EW In Land Operations

The electrification of the battlefield to the point where every soldier carries electronic equipment has greatly improved the ability to coordinate land formations and situational awareness, and therefore the tempo and lethality of land forces. This has also created a pervasive presence within and dependency on the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). A force’s competence in manoeuvring in the EMS and its ability to disrupt or deny enemy manoeuvre in the EMS are therefore determining factors in its competitiveness. This means that electronic warfare (EW) has shifted from being a niche force multiplier to become an all-arms concern. This paper outlines what has changed in EW operations and assesses how this should impact force design within NATO militaries.

EW performs three critical functions for the force:

1. Electronic surveillance allows the force to detect and track adversaries, understand friendly vulnerabilities, and collect and analyse adversary waveforms.

2. Electronic attack can jam enemy communications and navigation, inflict permanent damage on enemy electronics, or provide a vector for the delivery of cyber payloads to corrupt adversary networks.

3. Electronic defence disrupts enemy kill chains and interferes with enemy munitions to protect the force from precision strike. Capabilities for all three functions are now needed, covering all echelons.

Meanwhile, the manner in which EW effects are fielded is changing in three ways:

1. The digitisation of the battlefield reduces the requirement for bespoke EW systems, as EW software-defined radios (EWSDRs) can be programmed to perform a wide range of EW tasks.

2. The miniaturisation of EW systems (and of the batteries supporting them) allows these capabilities to be fielded much more broadly.

3. Algorithmic warfare allows for the mass generation of bespoke EW payloads, reducing the power required for a given effect.

Dealing with these changes is not an abstract question related to a notional future battlefield, but instead applies to the capabilities that are necessary to remain survivable today: in Ukraine, for example, EW has become a company-level asset.

Preparing the British Army

If the British Army is to prepare effectively for the evolving threat landscape that these EW changes will bring, several measures are necessary:

1. Education on the EMS should be delivered to all arms. The key is not to make every soldier an EW operator, but rather to make all arms spectrum-aware, and to ensure that tactical commanders understand electromagnetic principles well enough to have conversations about planning and deconfliction with EW specialists.

2. Training must allow for EW capabilities to be used routinely, so that soldiers become familiar with the procedures for identifying that they are under electronic attack and for resolving the ensuing frictions. Troops also need to be surveyed in the EMS by friendly EW teams so that they can learn how their electronic signatures appear to the adversary. In order to apply effects without revealing capabilities to the adversary, it may be necessary for some elements of EW to be applied in synthetic environments.

3. A programme should be established for procuring EW equipment to make the capability available at echelon. At its most basic, this means providing EWSDRs and associated receive/transmit antennas at a rough density of one per platoon. This would be overly costly if attempted for the whole force, but should be rolled out brigade by brigade over time.

4. Investing in the EW capability also requires a means of visualising the EMS within mission planning software so that battlespace management of EW effects can be brought down to the brigade and battalion level. There is an architecture and software requirement here, but also training of commanders in how to properly employ and command EW troops will be necessary. Furthermore, there is a need to examine the scaling of EW specialist signallers within existing formations.

5. Land forces must understand EW in the context of the joint force, and plan and train to: receive effects from space, air and maritime forces; help deliver effects for cyber forces; contribute effects in support of air and maritime forces; and suppress enemy space-based capabilities. This joint awareness requires closer collaboration between the Air, Land and Maritime Warfare Centres to ensure the development of joint tactics and the representation of other domains in domain-specific exercises. Failure to implement these measures will see the force cede its competitiveness to adversaries that are investing heavily in EW as an effective counter to legacy NATO advantages of coordination and precision.

Introduction

When Excalibur precision artillery rounds were first deployed in Ukraine, they hit their intended target 70% of the time, with misreported coordinates by those calling for fire largely responsible for the 30% that missed. By August 2023, at the height of Ukraine’s offensive aimed at liberating its occupied territories, just 6% of Excalibur rounds landed on target. The cause of this precipitous decline in effectiveness was Russian electronic warfare (EW).

EW has been a key tool in warfare for more than a century. However, for most of this period the primary task of EW units within land forces has been the detection and interception of enemy communications. Although contemporary Russian forces have placed an emphasis on jamming as an enabler of manoeuvre, this activity has historically been confined to the denial of fixed bands of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) for short periods, over a defined area. Generally, EW operators have been specialist force multipliers, with functions obscure to the majority of the force.

Today, the vast majority of military systems, down to those carried by the individual soldier, are electronically powered, while most modern force multipliers depend on the EMS. As forces become more integrated, they also become more vulnerable to electromagnetic interference, whether from the enemy or from friends. Mastery of EW determines a force’s efficiency and its cohesion at every echelon. While exquisite EW effects remain sensitive and specialist capabilities, EW is nevertheless the business of the whole force.

This paper discusses how EW has evolved, its impact on modern land operations, and how it should be integrated into combined arms operations in the land domain by NATO forces. The paper is based on observations of the effects of EW between 2021 and 2024 in Ukraine, in Israel and on exercises in the US and elsewhere, as well as on interviews with engineers in communications companies and government laboratories, and with operators across several states, including the UK, the US, Ukraine, Israel, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Australia.

The exact capabilities of specific EW systems remain highly sensitive, but the principles of what is possible are not. Moreover, as EW has become an intrinsic part of all combined arms operations, rather than a discrete force multiplier, it has become vital that its principles are more widely understood, so that it can be integrated into operations by non-specialists.

Structure and Focus

This paper is divided into three parts. As the paper is written for a non-EW-specialist military audience, Chapter I considers the principles of EW and how they relate to contemporary military operations. Chapter II examines what has changed about EW, and what is likely to become possible in the medium term, while Chapter III discusses how the force can best integrate these emerging capabilities into its structure – and the challenges this will create.

The focus in this paper is the employment of EW by land forces. NATO air forces and navies are extensive users of EW, and their systems are already far in advance of what is generally fielded by land forces. However, these capabilities are hard to replicate for land forces, as aircraft and ships have access to power levels and angles of alignment, and can carry antennas. EW must be utilised differently in the land domain, and this paper is solely concerned with that domain. The impact of modern EW in the air and at sea, as well as in space, is a worthy subject of study, but is better dealt with separately.

There is also a separate question about how naval and air EW can support land operations, and how land EW can support operations across the other warfighting domains. The authors address this in a range of other studies relating to joint approaches to operational problems, but it is worth emphasising that, to be able to implement the approaches discussed in these studies, each domain must have its own robust EW capability.

I. The Principles of EW

Before discussing how EW is evolving and its impact on modern military operations, it is necessary to briefly describe the core principles of how EW works. This chapter discusses the electromagnetic environment (EME), which constitutes the EW battlespace, how effects move through this environment, the military functions of EW, and the principles of their coordination.

The Electromagnetic Environment

The EME comprises the distribution of electromagnetic energy that is transmitted across the full spectrum of frequencies, within a geographic area. For the purposes of this paper, the discussion is primarily concerned with radio frequencies and not the bands of the spectrum containing infrared, visible and ultraviolet light, X-rays and gamma-rays. There is always a level of background electromagnetic activity and radiation, and this varies in intensity and saturation from place to place. Natural electromagnetic energy includes the Earth’s magnetic field and the build-up of electrical charge in the atmosphere that becomes observable in lightning. Solar flares cause significant electromagnetic energy that affects the portion of the Earth facing the sun.

In addition to natural electromagnetic energy, other emissions and fields are created by conducted energy resulting from human activity. For much of the 20th century, and across most of the world, such human-created emissions were limited. Moreover, most of these emissions were regular – radio stations, for instance, emitted at a specified frequency from known locations at a consistent level of power. In any given area, therefore, an electromagnetic survey would indicate which parts of the spectrum were occupied, and these surveys would remain reasonably accurate over a sustained period.

Several technologies have disrupted this state of affairs. First, the proliferation of satellite-based communication and navigation, alongside cellular communication, means that there is almost nowhere on Earth that remains unaffected by human-caused electromagnetic emissions. For example, the premise of global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) – satellite constellations that transmit signals to receivers in order to provide positioning, navigation and timing services – is that the constellation is sufficiently dense to enable a receiver on any part of the Earth’s surface to have line-of-sight to three to four satellites, thus allowing the position of the receiver to be triangulated.

Second, the emergence of digital (rather than analogue) hardware means that systems can be tuned to multiple, precise frequencies, allowing many more systems to broadcast and communicate at any given time within the same area. To use a musical analogy, the piano – which is an analogue device – has 88 keys, allowing for 12 notes to be played across seven octaves (with four additional notes). These notes comprise, in total, 52 tones and 36 semitones. However, a digital synthesiser can dynamically retune an electric piano to play a piece of music with quarter tones or octo-tones, such that – within the same number of octaves – it is possible to have hundreds of notes. Moreover, whereas adjusting the tuning of a normal piano would need to be done manually, key by key, digitisation allows software to rapidly retune devices in real time. Similarly, within a given band of the EMS – analogous to an octave – a digital system can distinguish between a far greater number of frequencies.

Third, the miniaturisation of computing owing to the microelectronic revolution means that there are now far more devices that emit and receive electromagnetic frequencies, and which are portable. The result is that the EME is becoming far denser all over the world, with more frequencies being used at any given time. Moreover, increased portability enables more devices to move in and out of a given geography, so that the EME is becoming less constant, and, because digital systems can be adjusted rapidly, there is less consistency as to what is emitting on a given frequency. Digitisation also allows specialist equipment such as military frequency-hopping radios to be drastically more complex in the patterns of emissions that it can generate. As a result, not only is the EME becoming denser, but finding the military signal of interest is also becoming increasingly difficult.

To effectively operate in the EME, therefore, it is necessary to understand which frequencies are being used, which are not, and what any given frequency is being used for.

Frequency, Alignment and Power

The mechanisms of EW revolve around the frequency, alignment and power of emissions.

Using light – the visible spectrum – as an analogy, frequency is comparable to shades of colour. Each colour, such as red, yellow and blue, has a range of shades, from lighter to darker. Similarly, each frequency band in the EMS encompasses a range of individual frequencies, from higher to lower. Emissions occur on a given frequency and can be distinguished from one another. However, it can be difficult to distinguish frequencies that are extremely close to one another, and even harder to distinguish different emitters on the same frequency. For example, while it might be difficult to track one orange dot amid 49 red dots, it is even more complicated to distinguish a red dot in the middle of a field of 49 other red dots.

Alignment characterises the direction in which an emission is travelling. To continue the analogy with light, if a laser pointer is shone onto the surface of the eye from the side, it is likely to be merely annoying. If it is shone directly into the pupil, however, it may be painful and prevent the person from seeing much else. If the laser pointer is shone onto the back of the person’s head, they will not see it at all. Alignment, therefore, can enable communications devices that operate on the same frequency to distinguish between different messages, because a receiver pointing in one direction will not track an emission on the same frequency coming from outside of its field of regard. Conversely, careful alignment of emitters can also prevent some receivers from detecting the emission.

The power of an electromagnetic emission determines both how far it travels before dissipating, and how a signal interacts with other emissions of the same frequency. To continue the above analogy, imagine two widely separated lights of the same colour being turned on in front of your eyes: one is a low-wattage bulb, and the other is a high-energy LED. Now picture them being brought closer together: the likelihood is that as the difference in spacing (alignment) between these two light sources diminishes, at some point the low-wattage bulb will become essentially invisible, while the more powerful light will remain visible (although there may be some reduction in the clarity with which it can be seen). Similarly, a more powerful emitter may render a weaker emission on the same bearing and frequency invisible (although the weaker emitter may reduce the clarity of the stronger emitter’s signal).

Another important consideration as regards power is that electromagnetic emissions constitute the transfer of electrical energy – the power of emissions can reach a level that saturates the capacity of a receiver. This phenomenon makes it possible to use an emission on a different frequency to prevent other frequencies being detected, or even to cause permanent damage to the receiver. A good analogy would be to consider what happens if you are exposed to extremely loud noise: it will prevent you from hearing any other noises, and it may be painful or even damage the eardrum. Similarly, high-power output on a given frequency can saturate or even damage a receiver, while lower-power emissions could still be pushing out energy, even if they are not readily perceived. A regular challenge in EW is to detect those faint signals of interest amid much louder signals.

EW therefore involves the detecting and mapping of the frequency, alignment and power of emissions, and emitting in such a way as to interfere with enemy systems.

Surveillance, Attack and Defence

The functions of EW can be divided into three broad categories: surveillance, attack, and defence.

Surveillance involves surveying the EMS to detect emissions and thus inform friendly forces about who is communicating, where they are, and, in some cases, what is being said. Electronic surveillance can range from simple identification and direction finding to the mapping of enemy tactics, techniques and procedures, thus providing the ability to anticipate enemy actions by building up catalogues of indicators and warnings. Another, more sensitive, function of electronic surveillance is to gather the waveforms of specific enemy emissions in order to assess how target systems might be affected at a technical level. Finally, surveillance is used in signals intelligence collection, which comprises the detection, identification, geolocation, decryption and demodulation, recording and dissemination of signals of interest to relevant parties either in real time or slow time.

Electronic attack (EA) is the creation of emissions to attack enemy systems. The most basic EA function is jamming, which is achieved by saturating the receiver of a target system by emitting on a particular frequency band, thereby preventing intended messages from reaching the recipient. High-power EA can physically damage target systems by overloading a receiver with electrical energy (note too that distance has a significant impact on the effectiveness of jamming). Jamming of this kind can also be directed at systems like radar to effectively degrade what they can see. The effect of much EA is to reduce the distance at which a radar can read returns, rather than preventing the radar from doing so entirely.

EA can also be undertaken to provoke enemy systems in ways that will facilitate their electronic surveillance by one’s own forces. For example, some communications systems will have reversionary modes, or will mask as another system but unmask if denied the use of the system they are pretending to be. EA can therefore be used to trigger behaviours in the target system that would not have been observable if there was no interference. Understanding the tactics, techniques and procedures of a target in response to jamming also strengthens the ability to identify, discriminate and track targets.

Similar but distinct from jamming is spoofing, whereby an emission is targeted at a receiver such that the recipient believes they are receiving a signal from a friendly system, when they are in fact receiving a corrupted signal from an unfriendly system. An example of this is GNSS spoofing. Because GNSSs are very low-power systems, it is possible to direct a higher-power message on the same frequency within an area, making it impossible for the receiver to distinguish between the unfriendly spoofer and one of the real satellite’s emissions. The spoofer can then send a bogus location and timestamp, so that the receiver triangulates its position using false bearings and is therefore spoofed into believing the satellite is in one location when in fact it is in another. Navigational interference of this nature can cause ships or aircraft to lose their way – or even crash – if they are wholly reliant on GNSSs for navigation, and can cause guided munitions to miss their targets. For this reason, ships, aircraft and precision-guided munitions often use additional navigation capabilities (such as inertial navigation systems) to reduce the severity of any ill-effects stemming from interference.

More sophisticated forms of EA include protocol-based EA and EA-delivered cyber attack. Protocol-based EA directs emissions at a target that cause it to respond in a manner that is either inappropriate or damaging to the target. Again, a musical analogy can illustrate the difference between jamming or simple spoofing and protocol-based EA. If a pianist close to you plays the chord of C major at high volume while another pianist, further away, plays C minor, you are unlikely to hear the latter chord; this effect is akin to jamming. Now imagine that the more distant pianist is playing a sonata, and that someone suddenly bangs on the keys of the piano that is closer to you, producing a discordant noise. Most people would flinch at such a disturbing noise and automatically turn towards the source of the encroaching sound: the combination of surprise and discomfort at the discordant notes, disrupting the sonata, is a predictable response. A protocol-based EA endeavours to produce similarly predictable results in the technical workings of a system by directing particular waveforms at it. In the most severe cases, a protocol-based EA may cause a system to react in a way that is physically harmful. It can also allow a receiver to be jammed while using a much lower power level, just as the playing of the discordant note may cause the listener to lose their concentration and awareness of the progression of the sonata, even though the latter is still audible.

EA-delivered cyber attack is different from protocol-based EA in that it is not concerned with how the system reacts to the signal, but is instead the transmission of a message, the contents of which constitute a cyber payload. An attacker spoofing a GNSS, for example, substitutes the GNSS signal with a different message. In contrast, an EA-delivered cyber attack might, for example, replace the triangulation equation with an adjusted one, so that the system would henceforth always “correct” the actual GNSS signal by a specified distance and direction, even after it was no longer being engaged by the EA system; this effect would last until the software was patched or refreshed.

It is also possible to sequence protocol-based EA and a cyber attack. For example, imagine an enemy camera that is receiving instructions from and streaming video to an enemy command post. It is possible to use protocol-based EA to convince the camera that the signal being emitted to it is on its control frequency, but to then transmit a cyber payload that causes the camera to broadcast an inserted video clip on a loop, or to send back the same five seconds of recorded video again and again, so that the command post sees no change in the observed environment, masking what is really happening in front of the camera.

Finally, it is worth briefly discussing EA that is specifically intended to do physical harm to a target. For example, directed-energy weapons like high-power microwaves are designed to saturate receivers and electronics with electrical energy such that they burn out. These weapons have significant potential to target and damage unhardened targets, such as many classes of drone.

The mechanisms of electronic defence are no different from those of EA, but are conversely directed to the protection of friendly forces. Electronic surveillance, for example, becomes electronic defence when it is used to monitor friendly forces’ emissions and then to provide warnings about what those emissions are revealing to the enemy. Likewise, jamming enemy radar is a form of EA, but may be used to protect a friendly aircraft if the radar is trying to guide a ground-to-air missile, at which point it becomes electronic defence. Another form of electronic defence is to spoof or otherwise disrupt a munition or targeting system such that a strike misses friendly forces. The capabilities required for electronic defence are therefore the same as those needed for attack and surveillance, but the placement of the systems on the battlefield may differ, because they need alignment with different targets. The importance of electronic defence has been significantly amplified by the pervasive threat from UAVs, which depend significantly on the EMS.

Manoeuvre in the EMS

EW is often prone to collateral damage and fratricide. As civilian systems have populated more of the spectrum, the availability of frequencies for military use that will not interfere with civilian systems has become very constrained. Ruining a popular radio station’s signal may not be particularly consequential, but interrupting emergency services communications has legal and humanitarian implications.

Furthermore, urbanisation has created complex environments with uneven line of sight, such that systems without dense and fixed infrastructure often have very uneven coverage, complicating the support of communications for military forces. Another issue is that friendly forces use and depend on access to the EMS for their own communications, and since jammers will often be closer to friendly receivers than their targets, it is easy to accidentally collapse friendly networks. Navigational interference may provide electronic defence for a friendly headquarters, but it may also prevent communication by desynchronising the precision-timing function of cryptographic systems, effectively constituting a protocol-based EA on the headquarters. (This is because frequency-hopping requires precise timing between the radios in a network, so that all radios remain tuned to the correct frequency.) Navigational interference could also interfere with the calibration of guns, causing friendly artillery to be spoofed.

Successful employment of EW requires careful battlespace management. Historically, this has been relatively simple, because there have been small numbers of EW troops, whose effects have often been tightly bounded. As the EMS becomes increasingly crowded, however, even just preventing friendly communications from interfering with one another is made increasingly challenging.

A further challenge to discrimination in the EMS is shadowing and exploitation of civilian networks. Militaries are increasingly employing civilian cellular communications as reversionary communications bearers. Conversely, non-state groups in Syria, for example, use civilian navigation systems to coordinate strikes on the basis that they assume Western forces derive too much benefit from the civilian network to countenance denying access.

The ability to manoeuvre in the EMS not only requires solid data and an up-to-date electromagnetic survey, but also demands that manoeuvre warfare officers sufficiently understand the principles of EW and EA outlined above. Only then can they determine when they will be dependent on different parts of the spectrum and make trade-off decisions between their command-and-control (C2) requirements, electronic defence requirements, and deconfliction obligations over different geographies and at different times during an operation.

II. Emerging EW Capabilities

Other than cyber payloads and protocol-based EA, all the principles described in chapter I were essentially in place at the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, there have been significant developments in EW over the past decade that have transformed both how it can be used by land forces and what is needed to remain competitive in modern combat. This chapter outlines these developments.

Integrated Sensing

The fielding of software-defined radios (SDRs) throughout the battlefield offers the possibility to transform both electronic reconnaissance and the data gathering necessary for EA. SDRs are not just communications devices – they are miniaturised computers that can dynamically program emissions for a wide range of purposes, from communications to EW.

Historically, EW baselines have comprised groups of specialist EW operators working across three locations to be able to triangulate their detections, while deploying dedicated EW equipment. EW baselines have also provided the opportunity for signals intelligence collection, although this has required each team to record frequencies and then share these recordings with their supporting intelligence and analytical structure. The limitations of this system are obvious: EW operators are a valuable and scarce resource, limiting the number of baselines that can be fielded. The Armed Forces of Ukraine, for example, spent most of 2022 and early 2023 having to field baselines of two EW positions, giving less precise locations of detected emissions, because they had insufficient personnel and equipment to maintain the optimal three per sector.

By contrast, SDRs, attached to appropriate antennas, can enable a wide range of military vehicles to be turned into baseline positions, integrating a large number of sensors. Whereas an analogue device is necessarily tuned to one frequency, to the exclusion of others, a software-defined communications system can receive on multiple frequencies, and, while translating one to sound or data for the user, can simultaneously log the detection, bearing and strength of the others and – if part of a networked system – transmit these detections in very small data packages. In this way, every unit potentially contributes to the EW baseline. Not every unit will be drawn on in practice; often, units will not be in a suitable position to fulfil this role. However, when units are occupying appropriate ground, the opportunity exists. The possibilities of using a widely distributed network of sensors are expanding even further as SDRs become ubiquitous on uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) that overfly the frontline, allowing EW collection to be extended into the enemy battlespace in order to catch relatively low-power transmissions and to reduce constraints on what can be detected because of the alignment of emissions.

The capacity to disperse and expand the number of collection nodes means that they will often be closer to the point of emission, meaning that lower-power emissions will be practically detectable and improving the survivability of the EW teams. Erwin Rommel, for example, used an EW baseline to great effect in North Africa against the British. But he only had one such system, which was located and destroyed; he was unable to regenerate the capability until he was deployed to Normandy. By separating collection from analysis – with the latter function requiring specialists – it becomes possible to better preserve EW operators and maintain capability.

Another important advantage of dispersed yet integrated sensing is that it allows for a sustained presence across the front. The old task of recording specific waveforms to refine attacks or optimise tracking of key systems was often frustrated by the fact that a system might illuminate too far from an EW team to be recorded, and then displace before the EW team could reach the relevant location. If sensors are distributed, however, it is possible to program equipment to flag when a waveform of interest is detected, and to record it and prioritise its transmission rearwards. A centralised EW team can monitor these waveforms of interest across a wide area. Waveforms can also be studied from different sensors as they move around the battlefield, so that long-duration recordings of emitting systems can be built up to see not only how the system behaves over time but also how it reacts to effects that might cause interference, from either EA or fratricide with other systems in the opposing force. In any case, as frequency-hopping and other methods are used to improve the robustness of communications, building up recordings of the hop pattern allows for a more refined picture of which radio is communicating, or to predict where the pattern might be under varying conditions.

A distributed EW capability allows for regular updates to the electromagnetic survey of the background environment. Collecting localised signals from many points increases the speed at which a picture of emissions patterns across the battlespace can be accumulated and disseminated. Furthermore, the accumulation of more data, with greater fidelity, is both exploitable by AI and allows analytical tools such as AI to have a better foundation with which to assess the environment. The ability to accumulate and assess regular EME surveys allows electronic surveillance to provide regular updates for planning in order to apply fires, plan routes for and launch UAS, or prepare a communications plan.

It will remain necessary to field dedicated EW platforms, as some specific enemy systems may use low-probability-of-detection or -interception techniques that can only be captured by specialist equipment, or the distances involved may demand dedicated antenna arrays to pick up signals. It is also necessary to be able to draw on and contribute to joint EW capabilities and national technical means. But by narrowing the range of routine tasks that dedicated EW teams are assigned, the integration of sensors should allow for these assets to be used in a more targeted way, improving coverage and thereby reducing the periods when monitoring is not available.

Adaptive Payloads

Software-defined systems allow for the acceleration of bespoke attack payloads being used in EW as the standard form of attack. The ability to record waveforms allows them to be examined by software and, as long as the desired effect can be designed, for the most precise and effective countermeasure to be programmed. In some cases, this may be possible at the edge. A group of four SDRs, for example, may have one set to attack and three set to receive, and will thereby both monitor the bearing of the target – enabling proper alignment of the attacking antenna – and track the evolution of the emission pattern of the target system over time (and as it responds to stimuli from the attacking system). This creates a feedback loop that enables the attacking system to outperform the target system, sustaining the jamming even as the defensive system endeavours to evade the effect.

The distribution of attack systems is somewhat different from that for surveillance systems, because conducting a successful attack requires not only an appropriate antenna, but also an appropriate source of power. This may be less of an issue when the power source is vehicle-mounted, but dismounted units will need power sources, whether they are battery packs or a generator. EA also necessarily requires emission, making the emitting unit itself a target for enemy electronic surveillance and subsequently for fires. Distributing a greater number of points of attack allows signals to be generated closer to the target, potentially increasing effectiveness, while limiting the risk of the overall EA system. The point of attack can also be switched between positions, or the attacking antenna could be geographically separated from the SDR, operator and power source. This latter case would facilitate a counter-battery engagement at the loss of only a single antenna, in an ideal case. The more points an attack can originate from, the greater the number of tactical options there are for how it is managed. Opportunities in this space become even greater if the offset antenna is mounted on an uncrewed system and is thus mobile.

Since protocol-based EA requires an understanding of how a waveform is received and what subsequently happens to the hardware within a system, the distributed reconnaissance capability does not allow for dynamic generation of these payloads. However, the use of algorithms to rapidly exploit captured equipment and thereby generate payloads closer to the front – and faster – does offer the prospect of a highly responsive EW capability development cycle. A distribution of attacking EW nodes also makes it possible for a sensitive payload to be held back before being pushed forward to a specific system once a target is identified by reconnaissance. Once delivered by that EW node, the payload could then be wiped from the device without the user needing to know that they were holding a sensitive payload. This approach makes it possible to remotely generate effects while also reducing the information security issues associated with pushing EW platforms and operators forward into tactical formations. By using protocol-based EA, it is also possible to reduce the power demands for a given effect.

The opportunity to deploy adaptive payloads against enemy communications is accompanied by the ability to provide agile electronic defence at echelon. For example, an enemy UAS may use a command link to receive instructions, and may offload live video to a base station. It may also rely on a GNSS for navigation. It can therefore be envisaged that distributed electronic surveillance may identify the pattern of traffic between the UAS and its base station, and that a counter-UAS system may identify the navigational pathway used by the UAS. At this point, it may be possible for the unit over which the enemy system is flying to jam the control frequencies used by the UAS, for an adjacent unit – noting the low power levels associated with a GNSS – to jam the navigational frequencies associated with the platform, and for a dedicated EW system with greater range (or a friendly unit in closer proximity) to jam the receiver of the video link in a synchronised manner. This would probably only be possible for a short period, but may provide the unit under observation with the time necessary to get a counter-UAS interceptor into position, or at the very least take appropriate measures to conceal critical systems.

It is also worth dwelling on the fact that while the distributed and dynamic payload-delivery capability described above offers advantages over past approaches to EA, the distribution of electronic defences across the force at all echelons is also essential for survivability, given the modern threat environment. Now that platoons can organically generate precise lethal effects out to 20 km, the ability to disrupt enemy kill chains is an essential capability for enabling manoeuvre without an unacceptable rate of attrition of personnel and materiel. As attacking systems use the same software-driven processes to rapidly update their navigational technique and communications protocols, the transition to a software-driven and dynamic EA architecture is not just a path towards advantage, but is vital for keeping pace with a rapidly evolving threat. Understanding that this process will be implemented by tactical echelons for their own preservation, even if it is not prepared before a conflict, shapes the command decision to erect such an architecture. The question is not whether such an approach should be attempted – for it is essential – but how well it is implemented.

Dynamic Command and Control

The surveillance, attack and defence capability described above creates a chaotic and complex electromagnetic battlespace. If a communication system is dynamically hopping frequencies in response to targeted EA by an adversary, and these hops are being tracked by the adversary’s electronic surveillance so as to inform the EA that is following the hops, then there is no way for either side to know beforehand which parts of the spectrum will be covered by the engagement. This is because software that is reacting dynamically to EA is not displaced by the attack to a pre-agreed contingency frequency but instead generates frequencies of opportunity depending on which parts of the spectrum are available and which parts are denied. The risk is that as multiple systems engage in this process of attack and evasion, the spectrum becomes extremely congested such that it is either effectively unusable over a given area, or else is unreliable and therefore denies commanders the ability to plan effectively.

It should be noted that under these conditions commanders on both sides may choose to turn off their EA capabilities, and in the absence of interference, this may lead to stable frequencies becoming occupied by both sides’ communications. This is often the case in Ukraine, where both sides have a strong desire to deny one another the use of UAVs but there is also a demand from commanders to have access to UAV feeds. The result is that both sides tend to lower jamming for particular periods and to sit very close to one another in the frequencies they use to operate UAVs, thereby preventing the other side from jamming them without also causing problems for their own ISR feeds.

If both communications and EW are being executed by the same SDRs, there are opportunities for the behaviour of the systems to be deconflicted technically. First, if EA and communications protocols are updated through software injections, then it is theoretically possible for the effects to avoid overlap. The deployment of algorithms to the edge or near-edge on individual platforms could increase the speed of real-time deconfliction in response to battlefield inputs while further reducing the cognitive burden on EW operators. Power level, alignment and range are also important. If EA nodes can be directed on the correct bearing – triangulated by the surveillance baseline – this can reduce or avoid the effects on the receivers of friendly communications systems. It is also only necessary for EA and communications to be deconflicted within the range parameters of the given EA effector. This means that deconfliction within a friendly tactical network will probably be necessary, and also eminently achievable. Scaling this manner of deconfliction across the force would be drastically more difficult, but is unlikely to be required.

Understanding the relationship between geography and emissions therefore becomes a critical consideration in how commanders draw their unit boundaries, with the potential requirement to draw a unit’s physical boundary of responsibility and area of interest separately from drawing its electronic boundary. This would thereby allow – for instance – seams in friendly electronic defences to be used to route UAS through areas with less electronic interference, thereby avoiding having to turn off electronic protection to push forward surveillance assets. This would also conveniently address the need to warn friendly units of impending overflight in order to avoid fratricide, by confining overflight to established routes that had been identified during the allocation of battlespace.

It is also important to note that modern technology alters some of the requirements for when units communicate. For example, the usual view is that once a unit is in contact, it should communicate freely, as its position is known to the enemy, and it needs the ability to coordinate its movement and fires. The need to coordinate movement laterally within the echelon in contact persists. However, with overhead observation, it becomes possible for higher echelons to observe the progress of the fighting and thereby organically generate fire support with very little communication with the echelon in contact. There is certainly no need for forward controllers to talk guns onto target. The result is that while a force may avoid jamming tactical communications frequencies in contact, it may continue to try to deny enemy artillery through GNSS jamming, and use EA to try to break inter-echelon communication, accepting that this may conflict with its own ability to call for fires in support of the manoeuvre.

At present, EW is largely managed at the divisional level in US doctrine and in British practice. The UK in particular has a history of fielding small EW teams that operate more independently, but the allocation and exploitation of product from these teams is often managed at a national level, making them a strategic asset. What is described above, as regards C2, would not be feasible within this structure. Put simply, a small EW cell at division would be saturated by the complexity and speed at which EW effects would need to be sequenced.

The problem with endeavouring to conduct EW battle management at a lower echelon has generally been the scarcity of operators and assets. However, while the scale of coordination is increasing, the provision of more intuitive decision support tools and the ability to display the EMS in a manner that can be visualised should reduce the training burden for some aspects of EW C2 and allow it to be carried out in a more distributed manner. The best current example of this kind of technology exists in air forces, where the need for pilots to conduct mission planning at speed has created a range of ways to display EW laydowns in relation to geography.

The challenge is not so much making the EME comprehensible to non-specialists as it is integrating this picture as a layer into other C2 tools used to plan and execute traditional manoeuvre. This represents a software integration challenge, but is achievable. The use of algorithmic tools can also help to show the interdependencies of activity, so that a change to one variable in a planning tool automatically adjusts the electromagnetic scheme of manoeuvre. Nascent tools like this are already in use by the US military, such as the Electronic Warfare Planning and Management Tool, which should become more effective as it becomes cross-referenced with other C2 applications through the US Army’s C2-Next programme.

Multi-Domain Effects

It is important to briefly discuss how the changes outlined above relate to the multi-domain fight, since the EME is a plane of manoeuvre which intersects all domains. Although this paper focuses on land operations, these are unavoidably effected by EW from other domains and vice versa, as the EME is a shared manoeuvre space for all domains. For example, ground force GNSS-denial routinely affects civilian and military aircraft operating in the vicinity, while a GNSS is itself a communications link emitting from space to the terrestrial domains. This section is concerned less about how EW is used in other domains than it is with how EW from other domains will impact ground operations.

Space

The most significant domain for the future of EMS operations is space. We may presume that unless an area of space is mutually denied by space debris, both sides will, in any peer or near-peer conflict, have access to dense constellations of satellites able to detect electromagnetic emissions. This does not necessarily allow tactical echelons to obtain this data in time for their fight, and therefore does not replace the need for electronic surveillance in ground units. However, it does mean that there is a reduced requirement for tactical units to share their picture of the EME up-echelon, because, from division and above, it is probably possible to provide regular and rapid electromagnetic surveys taken from space. It also means that tactical echelons will be persistently exposed to space-based observation from higher echelons, meaning that targets which stand out as high value or have unique signatures are likely to be found and struck. This increases the value in distributing EW capabilities and confusing the picture by making it flatter and more homogenous, with emissions continuously varying and locally unpredictable. This ability to track identified targets into operational depth from space also significantly increases the value in obtaining high-quality recordings for emissions signatures.

Space also offers the opportunity for EA. While this activity can be conducted against a very wide geography, tasking satellites in this way will only be possible against high-priority targets, such that while it remains an option, it does not reduce the requirement for EA at echelon.

Air

The air domain is the domain in which EW is probably most mature. EW has been critical to air forces ever since radar became the primary means for air defenders to track aircraft. The ability to locate and target defensive radar, to disrupt the accurate tracking of aircraft and to reduce the engagement ranges of surface-to-air missiles has been fundamental to an effective ability to penetrate and prosecute attacks into enemy airspace on a sustained basis and at scale. The successful use of each of these capabilities routinely leads to tactical or operational effects on land. Moreover, the ability of aircraft to carry electronic countermeasures (ECMs) to protect themselves from missiles – irrespective of the domain from which they were launched – is also central to any modern combat air capability. Air battlespace management – being dependent on radio frequency communications and radar – is also a key target for EW as a means of degrading the scale and synchronisation of enemy air activity. The emergence of precision strike, meanwhile, means that radar and electronic surveillance are core components of how aircraft engage in effective close air support. The development of stand-off munitions has not reduced the importance of EW, requiring the fielding of both penetration aides and decoys, and making navigation a contested capability critical to mission success.

The maturity of air EW capabilities means that land forces can be fast learners, as some of the same dynamics emerge in land warfare. There is also the opportunity, however, for land forces to better assist the air domain by conducting EA against both enemy air defences and enemy aircraft. The threat from the air also makes EA against air targets a highly useful capability in protecting land forces. However, aircraft can carry large and exquisite antennas, have access to abundant power, and can assume line of sight over very significant ranges out to 400 km, so many effects against air targets will need dedicated generators and antennas if land forces are to be effective. However, the software determining the emissions pattern may still be routed through the same EW SDRs. Land forces, unlike aerial EW, have the advantage of a persistent presence, whereas air effects are necessarily periodic, constrained by fuel and threat.

Maritime

Maritime EW remains a viable means of tracking enemy vessels, while radar and its defeat remains critical to tracking surface targets for the use of anti-ship cruise missiles. The primary means by which Russia tracks Ukrainian uncrewed surface vessels (USVs), for example, is through their electronic emissions, allowing the Black Sea Fleet to intercept most Ukrainian USVs using helicopter guided to the intercept point by EW capabilities. Ships also depend on EW as a means of disrupting one another’s missiles.

The spatial separation of land and maritime forces means that there is likely to be limited EW interaction between the two, other than in the context of coastal defence missile complexes, where land-based capabilities threaten shipping. However, whereas pervasive space-based observation poses a manageable risk for land forces that can distribute and flatten their emissions profile, space-based tracking of a surface action group through its emissions is harder to passively counter. As satellites become critical for the guidance of anti-ship ballistic missiles, navies will have to take a more aggressive approach to counter-space operations. Naval vessels have the antennas and power to conduct effective EW targeting space-based assets, and we may therefore presume that navies will routinely use EA against satellites. This is not a trivial task, as it requires highly calibrated alignment. Range also imposes constraints on what can be achieved given energy dissipation, making protocol-based effects critical. Nevertheless, navies will have to invest heavily in this area. This is likely to have an indirect effect on land forces by reducing the reliability and the availability of space-based communications and other capabilities when operating in a littoral environment. Given that navies are likely to possess this capability, land forces need to determine both how they can mitigate disruption to space-based assets, and where they may draw upon naval capabilities to protect themselves from enemy space-based observation, or even attack.

Cyber

There is an intersection between EW and cyber activities. Cyber attacks are distinct in their operational tempo and logic compared with EA. Whereas EA is immediate, cyber attacks require a protracted period of reconnaissance, penetration, payload design, emplacement and trigger architecture to generate. They are also unpredictable insofar as patches of the target system can either invalidate a payload or alter how it will impact the system within which it is embedded. However, EA is a means to both infiltrate cyber payloads and trigger them. The critical intersection here, therefore, is in planning, designing and building a pathway to distribute payloads to EW elements. There is also the fact that as the battlefield becomes widely connected by software-defined systems, the attack surface increases, such that cyber defence becomes an integral and critical function, which, from a task management point of view, will necessarily interface with the signals organisations that run EW.

III. Fielding Competitive EW

Having surveyed the basic principles of EW and how their application is evolving, this chapter turns to how these capabilities are best distributed and fielded in a modern land force. Although it could be argued that any SDR may now be used to conduct EW (given enough power and the right antenna), that does not mean that every radio should be employed in this way. This chapter therefore seeks to address several practical questions: What is the appropriate density of systems? Where are there requirements to retain bespoke EW platforms? And, in a context where there are many more EW systems than expert EW operators, where should these personnel be distributed?

Distributed Effectors and Networked Operators at Echelon

The concept of distributed effectors has been described above. Making this a reality, however, requires a detailed answer to the question of how many EW systems can and should be fielded across a force at each echelon. If we begin with the logic that each independent element of the force requires organic electronic defence to be survivable, then this means that any combat grouping must have an EW capability. We may consider a combat grouping to comprise a platoon or troop, made up of four vehicles or three squads/sections of soldiers and a command team. This is the minimal practical force element likely to occupy a piece of terrain. It is also worth noting that while the distribution of ECMs to defeat IEDs has been practised below platoon, this led to platoons fielding two multiples, rather than three sections, as the weight of these ECMs required additional soldiers in each section to carry the requisite equipment. While this was feasible in a counterinsurgency context, it would be overly disruptive to platoon tactics in a peer conflict, and so retaining the three-section structure means that managing EW systems at the platoon level as the lowest echelon appears reasonable. For vehicles, the weight constraint is not a factor, so the density of systems can be higher. If we therefore envisage the basic EW kit as comprising an SDR capable of either electronic surveillance, attack or defence, a suitable antenna for either receipt or transmission, and a power source, this produces a reasonable planning assumption for the density of these systems.

Platoon

The infantry platoon may be envisaged as having one such EWSDR and a power source, but with each section carrying antennas capable of both defensive and offensive functioning.

The laydown of the platoon’s EW capability, therefore, may be framed as follows. On the offence, one section may carry the EWSDR with antenna set to receive, contributing a single point for an EW baseline in electronic surveillance. Upon contact, or coming under observation, the platoon could set the antenna to transmit and maintain an area electronic defence against UASs or GNSSs while conducting offensive manoeuvres. Alternatively, the platoon could ground-base the EWSDR with a power source and have a series of networked antennas provide defence during an offensive action. Connecting four antennas to it, three would form a reconnaissance baseline and one an attack function, or all four an attack function, over the depth of a platoon attack. On the defence, each section might mount its receiving and transmitting antennas around its dugouts and connect these by cable to the EWSDR, connected to a dug-in power source, so that the platoon can have a defensive perimeter of jamming, as well as an organic EW baseline. The EWSDR, connected to an appropriate dedicated bearer network or Starlink terminal, or exploiting other bearers of opportunity, could then transmit the data and receive direction from higher echelon.

For a vehicle platoon, the density of systems would comprise one EWSDR, with a receiving and transmitting antenna on each vehicle, so that the platoon has an effective means of protecting itself, or else forms a baseline of up to four nodes. The functionality of the EWSDR would be very limited for the echelon, with options for a surveillance function, radio frequency (RF) jamming or GNSS jamming to be on or off. RF jamming could either feed off the detections from the surveillance function or be on specified frequencies determined by higher echelon, with instructions from higher echelon adjusting the frequencies being jammed. For EA, there is also the opportunity to mount the antenna and EWSDR on an uncrewed platform to offset the emissions from the actual vehicles.

Company

The requirement at company level would be minimal as regards additional capability, since the company commander’s main task would be to issue instructions as to the disposition of the antennas fielded by the company’s subordinate platoons. However, there would be value in an EWSDR being held by the company command group, with a display terminal allowing the company signaller to monitor the aggregated electromagnetic picture built up by the company’s distributed sensors. This could be achieved by the EWSDR allowing the aggregate picture across its associated tactical communications and information systems to be accessed via authenticated laptops connected to the EWSDR by cable. Thus, if required, any unit with an EWSDR could monitor the company electromagnetic picture, although this situation would not generally be the case. The company command post, if it is connected to higher echelons via SATCOM or another higher-bandwidth system, may also be the routing point for sharing the aggregated electromagnetic picture with higher echelons. Android Team Awareness Kit and other existing C2 tools already have the functionality to display the electromagnetic picture, if it can be transmitted. The priority is to expand the availability of this picture for systems like ZODIAC without duplicating pathways.

Battalion

It is at battalion level that the need for a dedicated EW section as part of a signals platoon becomes critical. Put simply, the number of EWSDRs distributed across a battalion means that the unit must have the ability to maintain their functionality in peacetime, necessitating a team with the relevant expertise. From the point of view of efficiency, possessing this EW logistics function at battalion is most desirable, as it represents an economy of scale between fielded systems and maintainers, while still being close enough to the user to be responsive to tactical demands and engaged with the tactical outcomes. In combat, this section would have wider utility. First, the section would be using the collected electronic surveillance picture to advise the battalion commander and support the battalion intelligence officer. Second, this section could possess the expertise to distribute updates to the battalion EW baselines in order to ensure that jamming was targeting frequencies in use by enemy UAS and other systems. The section could also determine which recorded signals deserved transmission to higher echelons for analysis. Third, as part of the planning process, this section could liaise with higher echelons to receive effects to be transmitted to platoon EWSDRs and thereafter turned on by the platoon under the conditions determined by battalion and company plans. This section, therefore, would be the nexus for integrating tactical EW with the company schemes of manoeuvre.

Brigade

Brigade is the echelon at which two factors critically intersect. First, as the echelon able to generate full combined arms groupings to successfully execute individual tactical actions, brigade is the echelon best placed to manage the deconfliction of EW effects between those arms. A battalion needs to deconflict, but owns its core assets under permanent command. A brigade integrates functions that train and are generated separately. As multiple kill chains and coordination mechanisms must intersect at brigade, this is the echelon that is appropriate for making sure that battalion EW assets do not threaten the efficiency of brigade fires or air defence. Second, brigades are the appropriate echelon to have dedicated EW capabilities to deliver bespoke effects or effects at greater range against higher-value targets. To achieve this, a realistic scaling appears to be the fielding of an EW company with a troop supporting the brigade headquarters with battlespace management, and troops crewing dedicated vehicles with larger EW antennas, generators and their own SDRs. It is likely that one of these troops would be primarily responsible for the electronic defence of brigade assets and enablers, especially logistics elements. The other troop would be dedicated to EA against priority targets, used proactively to shape and disrupt the enemy.

Division

At division, responsibility would therefore pivot from its current position of planning and deconflicting the employment of EW to acting at the boundary between tactical EW and national technical means. First, there is the provision of collection from the division’s subordinate elements to national technical means for analysis, and second, there is the drawing on national technical means to push bespoke payloads to subordinate elements. The division is likely the echelon best able to receive the surveillance picture from its subordinate elements, and to have the analytical capacity to analyse it. It is also likely to be able to receive this picture from the joint force and so compare the joint picture with that generated by its subordinate echelons. Further, the division likely has the ability to direct the assets of its subordinate brigades to assist with joint operations, or to field requests from the brigades to use higher-echelon EW to enable tactical actions. It is equally arguable that this function should sit at the corps level, with the division primarily concerned with the electronic defence of its rear area and critical sites using dedicated EW troops. The purist’s solution would likely be the latter one, but as few NATO forces operate at the corps level, most are more likely to find it necessary to field this function at the division level.

Cyber Security

A final consideration is the responsibility – likely concentrated at division – for assuring the cyber security of the networks across the formation, which must include the networks supporting the C2 of EW. This same element may also be responsible for the planning and distribution of cyber payloads where the EW enterprise is the delivery mechanism. Given the security classification of these capabilities and therefore the challenges in executing this planning, the division is likely to be the most realistic echelon at which a presence of appropriate personnel can be maintained. Nevertheless, it is necessary for the EW enterprise below the division to understand how to receive and execute capabilities generated from within the cyber function of the divisional headquarters.

Overcoming Challenges

In many respects, there already exists a scalable industrial base for the manufacture and procurement of the SDRs outlined above, their associated antennas, and even the C2 software for managing these assets. The network underpinning the C2 model is also deliverable with existing technology. The main barriers to fielding such capability are organisational and bureaucratic, rather than being related to development of/access to technology.

Procurement

Military C2 functions have historically been distributed by warfighting function, and therefore locked in with different companies that have a limited interest in integrating with the C2 tools of others. The drive towards open architectures has reduced this as a structural problem, though procurement processes lag behind institutional intent. Although industry incentives and therefore behaviour are changing, the process of breaking down these barriers is often prohibitively expensive at the whole-of-force level, resulting in only isolated pockets of integration existing in cross-domain functions. Such silos impede the integration of multiple specialised domain-specific functions, leading to delays and the further breaching of budgets. Similar dynamics apply for communication equipment procurement. Although domain integration has fewer requirements at the tactical radio level, it remains critical to combined operations.

Wider concerns about procurement strategies aligning more closely with platform-centric approaches further inhibit the ability to field competitive EW. Software-defined systems, whether tactical SDRs or higher-echelon capabilities, require constant software injections both to continue basic functionality and to respond to rapid battlefield changes. Shifting to software-as-a-service approaches permits greater long-term flexibility in the industrial relationship to maintain the delivery of such updates, but can exacerbate reliance on a small number of software vendors. Open Architecture standards provide the opportunity to expand the number of vendors able to contribute to a given system. Broader discussions of whether to mandate vendor-agnostic systems or establish the defence estate as the software owner fall outside the remit of this paper, but decisions in these areas will certainly affect the agility of EW capabilities.

Integration

Even when procurement of discrete systems is possible, the question of integration with existing capabilities persists. Unless it is possible to replace entire systems simultaneously, a degree of effort will be required to enhance backward compatibility when integrating legacy systems with new capabilities and enablers. A high-intensity war could also see a piecemeal procurement process where forces field a mosaic of EW equipment, requiring some level of interoperability. Software-defined systems can mitigate the burden of the legacy equipment, but reliance upon strategies of spiral development, or re-engineering architectures for greater openness, may also be necessary. This is already the practice in a wide range of industries, but is not yet fully realised in the way defence manages programmes.

The integrated sensing across the force described earlier requires continuous deconfliction and redelegation of assets at echelon to maintain functionality, yet bandwidth limitations and latency constrain the amount of raw data that edge sensors can transmit to higher levels for processing. As such, greater processing and compute capabilities will need to be delegated to tactical levels not only to process and retask SDRs, but also to filter the data that can – and must – be transmitted to command levels. Latency-sensitive intelligence would take priority for edge processing, while other data could be transmitted upwards, either to other edge or near-edge processors or to cloud-hosted applications. Relatively unsophisticated algorithms can accomplish some of the basic processing functions at platoon level, with compute increasing in correlation with command size and distance from the edge. Technically integrating such a model is feasible, although it would require both the EW architecture to maintain strict data standards (to ensure integration between platforms and systems) and for operators to be knowledgeable about data functionality. All this can be resolved, but managing the hardware and software changes across the existing force in a fiscally constrained environment is not programmatically simple.

Assuring the Force

It is one thing to conceptualise a software-defined EW enterprise for ground forces, but quite another to field one that can operate effectively. Even successful procurement and technical integration of the equipment would not create a fieldable capability. EW capabilities are far too often trained in their silo, rather than as part of a combined arms exercise. This prevents commanders from being exposed to the capability and from becoming familiar with how to plan and integrate it into operations, thereby producing serious friction in real-world combat scenarios.

The starting point, therefore, is that the basic principles of EW need to be a component of low-level all-arms training. Officers do not need to be technical experts, but they do need to understand the concepts of application, so that they can ask the right questions of their EW operators and make reasonable planning assumptions about how to integrate EW into their scheme of manoeuvre. All ranks also need to be made aware of what is (and what is not) possible with EW, so that they practise effective discipline in managing their emissions. As EW becomes a core combined arms function, it must be demystified. Training which does not address EW risks teaching units false lessons.

Training the force is complicated by four factors. First, EW introduces significant uncertainty into how systems perform, which raises safety risks during training, as imprecise navigation, for example, can disrupt safety measures to deconflict forces. Second, electronic defeat of a force may significantly disrupt the training of other arms, because important exercise opportunities will be wasted while most parts of an all-arms force wait for a small cadre of signallers to resolve connectivity issues. Addressing this issue is partly about redefining it from being an opportunity cost to being a wider training opportunity related to something that could occur frequently on operations. Third, live EW can affect civilian systems, including aircraft navigation, so finding areas where there is the opportunity to both manoeuvre forces and emit without posing a risk to civilians can be a challenge. Fourth, there are security concerns associated with EW related to the fact that if forces emit their attack frequencies, these can be recorded by enemy space-based electronic surveillance and so countered. (This concern does not apply to using electronic surveillance to train friendly forces on their own emissions.) In general, these four factors combine to prevent realistic training. Nevertheless, combined arms training utilising EW is critical to assuring the readiness of the force.

These issues can be resolved in a number of ways. Many of the process challenges and much of the uncertainty imposed by EW on commanders can be replicated in synthetic environments supporting command post exercises. It is therefore possible to effectively train officers in the battlespace management and deconfliction challenges that emerge from EW without jamming during live exercises. Accurate simulation of EW effects against synthetic systems can also be used to reduce the problems associated with emitting under observation and thereby exposing waveforms and capabilities.

Electronic surveillance, meanwhile, can be integrated into live exercises. This is routinely done at the US National Training Center, but is less common in Europe. Giving commanders an understanding of their own signature in the spectrum is an effective means of convincing them that the capability can have utility for them. Training officers to become familiar with when and where to establish EW baselines and how to erect these capabilities is best done during battalion exercises rather than in simulated environments, as synthetic environments will not create an intuitive feel for causes of friction and for the time and effort involved in carrying out the task properly. In most European militaries, the shortage of EW personnel is a major barrier to being able to integrate capabilities into exercises in this way.

Finally, as EW becomes a core component of combined arms manoeuvre, forces need to appreciate that many tactical effects are no longer especially sensitive. For example, the update cycle on UAV techniques and communications means that exposing the ability to jam a system is to cede a couple of weeks of development at most. When it comes to tactical UAVs, it is far more important that troops know how to detect and protect themselves from UAVs, and that the EW personnel know how to update their jammers, than it is to assure day-one jamming against a specific UAV type. In any case, it is likely that the UAV in question, if used at large scale in the enemy force, will have already been adapted by the time a conflict breaks out. It is also critical that friendly UAV operators are familiar with adapting their platforms and using tactics to get around EW systems. There is therefore considerable utility and limited risk in having live exercises in which UAV teams seek to fly through/around defences erected by EW troops. This would need to be done at a location where the permissions and regulatory environment are favourable to flying UAVs that may not be under control. Having such a site, however, is vital for assuring the readiness of the force, and with the right control measures, the exercises there can be conducted safely.

Conclusion

The digitisation of the battlefield has seen the electrification of every aspect of warfare, down to the equipment of an individual dismounted soldier. This has vastly increased the situational awareness available at all echelons, the lethality and precision of weapons, and the scale and complexity of what can be planned and coordinated. However, it also means that the force is pervasively present in the EMS and therefore potentially vulnerable. Effectively exploiting this threat surface offers myriad tactical opportunities. Neglecting the preparation of forces for an intensely contested EMS is to risk having one’s forces found, struck and disrupted throughout their operational depth. This paper has sought to outline how EW can be fielded to ensure that forces are competitive on current and future battlefields.

The capabilities described in this paper represent a step-change in what current military forces routinely field and deploy across NATO. All the constituent technologies already exist, however, and are fielded – in isolation – across the force. Moreover, while NATO forces have not prioritised EW, adversaries and partners certainly have. EW is a brigade asset in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, while Russia has gone beyond fielding EW companies at brigade to also issue “trench EW” systems routinely fielded at company level. Russia has also made significant progress in integrating these capabilities and centralising the accumulation of electronic reconnaissance to accelerate their kill chains. In short, the capabilities advocated for in this paper not only offer opportunities to the force, but also can be considered to be the basic requirement to remain competitive against pacing threats.

EW systems can be expensive, and as NATO forces try to regenerate combat power there is a significant opportunity cost in prioritising spending on force multipliers – like EW – without sufficient forces to be multiplied. Fundamentals must come first. Nevertheless, an examination of the rate of attrition from precision fires a force will face if it lacks electronic defence shows that fielding appropriate EW capabilities at echelon significantly improves the survivability and resilience of the force. Furthermore, the software and programmable systems that allow sophisticated EW effects to be generated are now fieldable using comparatively cheap components. The multifunctionality of software-defined systems also reduces the need to have fleets comprising multiple different capabilities aimed at different targets. Perhaps the biggest challenge in getting EW prioritised correctly is culture, as it remains a small specialism that much of the force finds hard to visualise. This must change, because EW is now an all-arms business.

If British land forces are to field competitive EW systems, professional military education needs to create a cadre of junior and field-grade leaders to understand how to think about the EMS and plan operations that manoeuvre through it. It is also imperative that all soldiers are “spectrum-minded”, such that they have a basic understanding of why the spectrum is vital, how it enables effects and manoeuvre, and how their own presence within it creates potential vulnerabilities. Further, it is necessary to create synthetic and real-world training environments where forces can experiment with EW capabilities. The force needs to receive the SDRs and associated antennas so that they can practice, adapt and learn to use them as a routine aspect of operations. It may not be possible under current budgetary conditions to fund such a high density of systems across the whole force, but iteratively rolling out capabilities within units would allow the relevant tactics and distribution of capabilities to be refined without massively increasing in-year spending. Regardless of the roll-out mode that is employed, the end result must be that British forces are competitive in the EMS if they are committed into action.

Jack Watling is the Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at RUSI. He works closely with the British military on the development of concepts of operation and assessments of the future operating environment, and conducts operational analysis of contemporary conflicts. Jack’s PhD examined the evolution of Britain’s policy responses to civil war in the early 20th century. Jack has worked extensively on Ukraine, Iraq, Yemen, Mali, Rwanda and further afield. He is a Global Fellow at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC.

Noah Sylvia is Research Analyst for C4ISR in the Military Sciences team at RUSI. Noah holds a BA in International Relations and Russia & Eastern Europe from the University of Pennsylvania. He has previously researched asymmetric warfare, emerging technologies in the military and military coalitions during wartime.