rest of the world in a way that resonates?”

First Plenary Findings

• Continued fragmentation: Economic security policymaking and risk management remain fragmented at the member state level, undermining broader EU objectives, although positive steps towards cohesion have been made.

• Interagency coordination: The European Commission’s heightened focus on economic security across Directorates-General will require enhanced governance structures to support unprecedented levels of interdepartmental coordination.

• A clear message: Defining the EU’s “offer” on economic security is vital in the context of a global paradigm shift away from rules-based multilateralism and open markets and towards rising economic nationalism and protectionism.

Looking Outward – International Economic Security

Persuasively articulating the European “offer” on economic security will be critical to engaging with international partners, and the importance of partnerships was emphasised by many Taskforce members throughout the second plenary. One Taskforce member with extensive European Commission experience outlined the “three circles of partners” that exist between the EU and third countries. The “inner circle” consists of likeminded partners with whom the EU cooperates closely on a regular basis, such as the G7 countries. The “middle circle” includes the EU’s free trade agreement network and “middle powers”, which the Taskforce member described as states that do not wish to “take sides” in geopolitical contests but share common interests with the EU, for instance, in critical mineral security. Finally, the “outer circle” encompasses the broadest set of countries and intergovernmental organisations, including the G7+, the OECD and the WTO, where the EU works to uphold a rules-based trade system. Taskforce members agreed that sustaining partnerships across these three categories, particularly with outer-circle partners, will require greater investment in the future, given the emerging global paradigm shift away from open economic systems towards closed and protectionist policies.

The importance of prioritising and strengthening economic security partnerships was highlighted by numerous Taskforce members. One noted the crucial role that international relationships play in raising awareness of economic security risks and supporting countries facing economic coercion. Many Taskforce members praised the work that had been achieved through the G7 in building consensus on economic security definitions, objectives, guidance, implementation and coordination. Some Taskforce members expressed optimism that similar outcomes could be achieved through the G7+, particularly in relation to promoting and preserving openness within the global economy. However, others felt that the size of the G7+ limited its ability to act proactively, rendering it a forum for primarily reactive conversations. Other Taskforce members suggested leveraging Global Gateway partnerships to strengthen Europe’s position on economic security issues, such as critical dependencies and sanctions circumvention. However, one Taskforce member with experience of the programme commented that its primary focus is on international development, rather than geopolitical objectives, which currently limits its potential impact for economic security.

Taskforce members also emphasised the value of learning from third country experiences, citing Australia, Japan and South Korea as examples where economic security best practices could inform EU efforts. An Australian Taskforce member shared that their government prioritises economic security dialogues with trusted global partners and, to best facilitate this, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade had recently established an Economic Security Branch. Economic security-related departments across the Australian government (such as the Treasury and the defence and intelligence agencies) can contribute to this central outward-facing body, which is responsible for managing international economic security relationships and identifying possible areas of collaboration. However, the Australian Taskforce member noted that it was often challenging, if not impossible, to find neat areas of overlap with other countries, due to differences in economies and vulnerabilities. Therefore, they stressed the importance of flexibility and adopting the mindset of “one size cannot fit all”.

The notion that there is, as one Taskforce member described it, “a no-common-denominator approach to economic security partnerships” was reiterated throughout the second plenary. Several Taskforce members linked this back to the idea of articulating the European “offer” on economic security, commenting that flexibility will be needed to ensure that the offer can be tailored to the diverse needs of international partners. However, it was acknowledged that establishing pan-European structures capable of managing these relationships, without adding unnecessary bureaucracy, would be challenging. Some Taskforce members suggested that the EU should follow the Australian example of establishing a cross-cutting Economic Security Branch, but adapting such a structure to function effectively across the various EU institutions would require careful consideration.

Adding to this complexity, a Taskforce member with expertise in EU international relations highlighted that partnerships under the European Economic Security Strategy differ from those envisaged under the “new economic foreign policy” announced by President Ursula von der Leyen in the “Political Guidelines for the 2024–2029 European Commission”. The Taskforce member explained that the political guidelines clearly indicate that the new economic foreign policy will sit above economic security priorities because advancing economic security is just one of the policy’s “three central planks”, alongside strengthening trade and investing in partnerships. As a result, the EU will need to coordinate two distinct yet intersecting types of partnerships – those supporting the European Economic Security Strategy, narrowly focused on economic security objectives, and those under the broader economic foreign policy, aimed at advancing EU competitiveness and innovation. The Taskforce member noted that, while neither type of partnership is new, their enhanced prioritisation within the Commission underscores the need for holistic economic security policymaking, systems and dialogues to ensure alignment.

Second Plenary Findings

• Importance of partnerships: Strengthening economic security partnerships between the EU and third countries has produced valuable outcomes, but this will require increased investment to ensure continued progress.

• A tailored approach: A “one-size-fits-all” approach will not suffice when partnering with third countries. The EU must remain flexible to adapt its economic security “offer” to the diverse needs of its international partners.

• Coordinating dialogues: Enhanced systems are essential to effectively coordinate the intersecting economic security dialogues arising from the European Economic Security Strategy and the new economic foreign policy, ensuing consistency, efficiency and alignment.

The Role of PPPs

The importance of PPPs to economic security strategies was a key topic of discussion during the first Taskforce meeting. Consequently, during the second meeting, Taskforce members sought to avoid repeating points that had been made previously. Nevertheless, across the first and second plenaries, valuable insights emerged on PPPs within the context of the meeting’s focus on “systems and structures”, which will be briefly summarised.

Taskforce members emphasised the critical need to implement systems that actively involve the private sector in economic security dialogues. One Taskforce member commented that there was a disconnect between the economic security policies being developed at the member state and EU levels, and their implementation by the private sector. The Taskforce member shared their experience that many companies, already feeling frustrated and constrained by regulation on other topics, often lack the capacity or willingness to engage with new economic security measures. The Taskforce member concluded that without robust systems to improve communication, information sharing and trust between the public and private sectors, there is little point in planning economic security strategies, because their implementation will be ineffectual. A private sector Taskforce member echoed these concerns, pointing out that companies face inconsistent legislation, growing regulatory demands, and competition from international commercial players operating under fewer – or no – rules. These challenges fundamentally impact how businesses advance their investments and operations. The Taskforce member emphasised that coherence and cooperation are essential for fostering private sector support for economic security goals.

The value of effective communication between policymakers and the private sector was underscored by an Australian Taskforce member, who shared their country’s experience in resisting China’s punitive trade measures.20 The Taskforce member explained that closed-door discussions between senior government officials and industry leaders about the nature of economic coercion challenges had been instrumental in building a shared sense of mission on economic security objectives. Taskforce members agreed that such tactics can be highly effective with domestic companies and thus offer valuable lessons for member states. However, others noted that the EU faces considerable challenges in engaging with multinational or US-orientated firms. These entities often operate under different priorities and legal frameworks, complicating efforts to build alignment on EU economic security objectives.

PPPs Findings

• Strengthening collaboration: To ensure effective implementation of economic security strategies, robust systems for improved communication, information sharing and trust between the public and private sectors must be established.

• Enhancing engagement: Informal communication channels between senior policymakers and domestic companies can play a crucial role in building private sector support. However, effective strategies must also be developed to engage multinational and US-based companies on economic security issues.

Looking Forward – A European Economic Security Doctrine

For the final plenary, Taskforce members were asked to build upon the previous discussions and consider the potential, and possible pitfalls, of a European economic security doctrine. A recurring theme throughout the first and second plenaries, as well as during the inaugural Taskforce meeting, was the current fragmentation of economic security policymaking. This is evident in the silos amid government ministries and between the trade and security communities; a lack of alignment among member states; a disconnect between member state initiatives and EU-level policies; and ineffective engagement with the private sector. Taskforce members agreed that an economic security doctrine could provide “the link” between these areas of fragmentation, fostering greater cohesion, coordination and consensus. However, there was also a general acknowledgement that, as one Taskforce member observed, “this is easier said than done”.

Many Taskforce members emphasised that an economic security doctrine should not replicate the European Economic Security Strategy. One Taskforce member suggested that the doctrine should focus on mapping out “who does what, when, and with what tools”. However, some Taskforce members argued that this level of detail could not be achieved by a single doctrine. Instead, they advocated for the development of multiple doctrines tailored to specific industries or supply chains, which would use risk assessments to identify sensitive pinch points, outline applicable tools, and address potential conflicts between member state and EU competences. In contrast, others expressed concern that multiple doctrines would lead to even greater fragmentation, government intervention and institutional bureaucracy, overburdening the private sector and undermining competitiveness. Instead of trying to cover the field, a Taskforce member raised the importance of realism, suggesting that a doctrine should focus on identifying the most strategic economic security steps the EU needs to take within the next five years.

Drawing on these various observations, a geoeconomics and security specialist offered a defence perspective on the concept of a doctrine. The Taskforce member explained that, in a military sense, a doctrine serves as the bridge between strategy and implementation, ensuring coherence. Operational fields – analogous to specific industries or supply chains in the context of economic security – do not require separate doctrines, but rather tailored approaches within a unified framework. The Taskforce member emphasised that the purpose of a doctrine is to establish clear goals: defining what needs to be achieved; within what time frame; and identifying all instruments that are necessary to reach those objectives. The doctrine thus becomes an encapsulation of the overarching strategic vision, which can be adapted into a suite of tailored operational approaches.

The need to articulate a strategic vision for the future of European economic security emerged as the central consensus point of the third plenary, with several Taskforce members commenting that this was missing from the European Economic Security Strategy. Revisiting discussions from the first plenary, a number of Taskforce members suggested that a strategic vision should be thought of as the European “offer” on economic security, which could be operationalised through a doctrine. One Taskforce member commented that crafting such a vision requires answering a fundamental question: “What does the EU want to use its economic power for?” There was broad agreement that the EU should transition from its current risk-based and defensive economic security agenda towards a more proactive and offensive stance. One Taskforce member highlighted that the euro is the second most important currency in the international monetary system and that the EU is the world’s second largest economy. They argued that a doctrine’s offensive objectives should focus on how the EU can leverage its economic power to strengthen international economic security, benefiting both Europe and its likeminded partners.

The importance of effectively communicating that a European economic security doctrine benefits not only Europe, but also serves the interests of broader partners, was the concluding focus of the discussion. Several Taskforce members voiced concerns about how adversaries have successfully weaponised language on economic security topics. One example provided was the recent UN debate on unilateral coercive measures, where adversarial narratives framing such measures as illegal, unjust and exploitative gained significant traction. The failure of Europe to clearly articulate the objectives of its sanctions regime against Russia, or to secure broad third-country and private sector support after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, highlights a critical challenge facing a European economic security doctrine. As one Taskforce member aptly noted, “the language of the pitch is probably as important as the substance”.

Taskforce members agreed that careful drafting will be needed to develop a doctrine with global resonance. European economic security must not be presented as a zero-sum game or, in the words of one Taskforce member, as an expression of a “Fortress Europe mentality”. Instead, the doctrine should emphasise mutual benefit and shared prosperity. To achieve this, another Taskforce member suggested using the G7 as a sounding board to refine effective language. However, due to widespread perceptions of a geopolitical divide between the G7 and BRICS, the Taskforce member stressed that it would be important to deliver the doctrine’s message through more inclusive platforms, such as the OECD, the WTO or the G20. Despite the fractured nature of these multilateral institutions, engaging with them would demonstrate the EU’s genuine commitment to collaboration on a positive vision for the global economy. This could strengthen alliances with Europe’s likeminded partners, enabling the doctrine to be an instrument of unity, not division.

Third Plenary Findings

• An overarching vision: A European economic security doctrine can encapsulate an essential overarching vision for European economic security, which can be adapted into tailored approaches for specific industries and supply chains.

• Strategic realism: A doctrine could create cohesion among fragmented areas of economic security policy, but it is important to remain realistic and strategic about its potential impact.

• Careful communication: The doctrine’s language must be carefully crafted and communicated to gain the support of international partners and prevent it from being weaponised by adversaries.

Conclusion

The second meeting of the RUSI European Economic Security Taskforce featured a series of constructive and forward-looking discussions. Over three plenaries, Taskforce members emphasised the urgent need for enhanced systems to enable greater economic cohesion among member states; improve interdepartmental coordination at the EU level; and strengthen collaboration with international partners and the private sector. These structures, and other existing economic security initiatives, could be aligned under a doctrine that articulates an overarching vision for European economic security. Such a doctrine would need to be carefully crafted and communicated to ensure it serves as a unifying, not divisive, instrument on the world stage. While the meeting underscored the practical and ideological complexities of this goal, Taskforce members expressed strong optimism about the potential for likeminded actors to unite in developing a proactive and positive response to shared economic security challenges.

The Taskforce will continue to examine emerging issues for economic security in 2025, including the future of transatlantic trade relationships, key priorities for PPPs, and the security implications of Europe’s economic interactions with China.

Eliza Lockhart is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Finance and Security at RUSI. Her research examines matters at the intersection of law, finance and global security. Eliza is a lawyer and legal policy expert with experience advising on economic security, hybrid/state threats, electoral integrity, risk and compliance, and disruptive technologies.