Engage With The Taliban?

Three years have now passed since the humiliating retreat from Afghanistan. The UK has been fortunate that the US has borne the brunt of the opprobrium but, in truth, the Whitehall failure was equally shocking. In classic British tradition, the disaster is being rewritten as a Dunkirk-style “backs to the wall” triumph, with claims that the Taliban victory could not have been predicted. In fact, it was both predictable and predicted. There is little danger of lessons being learnt.

On 14 August 2024 the Taliban staged an impressive military parade at the former US air base at Bagram showing off the vast range of Western equipment that was left behind, including Black Hawk helicopters, MRAP mine-resistant vehicles, and Humvees. Far more serious are the thousands of semi-automatic weapons, millions of rounds of ammunition, artillery shells and (particularly) night-vision goggles that are now available to the many terrorist groups based in Afghanistan, some of which intend to destabilise neighbouring countries and further afield.

In the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) there is a sense of anticipation that David Lammy, the new foreign secretary, intends to make Afghan relations one of his flagship policies. Position papers are being prepared for meetings in early September.

Lammy visited Afghanistan in June 2022 and alleged that “the UK government’s woeful lack of leadership that was so visible last year is continuing as it ignores the humanitarian catastrophe. Ministers must urgently set out a comprehensive strategy for engaging with Afghanistan…” In reality, there is no need for political contact to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, most of which is delivered by the UN and international NGOs. In 2022 the FCDO provided £286 million in aid to Afghanistan and co-hosted an international conference which raised a further $2.5 billion. The British HALO Trust continues to undertake its vital work of removing Improvised Explosive Devices, which killed dozens of civilians – mainly children – last year. Such aid must continue, even increase, because the Afghan people did not want or deserve a Taliban government foisted on them by a craven US negotiation.

Official-level contact with the Taliban continues, with Robert Dixon – the British charge d’affaires – visiting Kabul regularly from Qatar. In a meeting with a senior Taliban official only two weeks ago, he was quoted as highlighting “London’s commitment to collaborating with [the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] to enhance global relationships”. If correctly reported, this sounds like the first indication of a new policy in the offing. This may be the first real test of Lammy’s progressive realism.

In the absence of serious opposition to the Taliban and with no appetite to restart the cycle of armed insurgency, most countries have decided that quiet engagement is the answer

So why should the UK engage with the Taliban? There are three reasons: to improve its understanding of the terrorist threat; to stop the harassment (and occasional killing) of those Afghans who served with British forces (such as the Triples); and to address the problem of migration.

We should pause here to consider the Taliban of 2024. The much-trumpeted Taliban 2.0 was always a work of fiction, a press line cobbled together in Pakistan and swallowed whole by Western officials. The British Defence Chief at the time described the new Taliban as “country boys” who needed to be given space to show they were reasonable. However, the Taliban won the war against NATO, brought peace to the country and will likely be in power for a decade or more.

At present there are two main wings of the Taliban. The most influential group is based in Kandahar under the Supreme Leader Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada. These Kandaharis espouse a fundamentalist interpretation of their role. “We were created to worship Allah and not to earn money or gain worldly honour” was Akhundzada’s recent riposte to the Taliban government in Kabul, which wants international recognition and economic progress to reduce unemployment.

However, it would be a mistake to see the Taliban government in Kabul as moderate in any conventional sense – although the Pakistanis refer to them as the “saner Taliban”. Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani is a terrorist of long standing. Only two months after the victory in August 2021, he celebrated suicide bombers and their families at an event in the Intercontinental Hotel. Defence Minister Mullah Yaqub, meanwhile, is the son of the former Taliban Emir (or Amir) who gave Osama bin Laden sanctuary in Afghanistan before 9/11.

It is true that Deputy Foreign Minister Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai spoke out in favour of female education in December 2023, and his comments were but one indication of policy tensions within the Taliban. But, as in Iran, it is the word of the Amir (or Supreme Leader) that prevails. Taliban enthusiasm for outreach to the West is largely tactical, to alleviate the financial and economic chaos into which they have plunged their country. In particular, they are seeking the unfreezing of Afghan state assets held overseas.

Could the Kabulis overthrow the Kandaharis? In theory, yes – the blood-soaked Haqqanis alone have the capability. In practice, though, this is implausible. Akhundzada is the “Amir ul-Momineen” or Commander of the Faithful and is imbued with full religious authority. It would be a terrible crime from which the perpetrators would never recover. The best that the Kabulis can do is use the power of argument to secure small adjustments in policy.

So Lammy and his FCDO officials should have no illusions about who they are dealing with. There is no chance that the Taliban will accord women their rightful place in society. At best, Whitehall can hope for small incremental steps on women, human rights and terrorism.

Although no country has yet recognised the Taliban as the official government of Afghanistan, there is a great deal of guile behind the scenes. Pakistan, Iran, Russia and China were all represented at the Bagram parade. A further 20 diplomatic missions in Kabul are now staffed, including those of Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and the five Central Asian Republics (CARs). In the absence of serious opposition to the Taliban and with no appetite to restart the cycle of armed insurgency, most countries have decided that quiet engagement is the answer.

However, no-one is finding engagement easy. Pakistan, in spite of its decades of ill-considered support for the Afghan Taliban, has failed to obtain any cooperation against the TTP (often known as the Pakistan Taliban), which mounts terrorist attacks inside Pakistan. China has offered to include Afghanistan in its massive but ailing Belt and Road Initiative, but has not found sympathy for its request to hand over Uyghur militants. Even Qatar, which hosted a Taliban diplomatic mission when the group was fighting NATO forces, is finding that the Taliban prefer to deal with the UAE.

In an ideal world, London would demand full women’s rights and counterterrorist cooperation in return for installing Dixon in the UK’s embassy in Kabul. However, maximalist demands have no chance of being accepted. This is what happens when you lose a war. As a regional Islamist told the author: “Losers can’t be choosers”.

The central question is whether engagement can extract sufficient benefits to be worth the risk of being credibly accused of selling out on fundamental women’s rights

So, what realistic measures could the UK require from Afghanistan before reopening its embassy in Kabul? There are four principal areas:

• Women: A recent survey by the UN found that 64% of Afghan women felt unsafe leaving their homes (compared to 2% of men). Women’s safety is one area where the UK could push for change, as a first step towards other gradual improvements.

• Terrorism: There is clear evidence that the Taliban are fighting Islamic State Khorasan Province, and this is an area where the UK could benefit from cooperation. However, the Taliban are also playing host to a vast array of other terrorist groups and individuals – including Al-Qa’ida and the TTP as well as Balochis, Uyghurs, Uzbeks and Chechens – who will remain unmolested.

• The Triples: There is still evidence that the Taliban are hunting down members of the British-trained and sponsored Special Forces units, 333 and 444. Any move towards engagement should require a full and monitored amnesty for the Triples, including assisted transfer to the UK if requested. This could lead to further cooperation on migration to the UK, preventing Afghans from having to resort to a perilous 4,000-mile journey followed by a Channel crossing at the mercy of predatory smugglers.

• Heroin: 90% of heroin on UK streets comes from Afghanistan. The continuing Taliban prohibition on cultivation should be welcomed, although there is now Fentanyl to plug any gap in supply. The UK could work with the Taliban to explore alternative livelihoods for newly impoverished opium farmers, using the extensive work conducted in London during the 2000s.

None of this can be done in isolation. Afghanistan would provide an ideal subject for Lammy to collaborate with other countries, not just the G7 and the EU but India, Turkey, the Gulf states, the CARs and even China. There is a great deal of global unanimity on what is required from Afghanistan. The key is to leverage change but to demand conditionality at every stage. This is something that both Trump and Biden failed to do after the Doha Accords.

The central question is whether engagement can extract sufficient benefits to be worth the risk of being credibly accused of selling out on fundamental women’s rights. However, there is no point in pretending the Taliban do not exist. So, Lammy should proceed, but with extreme caution. If he gives too much in return for too little, he will become the latest of many generations of UK politicians to underestimate the political dangers of Afghanistan. The probability is that any hopes of genuine change will ultimately perish on the rocks of the Amir’s theocratic obduracy.

Tim Willasey-Wilsey is a Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI. Tim has a particular interest in the Kashmir dispute, Afghanistan, and the stand-off on the Korean peninsula. He served for twenty-seven years as a British diplomat in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Europe.