Are European Navies Ready?

Executive Summary

This report is part of the CSIS project Transforming European Defense. The goal of the project is to leverage the strengths of CSIS in political-military analysis and defense industry engagement to create a plan of action to rationalize European defense. It will develop specific recommendations for European policymakers to reduce inefficiencies and seek creative joint endeavors for European security. The project also develops recommendations for actionable initiatives that U.S. policymakers can engage with and push European allies to implement. This project thus seeks to impact policy on both sides of the Atlantic.

Although the war in Ukraine has put the emphasis on land warfare and the importance of controlling the skies, the naval dimension should not be overlooked. Strategic competitors’ fleets are growing in numbers, in tonnage, and in sophistication, and they increasingly contest maritime borders as well as international laws and customs applicable to the maritime domain. Faced with overlapping challenges, European navies are plagued by a number of issues such as poor availability of assets, lack of combat readiness, aging platforms, fragmentation, and insufficient coordination. This report outlines the main threats and challenges that Europeans face at sea and details the gaps in capabilities before providing recommendations for how to fill those gaps.

Introduction

As the Cold War became history, so did the prospect of conventional conflict at sea against a peer competitor — or so most Western capitals believed. The post–Cold War peace dividend ushered in decades of dwindling investment in naval capabilities and a refocus on low-end missions for Western nations. This contrasted with a massive naval investment by yet-to-become rivals, China and Russia. As Europeans awaken to a new era of strategic competition, they now face a highly threatening maritime environment.

Strategic competitors’ fleets are growing in numbers, in tonnage, and in sophistication; further, there is a proliferation of advanced missiles, sensors, and autonomous weapons, along with the application of disruptive technologies such as cyber and artificial intelligence (AI). A more assertive China is now at the helm of one of the largest navies in the world. The war in Ukraine has so far left Russia’s naval capabilities largely untouched. In addition to a buildup of capabilities, strategic competitors increasingly contest maritime borders as well as international laws and customs applicable to the maritime domain. Once unfathomable, modern naval warfare is now not so distant or unlikely of a prospect.

Although the war in Ukraine has put the emphasis on land warfare and the importance of controlling the skies, the naval dimension should not be overlooked. In the first weeks of the conflict, Russia quickly moved to block Ukrainian ports, laid sea mines, deployed its nuclear submarines, and effectively launched Kalibr missile strikes from the sea. Subsequent missile, drone, and autonomous vessel attacks by Ukraine on Russian forces — as well as decisions by Turkey to restrict access to the Bosporus Strait and the Dardanelles — have considerably hampered Russian maneuvers, showing the importance of controlling key choke points.

Europe has an economy equivalent in size to the United States or China, and its members combined have the largest exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the world. More than 75 percent of European imports enter by sea and 99 percent of its data is provided through undersea cables, while Europe’s navies and shipping firms rely on free navigation. Europe is therefore a global economic power with immense interest in maintaining free and open seas and respect for international maritime laws and norms, whether in the Indo-Pacific, the Mediterranean, the Baltic, or the Arctic.

Yet maritime security is now affected by challenges of increasing diversity and intensity. Unfortunately, the state of European navies is largely consistent with the broader state of European defense. Europe’s navies have suffered underinvestment for years, if not decades. The European naval landscape amounts to patchy, isolated, and often unconcerted national efforts. European navies are plagued by a number of issues such as poor availability of assets, lack of combat readiness, aging platforms, fragmentation, and insufficient coordination. Should a scenario of high-intensity warfare arise, European navies would likely be underequipped and underprepared.

As shown by the EU Strategic Compass and NATO’s Strategic Concept, Europeans are aware of the need to step up to this new strategic environment. Additionally, navies continue to play a vital diplomatic role, whether in the form of ship visits, naval exercises, or freedom of navigation operations. These activities send important messages to allies and partners — as well as to adversaries — about Europe’s strength, its dependability, and its resolve. Conversely, Europe’s lack of naval capacity means that Europe struggles to ensure the necessary level of presence at sea, undercutting its broader diplomatic standing. As Europe focuses on rebuilding its armies and air forces for a Russia contingency, it cannot neglect the naval domain.

But maintaining a strong naval capacity is a resource-intensive effort, and it comes at a time when every segment of Europe’s militaries calls for renewed investments, putting strain on still limited budgets.

European navies are facing several dilemmas. They must deal simultaneously with increased security threats along their shores and the need to increase their presence further away in order to protect sea lines of communication, their key interests, and the interests of their partners abroad, all of which can take them very far from their territory. Currently, due to its shrinking naval capacity, Europe has difficulties ensuring a permanent presence at sea in critical areas, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. It must invest in high-end capabilities to stand up to key competitors, but European countries also cannot afford to relinquish their assets for coast guard functions or neglect daily issues that can disrupt their vital supplies or could result in humanitarian catastrophe. There is a danger, as focus goes to rebuilding Europe’s armies, air forces, and missile defense capacities, that European navies will be deprived of investment.

In this context, this report explores ways to rationalize efforts to adapt European navies to this new and fast-evolving environment.

Threats in the Maritime Domain

Increasingly Intense and Diverse

While strategic competition on and below the seas is shaping maritime security, lower-end issues such as piracy, migration, and organized crime at sea have not disappeared — quite the contrary. These challenges are compounded by the effects of climate change and overfishing, which have evolved into the top concerns in some areas.

Strategic Competition at Sea

Powers aspiring to contest the world order are investing massively in their navies, equipping their warships with more diverse, advanced, and complex combat systems to gain a capability edge. They simultaneously call into question the laws, rules, and practices applicable to the maritime domain. The increased propensity for uninhibited aggression in sea lines of communication vital for Europe has been underlined by naval “incidents” such as the Iranian attacks on tankers in the Gulf in 2019 or some tense encounters in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

RUSSIA

The Kremlin has long sought to counterbalance the perceived superiority of its peers in terms of tonnage, number of ships, and force projection capabilities. The navy of the Russian Federation (Voyenno-morskoiflot, VMF) has developed highly capable submarines (such as the recently commissioned Project 08851 Yasen-M SSGN and Project 955A Borey-A SSBN) and powerful offensive missile systems with nuclear-tipped torpedo capability. Although it lost its Black Sea flagship — the Slava-class surface ship Moskva — two months into the conflict in Ukraine (the first destruction of a major warship in combat since the British frigate Sheffield during the Falklands war 40 years ago), the VMF is the only corps of the Russian armed forces that remains largely untouched by the war in Ukraine.

▲ Figure 1: The Russian Threat Axis. Note: The threat axis (defined by the red dashed lines) show the routes that NATO and the European Union will need to monitor for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. This will provide critical warnings and indicators of Russia’s maritime activities. Source: Authors’ research and analysis.

Moreover, it plans significant additions in the coming years, as it is working on the Surrogate-W unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) and on modernizing the fleet’s anti-ship missile capabilities through a process known as “Kalibrisation”: the widespread equipment of 3M14 Kalibr cruise missiles on a variety of vessels. This adds to the 3M22 Zircon hypersonic cruise missile, which is still in development and allegedly capable of Mach 9 speeds with a 1,000 km range.

The VMF is therefore set to evolve as the most critical naval threat to Europeans, with its ability to pose strategic dilemmas, to employ an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy, and to eventually engage in naval warfare with significant symmetric and asymmetric assets. However, it is unclear whether Russia will be able to maintain its modernization plans. Russia will likely prioritize the war in Ukraine, limiting the availability of certain assets like missiles. Its defense industries might also struggle to access or replace Western parts and components critical to its naval modernization.

CHINA

China has built a modern navy at great speed and now operates the largest navy in the world (in terms of number of ships, not tonnage, in which it remains second to the United States). Contrary to Europeans, the investment in modern capabilities for the People’s Liberation Army Navy has been underway for more than 25 years. It now possesses three aircraft carriers and has been moving rapidly to fill a gap in amphibious capability.

According to the U.S. Department of Defense, the overall battle force of China’s navy is expected to grow to 400 ships by 2025 and 440 ships by 2030 (compared to 290 for the United States by 2030), along with 5 aircraft carriers and 10 ballistic missile subs. China’s military modernization effort is aimed at asserting Chinese claims in what Beijing perceives as its hinterland: Taiwan and near-seas regions, particularly the South China Sea. This alone has the potential to affect Europeans, as it would give China leverage over key sea lanes of communication — 30 percent of global trade goes through the South China Sea.

Challenges posed by China are not limited to the Indo-Pacific. Beijing is also developing vessels capable of sailing far from its shores (a “blue-water navy”). It established in 2017 its first overseas military base in Djibouti, on the Horn of Africa. It simultaneously invests in dual-use infrastructures on key sea lanes of communication along its Belt and Road Initiative and in important ports in Europe (Piraeus, Hamburg), potentially developing facilities that China can use to conduct activities running counter to European interests (from espionage to navigation disruptions). Chinese navy ships are also conducting an increasing number of operations in the waters surrounding Europe, including the Mediterranean Sea and the Baltic Sea.

NORTH KOREA, IRAN, AND OTHERS

Other countries overtly challenge the international rules-based order and have also invested in their naval capabilities. The North Korean navy is tied to the nuclear program via Kim Jong-un’s personalized push for a submarine-based second-strike capability. It maintains one of the world’s largest submarine fleets, with estimates ranging from between 60 and 80 vessels, although these are mostly coastal and aging. It cooperates actively with China — notably because the navy plays a preeminent role in fishing, a sector in which Beijing’s interests are enmeshed with those of the Korean peninsula. The Islamic Republic of Iran has embraced a hybrid strategy combining conventional naval power — including capability buildup, such as the delivery of its Shahid Soleimani catamaran missile corvette in 2022 — and asymmetric warfare through thousands of heavily armed speedboats or sabotage activities against commercial vessels or offshore energy infrastructures. It has also instituted joint drills with Russia in the northern Indian Ocean.

KEY CHOKE POINTS

Strategic competition at sea is also defined to a large extent by the ability to control critical sea lines of communication and key choke points. Control of the Bosporous Strait is a major asset: for example, during the war in Ukraine, Turkey implemented Article 19 of the 1936 Montreux Convention, restricting warships from accessing the Black Sea. In this regard, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz are major Achilles’ heels for European countries, especially as rivals and competitors are trying to get footholds in the northern Indian Ocean, through which transits half of the value of the trade between the European Union and Asia. This underlines the importance of relations with countries such as Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

The regional situation in the eastern Mediterranean is also extremely volatile, with competing claims over resources and EEZs opposing all littoral countries (Turkey, Cyprus, Greece, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, and Libya). Although there have been some diplomatic breakthroughs — such as the agreement between Lebanon and Israel through U.S.-led, French-supported efforts — the majority of maritime boundaries in this region are not demarcated, and those that have been agreed bilaterally are contested by other countries in the area. Renewed tensions could therefore arise, as the situation frustrates the exploration, exploitation, and commercialization potential deriving from the substantial hydrocarbon resources present in this part of the world.

Turkey, although a NATO ally, has repeatedly provoked diplomatic or security incidents in recent years with other European allies and EU members in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey has a revisionist vision of its own maritime environment, encapsulated in its Mavi Vatan (“Blue Homeland”) doctrine developed by admirals of Turkey’s navy. It lays claims on a continental plateau and EEZs that are also claimed by Cyprus and Greece; this is exemplified by the agreement with Libya’s Government of National Accord in 2019 to establish a common maritime border, encroaching on Greece’s claimed EEZ. The matter is compounded by the large presence of hydrocarbons in disputed areas, leading Turkey to conduct illegal exploration and drilling — in which operating ships are escorted by Turkish military vessels — as part of a broader pattern of aggressive and assertive behavior at sea to advance its interests.

With new routes and economic opportunities arising from the receding of Arctic ice, the High North is also set to be increasingly disputed. Russia released a new Maritime Doctrine in July 2022 that presents the region as its most important focus, pledging to protect its waters “by all means.” This includes the introduction of new missile capabilities for its Northern Fleet, an increasing number of exercises, and the buildup of the largest icebreakers fleet, some of which are Kalibr-capable. Russia’s combined A2/AD and new offensive capabilities increase the vulnerability of the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap and expose neighboring Arctic countries such as Norway or Finland. In any NATO-Russia conflict, protecting this sea lane — and therefore the maritime link between North America and Europe — will be vital to the alliance.

Europeans also have increasing stakes in the Indo-Pacific, as the region is key for the future of Europe’s prosperity and security. Some countries have direct interests in the region, such as France through its overseas territories and its permanent military bases in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans; others are less directly concerned but acknowledge it as the epicenter of strategic and systemic competition as well as the top priority for their key ally, the United States.

▲ Soldiers of the Naval Special Forces Command take part in a boarding demonstration on board a frigate during the inaugural visit of the German defence minister to the German navy (Deutsche Marine) at the naval base in Eckernförde, northern Germany, on February 21, 2023.

Recent years have seen an unprecedented concentration of European warships in the region, including from “non-usual suspects” such as Germany with its Bayern frigate historical voyage across the region or the Royal Netherlands Navy frigate Evertsen in support of the UK-led Carrier Strike Group in 2021. The geographical immensity of the area and an array of further challenges will represent a litmus test for European assets’ availability and projectability. As emphasized by the simultaneous, uncoordinated announcement of the AUKUS security partnership and the EU Indo-Pacific strategy on September 15, 2021, there are strategic dilemmas for European countries between aligning on U.S. interests and policies in the region or charting an alternative, autonomous path.

NON-STATE FACTORS

In the meantime, piracy and criminality at sea (armed robbery, kidnapping of seafarers, bunkering, etc.) have not disappeared. Hotspots and methods are constantly evolving: while the northern Indian Ocean was the main nest of piracy in the 2010s, notably off the coasts of Somalia, the numbers of attacks has constantly decreased in the region (from 200 in 2011 to only a handful in recent years) with the aid of European action through EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Operation Atalanta, which began in 2008. The new piracy hotbed in the past few years has been the Gulf of Guinea, while high rates of criminality at sea remain in areas such as the Caribbean or the Malacca Strait.

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, largely driven by Chinese and Asian demand that induces fisheries to look for resources further afield, is also an increasing source of tensions. By depleting fish stocks, it can have a dramatic impact for some local communities that heavily rely on products from the sea for their daily needs (such as those in the Gulf of Guinea, the southern Indian Ocean, or Southeast Asia).

Illegal migrations by sea, human trafficking, and smuggling also take a heavy toll: First, in human lives, with deaths in the thousands each year on migrants’ routes to Europe (over 3,000 in 2021). Second, by mobilizing important assets, as well as human and financial resources. Third, because migration disputes can divide Europe and create unease over how to handle the issue, as shown by recurring tensions between France and the United Kingdom over English Channel crossings or between Italy and France over migration rescue operations at sea.

Increasingly, climate change transforms maritime spaces and is a threat multiplier. If climate adaptation and coastal protection efforts fail by 2100, approximately 48 percent of the world’s land area, 52 percent of the global population, and 46 percent of global socioeconomic infrastructures and activities are at risk of flooding. It also results in a growing number of natural disasters, requiring navies to invest in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief assets and operational knowledge.

Finally, critical infrastructures at sea are increasingly targeted, as part of hybrid attacks aiming at harming European interests while remaining under the threshold that could trigger a collective response from NATO or the European Union. Energy platforms or undersea cables that are key to the European economy are particularly vulnerable, as shown by the sabotage of Nord Stream pipelines or the mysterious rupture of submarine fiber-optic cables near France and the United Kingdom.

These challenges and threats are increasingly severe and diverse, and tackling them all at once is an immense task that creates some dilemmas for European navies. First, they must choose between giving priority to high-end or low-end capacities. Second, there is a tension between focusing on protecting Europe’s shores and surroundings and venturing further away, be it to actively protect key sea lines of communication, to defend the rules-based order, or to appear as credible security providers for partners.

This report argues that European countries do not have the luxury to choose their threats. They should therefore seek ways to rationalize their collective efforts and capitalize on each other’s assets, as well as those of their partners.

The European “Naval Landscape”

Turning the Tide

Between 2000 and 2020, European navies retired a third of their main surface combatants (frigates and destroyers), bringing the fleets to their smallest size in recent history. European countries are now reinvesting, with a view to high-intensity warfare at sea. This includes investments in surface combatants, amphibious vessels, and submarines (see Table 1 below), but it also involves boosting their capacity for logistics, surveillance, and long-range strike.

However, such capabilities are difficult to develop in the short term due to their technical complexity, long lead times to delivery, and costs. Each country strikes a balance between deploying low-end military capabilities for daily security tasks on the one hand and developing high-end war-fighting capabilities for worst-case scenarios on the other. The following section outlines an overview of priorities, and some capabilities, of the main European navies.

▲ Table 1: Number of Assets of the Major European Navies in 2022. Source: Authors’ research and analysis based on data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2023 (London: Routledge, 2023).

THE ONLY TWO NUCLEAR, EXPEDITIONARY NAVIES ABLE TO ASSEMBLE COALITIONS: FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

France and the United Kingdom are currently the two most important European navies — and they will remain so, considering their investment plans. Their navies share very similar features, being the only two operating nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines for nuclear deterrence and attack submarines able to launch conventionally armed land-attack cruise missiles. They have unique deployment capacity and experience among Europeans, sustained by the possession of overseas territories as well as a wide network of partner nations.

Their strained bilateral relationship over Brexit — which, in the naval domain, culminated in the AUKUS episode which scrapped a monumental submarine deal between France and Australia — has stalled the cooperation between the two neighbors. There is hope, however, that announcements at the March 2023 summit between Emmanuel Macron and Rishi Sunak give new impetus to the relationship. The leaders pledged to fully harness the potential of the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (a common deployable force that reached its full operational capacity in 2020) to move forward regarding the joint development of the future cruise/anti-ship weapons (FC/ASW) and to coordinate carriers’ deployments “to provide complementary and more persistent European presence in regions of shared interest.”

France: The French navy (Marine Nationale) is the only national maritime force besides that of the United States to operate a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, as well as the only European navy to include a catapult-equipped carrier. It has a significant surface combatant fleet, but its vessels are stretched thin over the second-largest EEZ in the world and multiple operational engagements.

Key priorities for France include contributing to nuclear deterrence through its strategic submarine fleet and nuclear-capable embarked aircraft, protecting France’s sovereignty at sea and in its EEZ (mainly located in the Indo-Pacific), and maintaining power projection capabilities. The navy’s budget is dedicated to large-scale procurement programs such as the next-generation nuclear aircraft carrier to replace the Charles de Gaulle. Commissioning is expected in 2038 and is set to feature an angled light deck and up to three electromagnetic aircraft launch systems.

France also plans the purchase of six Suffren-class Barracuda nuclear attack submarines (SSN) and five FTI medium-sized frigates, and it has recently received six of its eight — and last — European multi-mission frigates (FREMM). Overall, France is planning to have 15 frontline frigates and destroyers by 2030. France also plans to upgrade 18 maritime patrol aircraft (ATL2s) and three out of five La Fayette frigates. Several of France’s largest, most expensive procurement programs, such as the FC/ASW missile system and a new generation of strategic nuclear submarines, will not be delivered until after 2030.

The United Kingdom: London aims to meet its stated ambition of “restoring Britain’s position as the foremost naval power in Europe.” The Royal Navy calls for a doubling in shipbuilding investment over the next five years. The United Kingdom has the ambition to operate its two 65,000 metric ton carriers simultaneously and maintain the United Kingdom’s continuous deterrence posture at sea, increasing the number of deployments at sea by fifth-generation F-35 combat aircraft.

In the surface fleet, the plan is to increase the frigate fleet from 19 to 24 by the mid-2030s with upgraded versions of the Type-31 and Type-32 frigates and Type-45 destroyer as well as a newly launched Type-26 frigate. The 2022 National Shipbuilding Strategy outlines a pipeline of close to 150 new naval and civil vessels over 30 years. While the United Kingdom plans to invest in a range of new weapons — including air- and sea-launched long-range, anti-ship cruise missiles — these will only enter service after 2030. The United Kingdom is also regenerating its fixed-wing maritime-patrol aircraft capability, essential to protect the nuclear deterrent. Through the AUKUS security partnership with the United States and Australia, the United Kingdom will help develop the SSN-AUKUS for Australia, which will be based upon their next-generation SSN design and will be built and deployed by both Australia and the United Kingdom. Building is expected to start before the end of this decade, for a delivery in the late 2030s.

WORLD-CLASS NAVIES: ITALY, GERMANY, SPAIN

Italy: The Italian navy (Marina Militare) is one of the most important contributors to NATO and EU efforts in the Mediterranean Sea. The EUNAVFOR-MED Irini Operation is headquartered in Rome, while the U.S. Navy 6th Fleet is based in Naples. Italy operates the Cavour flagship with a carrier wing for F-35Bs, making it the only one in the European Union to have a carrier strike group equipped with fifth-generation aircraft. Below the surface, the backbone of the Italian navy is the four German-Italian Type-212A submarines.

The Marina Militare is planning to acquire new combat systems that will increase its potential for naval warfare, starting with long-range strike capabilities in the form of cruise missiles fitted onto frigates, destroyers, and submarines. Among the navy’s most important priorities is to strengthen its anti-submarine capabilities, in view of the underwater environment becoming more congested in the Mediterranean. It has therefore ordered two U212 Near Future Submarines. The Multi-Year Programming Document for 2022–2024 also outlines the plans to launch de-risking studies for the two next-generation destroyers (dubbed DDX) to replace the navy’s two Durand de la Penne–class units by 2028. This is only if sufficient funding can be provided. According to the navy, the blurring of the domains’ boundaries requires a new concept for naval combat, which was outlined in some detail by the Future Combat Naval System 2035 in Multi-Domain Operations (FCNS 2035) concept. However, the Marina Militare remains in an early stage regarding sea-based unmanned platforms, as it operates only a modest number of small shipborne unmanned aerial vehicles.

Germany: While the post–World War II German navy has been mostly dedicated to the protection of German seas and NATO missions, it has recently extended its actions and ambitions, contributing to EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean and sending frigates to the Indo-Pacific. Germany boasts the largest number of naval auxiliaries but is far behind the other major European navies in terms of combatant vessels.

In the “Zeitenwende” context, the air force and land army will likely be given greater priority. Yet the German navy’s current defense plan includes major investments in new anti-submarine aircraft as well as more combat support ships, including frigates, five corvettes, two submarines, and mine-laying capabilities. Germany also plans to equip its frigates with anti-submarine warfare technologies. It has purchased submarines in partnership with Norway and it is pursuing a deal with India to jointly build six conventional submarines. Concerning its main weapons system, the navy is producing a replacement for its aging Harpoon stock: Kongsberg Naval Strike Missiles. The navy is also working towards acquiring a submarine-based missile, while the so-called Interactive Defence and Attack System for Submarines (IDAS) has been under development for many years.

Spain: Once world-straddling, Spain’s navy (Armada Española) is now modest in size and capabilities, and it very much depends on international operations to maintain its capacity to deploy overseas. It leads EU operation Atalanta, headquartered in Rota since 2019. In 2020, Spain joined the European Patrol Corvette project under the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) scheme aimed at developing corvettes that can serve missions performed by offshore patrol boats and light frigates. In addition to the new Isaac Peral submarine class (S-81), the Spanish navy is expected to receive five F110-class multi-mission frigates by 2031. With looming budgets, however, Spain is likely to find it difficult to support its wide range of capabilities at current spending levels.

OTHER ROBUST EUROPEAN NAVIES: THE NETHERLANDS, DENMARK, GREECE, NORWAY, PORTUGAL

The Netherlands: The Netherlands will replace the aging Walrus-class submarines to maintain its high-demand submarine capability within NATO and the European Union. The Royal Netherlands Navy is also upgrading two of its four air defense and command frigates, which should be equipped with a new, more advanced surface-to-surface missile to replace the Harpoon. The Netherlands has also conducted national guidelines for maritime engagement in the Indo-Pacific. The country has an advanced domestic defense industry, including for naval ships.

Greece: Athens’ plans for its navy are mainly oriented by Turkey’s growing military posture in the Aegean Sea. The Greek government has approved a multibillion-dollar project to modernize the naval forces. This includes the purchase of three Belharra frigates. Greece has an extensive defense industry focused on the domestic market, capable of manufacturing and developing naval vessels.

Denmark: Denmark’s economy relies heavily on the seas and the country boasts the world’s largest container shipping company through the APM Maersk group. The Royal Danish Navy (Sørværnet) is notable for operating the Absalon-class support ship, which is unique for combining the features of a frigate and a landing platform dock. The Danish Ministry of Defence plans to strengthen by investing in new warships. The Iver Huitfeldt–class frigates (also known as the lead ship in the three-ship class of the Royal Danish Navy) have been upgraded with ballistic missile defense and integrated air and defense capabilities.44 In partnership with Finland, Denmark also seeks to improve future mine-laying solutions based on existing capabilities.

Norway: The Norwegian Fleet is composed of several types of vessels, including frigates, submarines, minesweepers, and service vessels. Some of the major project activities in the upcoming period are the replacement of the current ULA-class submarines with 212CD-class submarines in partnership with Germany and the order of additional Kongsberg fifth-generation naval missiles that represent the navy’s main weapon against surface ships.

Portugal: Maritime security is one of the key tasks of Portugal’s armed forces. The Portuguese navy (Marinha Portuguesa) aims to strengthen its means of surveillance by 2029, with the purchase of six new ocean patrol vessels in addition to the four that are already in service. The Portuguese navy has also launched a new drone mothership project, also known as a multifunctional naval platform.

▲ A German navy sailor approaches a Skjold-class ship from the Norwegian navy on June 6, 2022, as the ship participates in the BALTOPS 22 exercise in the Baltic Sea.

Sweden: Sweden has an active naval shipbuilding industry, able to produce conventional submarines. It has embraced amphibious capabilities for small-scale, special operations forces insertion.

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NATO

The two main supranational organizations in charge of European security play a key role in supporting the synchronization and coordination of European navies’ agendas and strategies — a purpose they unevenly fulfill. As in other domains, the two organizations also face the issue of avoiding duplications and finding useful complementarities. They will also increasingly seek to be the prime venue to coordinate European involvement in the Indo-Pacific.

NATO, by virtue of its mission to defend the Euro-Atlantic area, is the designated venue to coordinate allied navies through its Maritime Command (MARCOM) headquartered in Northwood in the United Kingdom. NATO ensures a permanent presence at sea through its two multinational Standing Naval Maritime Groups (SNMG) and their two mine countermeasures equivalents (SNMCMG); it also plans major military exercises, such as Dynamic Manta, Dynamic Guard, and Dynamic Mongoose.

In practice, however, since the end of the Cold War NATO has followed the general European movement toward low-end missions, launching its own counter-piracy effort in the Indian Ocean (Ocean Shield, 2009–2016) and maritime security operations in the Mediterranean (Operation Sea Guardian, launched in 2016 to take over from Operation Active Endeavour, which had been set up in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and is now largely moribund).

The alliance is now trying to adapt to ongoing trends toward naval warfare, especially following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. NATO has thus launched initiatives that focus on applying disruptive technologies in the maritime domain, such as the Maritime Unmanned Systems Initiative to enhance the alliance’s capabilities, particularly in the areas of anti-submarine warfare and mine countermeasures.

The European Union has accrued experience in deploying naval operations (EUNAVFOR) along non-European shores, such as Atalanta in the Indian Ocean or Sophia (and then Irini) along the Libyan coastline. These have primarily been performing maritime security tasks, countering piracy, and conducting maritime surveillance assignments.

The European Union adopted its first EU Maritime Security Strategy and its Action Plan in 2014. The 2022 Strategic Compass puts EU maritime security, joint capability development, and interoperability high on the agenda. The development of an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity reaction force of up to 5,000 troops should include maritime components. The Strategic Compass also commits EU countries to expanding the European Union’s Coordinated Maritime Presence concept, designed to enhance maritime security in fragile areas that are key to European interests. A pilot project has been tested in the Gulf of Guinea and is now fully operational. Consistent with the European Union’s Indo-Pacific strategy, which commits to “a meaningful European naval presence” in the region, member states have agreed to implement a second Coordinated Maritime Presence in the northern Indian Ocean.

The Strategic Compass also commissioned an update of the 2014 EU Maritime Security Strategy, complemented by an Action Plan, published in March 2023. It commits the European Union to stepping up its action under six strategic objectives: activities at sea, including through naval exercises; partnerships, including deepening EU-NATO cooperation; a leading role on maritime domain awareness; managing risks and threats; boosting capabilities; and education and training.

In order to support joint capability development, the European Union (through its member states) has sought to foster naval cooperation by means of PESCO and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence. Initial financing is coming from the European Defence Fund as a means to lower development, construction, and maintenance costs while helping the development of harmonized standards. It is in this framework that the project to develop a European Patrol Corvette by 2030 has been agreed upon. Led by Italy, with the participation of France, Greece, and Spain, the project is set to deliver the first “EU-developed” vessel of its kind. Other PESCO projects also aim at developing technologies for the maritime domain. These include the Maritime Unmanned Anti-Submarine System, coordinated by Portugal, along with the project led by Belgium in cooperation with several other smaller navies for delivering semi-autonomous and autonomous underwater, surface, and aerial technologies for mine countermeasures.

Table 2 tallies the numbers of combatant vessels available to major powers, as well as to supranational groups.

▲ Table 2: Tally of Combatant Vessels among Major International Powers and Groupings. Note: This includes Australia, India, and Japan. Source: Author’s research and analysis based on data from IISS, The Military Balance 2023.

OBSTACLE: SCARCE INDUSTRIAL AND OPERATIONAL INTEGRATION

The naval shipbuilding industry, with more than a dozen shipyards, is still one of the few defense sectors in Europe that has not undergone any major consolidation in recent decades. Industrial cooperation has proven challenging for Europeans eager to defend and promote their national defense industrial base. Each of the large shipbuilding countries has its own industrial champion, often partly owned by the state. Shipyards are usually large employers that generate a high return for the local economies. Disputes over the lead shipyard or difficulties in reconciling national requirements have therefore hampered several projects.

Apart from PESCO, joint investments, procurement, and projects remain scarce. Europeans operate 29 different types of frigates and destroyers (compared to four in the United States) and 45 different offshore patrol vessels. There are only a few examples of successful integration, mostly between neighboring countries:

• France and Italy: In 1992, the two countries launched the Horizon program, which led to the development and construction of nearly identical advanced destroyers for the French and Italian navies, allowing for a high degree of interoperability. They further agreed in 2002 to jointly develop the FREMM, which has become a competitive ship for exports. They also cooperated in the design of the Vulcano and Jacques Chevallier classes of fleet-replenishment oilers. In late 2019, the two national champions, Italy’s Fincantieri and France’s Naval Group, created their joint venture Naviris, which leads the European Patrol Corvette consortium.

• Belgium and the Netherlands: The countries established a joint naval staff, based on the BeNeSam agreements, signed as early as 1948 and strengthened in 1995. They both operate the same Karel Doorman–type frigates and decided in 2018 to jointly build 24 vessels (including two frigates), worth €4 billion. They also agreed with Denmark to establish a joint command for their special forces.

• The United Kingdom and France: In addition to the ongoing FC/ASW project, the two countries have jointly developed the anti-ship missile Sea Venom through European missile manufacturer MBDA.

Other significant bilateral projects include the construction by German TKMS of six Type-212CD submarines, of which four will be delivered to Norway before 2030, integrating missiles from the joint venture between TKMS and Norwegian Kongsberg. The Volcano long-range ammunition developed by Italian Leonardo and German Diehl can also be mentioned.

The few multilateral examples include the Tripartite or Eridan mine countermeasure vessels developed by Belgium, France, and the Netherlands in the 1970s. Additionally, the small navies of the three Baltic states — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — have established a joint naval unit, BALTRON, with small bases in each country.

At the operational level, the European Union and NATO favor interoperability through their standing groups, operations, exercises, and joint drills. Beyond the European Union and NATO, however, some naval coalitions have been formed on an ad hoc basis. This is the case of the Joint Expeditionary Force ( JEF) assembled by the United Kingdom and based on an agreement with nine other European nations. Another example is the French-initiated European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz project. Aimed at ensuring the freedom of navigation in the Gulf, it brings together seven other EU countries and is headquartered in Abu Dhabi, UAE. France also launched the European Intervention Initiative in 2018 in order to foster common strategic culture and develop the ability to jointly deploy quickly in case of crises.

Finally, some navies sponsor exercises that usefully put increasing emphasis on high-end and naval warfare, such as the French-led Polaris or Italian-led Mare Aperto. It is worth noting that even though this level of integration between various national navies remains unparalleled when compared to other continents, it is yet insufficient to present a united and fully interoperable European force in case of high intensity conflict at sea.

Critical Capability Gaps

Many Western European nations are investing in “high-end,” technologically advanced maritime equipment. While these capabilities are important, emerging adversarial cyber and space tactics make European states vulnerable. Traditional maritime assets and “low-end” proven capabilities will be critical in the event of conflict. Additionally, these assets will be able to conduct routine law enforcement at sea — operations such as anti-piracy, anti-trafficking, search and rescue, and sea lane and EEZ patrols — while also providing warnings and indicators to counter malign actions such as tampering with seabed infrastructure or potential gray zone operations.

Europe has a broad technological competence and high capability in the integration of complex technological knowledge areas such as sensors, propulsion, electronics, weapons systems, protection technology, and lightweight construction. But due to their tardy awakening to the risk of renewed naval warfare, European navies are lagging in a certain number of critical capabilities and systems.

Anti-submarine Warfare: NATO and the European Union need to ensure their anti-submarine warfare capabilities are ready to deter and deny any threat from a peer competitor. Investment in submarines is essential to control the undersea domain, to stand up to the acute Russian threat, and to have the ability to deploy to the Indo-Pacific theater to address the China pacing threat. The United Kingdom is making that investment with the Astute-class submarine, but others need to follow suit to have a critical mass at the European level.

The industrial potential to increase undersea capabilities exists, as seven nations have historical roots in submarine production: France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and Spain. France is the only European country to master the technology to build nuclear submarines but refuses to export such submarines for non-proliferation reasons. Industrial support and additional port facilities capable of offering maintenance can provide a much-needed strategic edge and control of the maritime environment.

In parallel, investments need to be made in undersea monitoring capabilities, following the model of the U.S. Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) network by placing hydrophone nets near critical infrastructure on the seabed. These networks, coupled with coordinated submarine, surface, and aircraft capable of combined ASW, can be instrumental. The United States will also need to share these warnings and indicators through intelligence centers that contribute to NATO and EU maritime domain awareness.

Uninhabited Vehicles: In the war in Ukraine, uninhabited aircraft have proven effective on both sides of the battlefield. Expanding this capability in the maritime environment will bridge the gap between the high-end and low-end equipment. Air, surface, and undersea vehicles not only can bring kinetic effects but more importantly provide essential targeting and intelligence. As naval combat maneuvers will be increasingly “uncrewed,” uninhabited vehicles are likely to serve as linchpins for systems integration, including in terms of artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, or directed energy weapons.

With few exceptions (the United Kingdom, France), national investments and PESCO projects are not enough to sustain competition with Europe’s main rivals.

Missiles: The Ukraine war has revealed the critical importance of munitions stockpiles. According to Jeremy Stöhs, after years of downscaling, navies retain only a limited number of frigates and destroyers designed for air-defense tasks. These warships are comparatively lightly armed and lack the necessary number of battle force missiles and corresponding vertical launch systems (VLS) cells to conduct and sustain high-end naval operations effectively.

Seabed Warfare: The seabed is critical to the European economy and way of life. NATO and the European Union therefore need to ensure that adversaries do not disrupt the free flow of commerce, energy, and data. Pipelines have already proven a target, but information-sharing networks or communications cables could be next. Admiral James Stavridis, former supreme allied commander of NATO, succinctly captured this resource war at sea: “There is now a vast critical infrastructure at sea, yet the United States and its allies have done precious little to prepare to defend it, including honing offensive skills to create real deterrence in the mind of any potential attacker.”

The infrastructure, training, and equipment required to adequately defend this vital network will take years to develop. While Russia has the same problems, it has already started to fortify its energy assets in the Baltic Sea and High North. NATO and the European Union do not carry the same threat to Russian undersea assets that Russia poses to NATO due to the alliance’s respect for the international rules-based order. Russia has been suspected of tampering with seabed lines of communication for years, especially at the transatlantic node that leads into France’s naval base in Brest. Creating redundancy in these vital lines of communication is one investment that could prove effective, especially with the increased accessibility of the Artic. For NATO, investment needs to happen immediately, with clearly defined tripwires across alliances and partnerships.

Technological Innovation: Emerging and disruptive technologies have received considerable attention in the military planning of revisionist powers such as Russia and China, including quantum technology, hypersonic and conventional missiles, and directed energy weapons. The ideal modern warship should be equipped with a great number of cutting-edge sensors, countermeasures, and weapons that increase both its offensive and defensive capabilities, while relying on an advanced combat management system able to manage all systems and the incoming data — and to be connected to an integrated network.

Mine Countermeasures: The use of mines is a tool that leverages uncertainty to deter an adversary with minimal assets. Russia has the largest quantity of mines of any nation — approximately 250,000 munitions — and knows that its Western competitors are bound by a prohibition against the use of mines. Russia would likely attempt to mine the shores of NATO allies in advance of an offensive operation. The alliance must be ready to immediately clear those waters and needs to invest in demining capability to ensure that freedom of navigation is maintained throughout the Euro-Atlantic area.

The accession of Finland and Sweden into the alliance will bring two highly capable military forces into NATO, whose strengths include mining and demining capabilities. The Gulf of Finland is a strategic sea lane for Russia into St. Petersburg and a strategic area for contested EEZ operations. Finland, alongside the alliance, will defend those waters and can contain the Russian naval and civilian vessels in port through offensive mining.

Amphibious Readiness: There is little recent familiarity of amphibious deployments among European navies. However, approximately 40 percent of the world’s population, or nearly 2.4 billion people, reside within 100 km of coasts, which will likely increase the needs for deployments.

Human Resources: A widespread issue among European navies is the lack of manpower needed to adequately operate and crew some of their current capabilities, or the ones they are investing in. This can have severe operational impacts as it can constitute an important hurdle to deployment. There is an acute need to plug gaps in terms of numbers and skills, through both recruitment campaigns and training.

▲ SNMG 1 takes part in Norwegian exercise ARCTIC DOLPHIN 2023.

Recommendations

The above elements show that the European navies need to accelerate and expand their efforts, adapt to a rapidly changing environment, and be further rationalized and integrated. This last section lays out recommendations related to capabilities, tools, and governance, and it concludes by looking at what the United States could do to support these needed evolutions. This section purposely does not tackle geographical priorities, since the authors assume that European navies should in any event aim to have a global reach due to the rapidly changing security environment and the interconnectedness of challenges and threats.

Capacities: Robustness and Flexibility

Aim for the higher end: The diversification and intensification of challenges at sea call for increased investment in capabilities that will help Europeans cope with the whole spectrum of warfare. When pondering prioritization, this report suggests giving the priority to the higher end, for the following reasons:

• Of all the threats identified, “strategic competition” and the ensuing risk of modern naval warfare is the most “capacity intensive” and the one that can have the biggest impact on European navies. To sustain competition, European countries need to be able to have a deterrent presence at sea, and — if needed — to combat and ultimately prevail. High-end capabilities are what strategic competitors will look at when strategizing their approach to Europe.

• High-end equipped vessels are inherently multipurpose and can carry out several tasks. They are therefore fit for various kinds of security environments. In peacetime, they can serve as deterrent; be used for training, exercises, or routine maritime security operations; and easily switch to combat mode if required. Vessels dedicated to lower-end missions do not have this reversibility.

• Higher intensity does not necessarily mean higher concentration. There is indeed a risk in concentrating budgets into high-end combat forces: that European navies become even smaller in numbers than they already are. To conjugate robustness and flexibility, modern European capabilities should be easily dispersible, stealthy, and agile.

Do not underestimate mass: Facing the proliferation of combat capabilities coming from competitors and rivals, it is essential that Europeans be able to assemble a robust and deterrent presence in different geopolitical hotspots simultaneously if needed. To concomitantly deploy sufficiently robust groupings in order to efficiently defend their interests in a multi-theater conflict, Europeans need to have a critical mass of available assets — with their partners when possible, but also on their own when necessary.

Foster multi-domain approach and modularity: Naval warfare touches perhaps more physical domains than any other kind of warfare, as it extends from space, through the air, onto the sea surface, underwater, and down to the seabed, not to mention the coastal areas that are stage to amphibious operations. As suggested by Jeremy Stöhs: “Defense planners should consider fusing together sea-, air-, land- and space-based sensors (including unmanned platforms) to establish more comprehensive C2 and Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) arrangements that allow joint, multinational forces to perform the full array of naval missions.” This multi-domain approach should be tested through training and exercises.

Modularity should continue to grow to easily switch between mission sets by bringing on or off compartmentalized capability, such as mission payload kits for specific threats (anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, electronic warfare/intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR], air defense, and mine warfare, to name a few). “Bolt on, bolt off” capabilities could be created. For instance, with the changing ISR landscape, different nations can work at the speed of technology to field cutting-edge signals and intelligence-gathering mission systems. Interoperable systems that link into a variety of vessels can increase domain awareness — future capabilities could even see advanced weapons systems with the bolt on, bolt off design — advancing the concepts of containerized vertical launch capabilities but avoiding the legal minefield of making maritime vessels combatants. Modularity and the bolt on, bolt off concept come with their own risks. Primarily, in a contested environment, vessels may lack the ability to utilize facilities capable of changing payload kits. The second risk is that these concepts may not work for legacy platforms, likely requiring time and investment to field.

Beef up shore-based defense: Russian and Chinese examples show an emphasis on land-based A2/AD to advance and secure interests in the maritime domain. As some Black Sea and Scandinavian states are already demonstrating, defense planners should enhance land-based aviation, anti-ship missiles, and coastal-defense missile systems (similar to those responsible for the sinking of the Moskva); sensors (including space-based assets); and cyber capabilities to secure European shores. This particularly applies to smaller states (the Western Balkans or the Baltic states, for instance), which should leverage the potential of AI, semi-autonomous and fully autonomous systems, and other disruptive technologies to deny adversaries sea control.

Get serious about industrial consolidation: Europeans remain highly dependent on the United States for high-end capabilities, sensors, and logistical support. Although it is less a problem to be dependent on an ally than on potential rivals, Europeans first need to take their share of NATO’s combined effort to maintain a competitive edge. Additionally, in case of changes in trade and industry strategies from the United States, they need to be able to produce and procure their own equipment. This requires multiplying bilateral and multilateral cooperation. One key line of effort should be the integration and interoperability of unmanned assets through a “systems of systems,” which will be crucial in future operations.

Make full use of EU instruments: The PESCO framework, although still a fledgling project, has already shown its added value — such as with the European Patrol Corvette. This potential should be fully harnessed, especially when EU funds allocated to defense projects such as the recent European Defence Fund and the upcoming European Defence Investment Program are fully available, and hopefully significant enough to drive technological progress forward. New projects in the aforementioned “critical capability gaps” could be prioritized.

This also applies to projects aimed at enhancing European readiness. As suggested by Daniel Fiott, a specific project could be dedicated to amphibious forces, “linking to existing and future [PESCO] projects such as ‘co-basing,’ amphibious assault ships, precision-guided munitions, high-speed craft, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and air power capacities.”

Build a European submarine: Building on the experience of the European Patrol Corvette, Europeans should step up their ambition and consider the joint development of new critical capabilities, such as submarines. The following options could be envisioned:

• A high-end, European-made and EU-funded, new class of submarines. Industrial powers with a history of cooperation and national know-how on submarines could apply to existing (European Defence Fund) and upcoming (European Defence Investment Program) EU funds and think about the development of new capacities that could become flagships for European defense.

• An “AUKUS-like” partnership with a key Indo-Pacific partner. France and Italy could perhaps harness the close ties they developed respectively with India, including in the provision or development of critical capabilities (e.g., Rafale jet fighters, existing cooperation on submarines between Paris and New Delhi) to develop trilateral security partnerships comprising of an ambitious and meaningful industrial project.

• An effort to fill intra-European gaps. Countries with industrial capacities (Germany, for instance, with the Netherlands or Norway) could build coastal submarines fitted for the member states deprived of such capacities, such as the Baltic states.

Governance and Institutional Support

Think of an overarching coordinating structure: Inspired by the Maritime Areas of Interest Coordination Cell of the EU Coordinated Maritime Presences, a light structure could be established to bring together European countries’ naval staff, along with representatives of NATO and the European Union, in order to coordinate deployments, engage in operational planning, or conduct exercises. It would allow the UK navy to participate in a European organization, and it would also be open for Cyprus and Turkey to join as long as they do not impose restrictions on other members. This body’s main aim would be to synchronize and deconflict respective efforts, with a view to ensuring a consistent and coordinated European presence at sea. Down the road, such a structure could evolve to bring closer doctrines, tactics, and strategic thinking more broadly.

Expand information fusion: Maritime situational awareness is a key enabler for European navies. Integration is underway through the Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR) project, which is a technical solution that allows dialogue between maritime information systems and is provided to 18 member states plus Norway and the United Kingdom. Building on this effort, Europeans should aim at a comprehensive and performative shared platform able to integrate upcoming technological innovations.

Enhance political-military approach: Deployment strategies should be more concerted between defense and foreign affairs ministries to maximize their strategic effect. This applies at the national level, as well as for bilateral or multilateral efforts, such as the commitment by France and the United Kingdom during the March 2023 bilateral summit to coordinate their carriers’ deployments.

Maximize effects through partnerships: Investing in navy-to-navy partnerships can prove highly beneficial to Europeans for several reasons. As European nations will struggle to significantly expand their global presence at sea in the short to medium term, engaging in operational cooperation is paramount to develop interoperability, to offset the European absence in certain regions, and ultimately to build new coalitions to tackle shared challenges.

In parallel, European navies still have a lot of expertise to share and should emerge as the key partners of major regional powers, especially those who are wary of too close cooperation with the United States and are being courted by China and Russia — such as Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Indonesia, or Malaysia. Finally, building sound and confident relationships with countries along key sea lines of communication, such as Egypt, the UAE, India, and Singapore, can prove instrumental to providing against potential disruption attempts.

What the United States Can and Should Do to Help

The United States remains the centerpiece of NATO’s maritime forces. It therefore has a pivotal role to play in leading by example and increasing European navies’ joint warfighting readiness. It should at the same time encourage European navies to be more responsible and more credible on their own, to make sure that they are able to do their share in defending the international rules-based order everywhere on the planet. Recently, the U.S. Navy used the Italian FREMM design to invest in the new Constellation-class guided-missile frigate (FFG 62), modifying it to meet U.S. standards and navigating congressional restrictions on utilizing U.S. manufactured frigates. Despite the balance struck, this $5.5 billion contract in collaboration with a foreign ally strengthens the bond between countries, may increase interoperability, and shows other nations that filling critical capability gaps in a timely, cost effective way can outweigh national interests. In the future, that message and encouragement across NATO and the European Union will be critical to ensure that defense spending in European nations remains at a level that can support broader objectives.

▲ Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG) 1 kicks off annual NATO Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) exercise Dynamic Guard off the coast of Bergen, Norway, February 20, 2023.

Mathieu Droin is a visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he focuses on transatlantic European security and defense. Prior to joining CSIS, Mr. Droin served as deputy head of the strategic affairs unit at the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs (MFA), where his work focused on NATO, EU Common Security and Defence Policy, and maritime security issues.

Courtney “Stiles” Herdt is an active-duty naval officer and current military fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and United States Naval Institute (USNI). He reported to CSIS as a federal executive fellow after his successful command tour, leading the world-famous Swamp Foxes of Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron Seven Four (HSM-74) through two deployments as part of Carrier Air Wing Three and the Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group.

Gabriella Bolstad is a former Stuart Center visiting fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program. She is a researcher at the Fritdjof Nansens Institutt, where she conducts research on U.S. foreign policy, Norwegian security, and defense policy, and transatlantic relations. She has prior work experience at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Yangon, and the Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt in Oslo.