CN’s Emergence As Superpower

A Graphic Comparison of the United States, Russia, China, and Other Major Powers

Anthony H. Cordesman | 2023.08.15

This report compares the key trends in civil and military power in the United States, developed democracies, China, and Russia. The graphs, maps, and tables in this report only highlight a limited range of the complex changes involved, and reliable data are often lacking for the years after 2020. They still show, however, that the civil and military role of the world’s major powers is in a process of dramatic and unpredictable change.

The Key Impact of China’s Emergence as a Major Global Economic Power

China has emerged as an economic superpower that rivals the United States in many ways, although the total economic power of modern democracies — most of which are strategic partners of the United States — vastly exceeds the size of the Chinese economy, trade efforts, and efforts in technology and research and development. China also faces major internal challenges created by outside restrictions and economic sanctions, its handling of Covid-19, and state interference in its economic development.

Nevertheless, China is already competing with the economies of developed democratic states on a global level. Its “belt and road” efforts to establish economic ties to developing states and control critical minerals and resources. It may succeed in creating a rival economic bloc that can function and grow outside the “rules-based order” democracies created after World War II, and it is already competing in its relations with a number of developing states and other countries.

The trends presented in this report show that this competition may well become an ongoing confrontation between China and its allies, and developed democracies and their strategic partners, unless radical changes take place in Chinese policies and leadership. And — as is discussed shortly — is a growing level of civil confrontation that is being matched by military confrontation as well.

Russia’s Diminished Global Economic Role

The following graphics show that Russia is not an economic superpower now that it has lost control of most East European states and many of the Central European and Asian elements of the former Soviet Union. Russia has long lagged badly in total economic growth, trade, research and development, and all the other major areas of economic power. Russia’s size, geographic position, and large oil and gas reserves do, however, still make it a key global power.

Key Uncertainties in the Civil Impacts of Economic Power

It should be stressed, however, that current trends can only tell part of the story. Any analysis of economic and civil power will be shaped by many key trends that cannot be quantified. They include the longer-term impacts of the economic stresses between and within developed states, the impact of internal politics, the impact of demographic change and population pressure, and the impact of global warming. They also include the degree to which the developed democracies can succeed in cooperating and creating truly functional economic strategic partnerships. As yet, governments often rely far more on rhetoric about such cooperation than on taking tangible action, although there are positive indicators as well.

The graphics in this analysis also do not include the developing world. Here, the allocation of international economic power has generally favored developed states. As the UN, World Bank, IMF, and a host of NGO reports make clear, many states have failed to move towards effective development and face major challenges from failed or corrupt governance, repression and internal division, population pressure, limited water supplies, and climate change. For all the former rhetoric about globalism, this includes at least one-third of the world’s nations.

At the same time, there are cases like India, where the trends in global power could move in other directions. While they are not yet positive enough to include in this analysis, India has overtaken China as the world’s most populous state, has a GDP of some $9.3 trillion, and ranks high in terms of total military spending. Several major petroleum states in the Gulf are taking positive steps to develop beyond a reliance on energy exports, as are some states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. For all the failings in the developing world, they are also important potential successes.

The Impact of Trends in Military Power

The graphs and tables that follow show that the United States remains the world’s largest military power, the one with the most combat experience and highest levels of total spending and investment in modernization, and the one with the strongest strategic partners.

It is also clear, however, that the United States already faces growing competition from China, particularly in the Pacific and in the Indian Ocean as well. In the case of Taiwan, competition has already turned to serious confrontation and the risk of war. Once again, China has vastly increased its capabilities since 1990, as well as its military links to other Asia power. Much depends on the United States’ ability to strengthen its strategic partnerships with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and other Asian states — as well as European states with major power projection capabilities like Great Britain and France.

The Uncertainties Driven by the War in Ukraine

At the same time, the United States and its strategic partners face a major challenge from Russia and one that current U.S. national strategy tends to seriously understate. As the graphics show, Russia may not have an economy that can fully support its present conventional forces, but it remains a major threat to the United States’ European strategic partners and NATO, and the Russian military threat must be given equal priority with that from China.

The trends shown in this analysis do not generally go beyond 2021 and cannot reflect the many longer-term changes in the military balance that are growing out of the war in Ukraine. It is clear, however, that the United States and its NATO allies are engaged in major proxy war, supporting Ukraine in its defense against Russia. They also are already rebuilding NATO’s overall level of extended deterrence against Russia, and doing so at a time when Vladimir Putin, Russia’s leader, has made it clear that he sees NATO as a major and continuing threat.

There is no current way to predict how the war in Ukraine will change the overall balance of military power and how and when it will end. It seems almost certain, however, that as long as Putin rules Russia, the United States and the rest of NATO will be engaged in a new Cold War, and one which will effectively match a similar Cold War between the United States and its strategic partners in Asia and China.

A Return to Nuclear Forces

As the final sections of this analysis also show, these two Cold Wars have a major nuclear dimension. The race to build up conventional military power is, in some ways, being outpaced by a new nuclear arms race. This race not only reflects the near collapse of nuclear arms control but a potential return to major tactical, theater, and dual-capable nuclear forces. It also is clear that Russia is now only a superpower to the extent it has inherited a massive legacy of nuclear weapons and technology from the former Soviet Union.

China’s Rising Economic Power Has Vastly Outstripped Russia and Competes with the U.S. and EU

But, China Does Not Compete in Per Capita Income and Russia has a Very Low Per Capita Income

China Has Become the World’s Dominant Manufacturer While Russia’s Rank Is Critically Low

China’s Technology Base Has Outstripped Russia and European States and Increasingly Competes with the U.S.

China and the U.S. are Major Global Traders

Russia Is a Third-Rate Trading Power – Falling Well below Major Western European Powers, Japan, and South Korea

Comparative Military Spending is Highly Uncertain, but the U.S. still has a Clear Lead.

China has made sustained major rises since 2000.

Russia has lagged badly since the early 1990s, but has made significant increases as a result of the Ukraine War.

Russia Is Still a Major Military Power but Its Reported Military Spending following the break up of the FSU was Far Below the Level Needed to Fully Sustain and Modernize Its Force Structure Through 2020-2021

Some Estimates Do, However, Reflect a Major Rise in Russian Spending Since 2021

The previous SIPRI data reflect a major increase from $65.9 billion 2021 to $86.4 billion in 2022, but this is not a serious rise not relative to the increases made by the U.S., China, and major NATO states.
The IISS report that the draft Russian 2023 budget, submitted to to the State Duma on 30 September 2022, showed that final core spending for 2022 rose from an original proposal of RUB3.50tr (USD50.0bn) to RUB4.68tr (USD66.9bn), with a corresponding rise in total military spending from RUB4.98tr (USD71.1bn) to RUB6.15tr (USD87.9bn).
Reuters reports that Russia spent 2 trillion rubles ($26 billion) on defence in January and February 2023, a 282% rise over the 525.4 billion rubles in the first two months of 2022, and driven by the conflict in the Ukraine.
Other estimates emerging from a Google search indicate Russia’s official 2022 military budget could be 4.7 trillion rubles ($75bn), or higher, and reach $84 billion for 2023. This is 40% more than initial military budget announced in 2021. They also estimate that Russia plans to spend a total of $600 billion on military and the police between 2022–2025, or $150 billion a year

Chinese Military Spending Has Led To a Massive Force Modernization Effort that Continues in 2023

Rises in spite of COVID crisis, investment crisis, and other issues.
Government fiscal revenues down 30-40% in some months of 2022.
Military spending up more than 7% in 2022.
Planned to increase by 7.2% in 2023

Arms Transfers Provide an Important Indicator of Comparative Strategic Influence and Security Assistance

The U.S. has cancelled its report on World Military expenditures and arms transfers, and there now is no reliable declassified estimate of the actual market value of arms sales.
SIPRI does, however, provide an well structure estimate of the total value of major weapons transfers based on estimates of comparable prices.
These SIPIR estimates indicate the the U.S. retains a massive lead over other providers of arms transfers and had 40% of the world total in 2018-2022.
Russia had a 16% share.
The other major arms sellers were largely strategic partners of the U.S.
China only had a 5.2% share, although it was increasing.

Russia Only Remains a True Military Superpower in Nuclear Forces

Chinese Nuclear Capability Is Growing Sharply

Seems to be more than doubling its stockpile of nuclear weapons. May have risen from around 200 to 350 by 2020. 272 operational for exiting missiles and bombs and 78 for new systems. Possibly grew by 118 warheads during 2020-2021. Estimates for 2023 are 410 weapons.
Have detected 270+ new missile silos. 119 in Northwestern China seem to be for ICBMs.
The Chinese Military Power estimates China may have some 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030, most deployed on systems capable of ranging the continental United States”
China has rejected arms control initiatives and provides steadily less transparency.
It is improving nuclear command and control and battle management systems.
Deploying advanced solid-fuel mobile ICBMs (DF-21 & DF-31/DF-31A/DF-32AG), MIRV’d liquid fuel ICBM (DF-5B), new MIRV’d DF-41 ICBM, Type 094 SSBN with JL-2 SLBMs.
Developing low noise 096 SSBNs and a 9,000 kilometer range 096 SLBM.
Progressively harder to determine what theater and short-range delivery systems may become dual-capable. DF-21 MRBM (2,150 KM) and DF-26 IRBM (4,000 KM) known to be nuclear. DF-21 is precision strike, dual-capable and could deliver low-yield nuclear weapons.
Modifying H-6 nuclear bombers to H-6N with refueling, missile carrying capability. H-20 stealth bomber in development.
May be evolving far beyond countervalue second strike capability. Examining use as theater warfare threat?

China Is Radically Changing Its Global Civil and Military Presence in Areas Once Dominated by the U.S. and Its Partners

“The ultimate in disposing one’s troops is to be without ascertainable shape. Then the most penetrating spies cannot pry in nor can the wise lay plans against you. It is according to the shapes that I lay plans for victory, but the multitude does not comprehend this. Although everyone can see the outward aspects, none understands the way in which I have created victory.” (Sun Tzu)

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