Iran’s Drones In Ukraine

Tehran has placed itself firmly in the Kremlin’s camp since the early days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Part of that is driven by the punishing sanctions regime that weighs heavily on both economies and part by a shared interest in weakening the U.S. and NATO. But the nature of Iran’s support shifted when Tehran supplied drones and then began training Russian forces on their use. Reports of the deal surfaced in midsummer and by August, Iranian drones were in Ukraine. The precise terms remain unclear, but Iranian drones offset surveillance demands on the Russian air force and may backfill rapidly depleting missile stockpiles. For Iran, the deal generates cash or repays a debt — but more significantly places its drones in yet another theater.

Drones already provide Iranian forces and regional proxies with critical capabilities, including aerial surveillance and short- and long-range strikes. Their smaller size makes them hard to see on radar, and they are difficult to hit because they fly low and slow — exploiting a gap in defense systems. Some drones function as precision munitions such as the Shahed-136, which earned the moniker of a “kamikaze” drone. Though individual drones carry a relatively low payload, drone swarm technology, which the Iranian military showcased in late 2021, can combine their firepower. The Shahed-136’s mobile, truck-mounted launchers present similar challenges to detection as did Iraq’s Scud launchers in the first Gulf War. Moreover, Iran sources some drone components from commercially available engines and other dual-use technologies, complicating efforts to prevent parts procurement. Indeed, Tehran has called drones “the main pillar of wars of the future” and asserted they will play an increasingly prominent role in its military posture.

The advancement in Iran’s drone threat should be no surprise. While Iranian military drills and reporting may inflate capabilities, Iranian drones have proved their worth in active conflicts. Yemen’s Houthis began using Iranian-sourced drones in 2016. They used a short-range drone to target Patriot air defense systems within the country, neutralizing them before firing missiles at the location. They also used these drones for cross-border attacks against Saudi military and oil infrastructure. Iran introduced longer-range designs that the Houthis tested against Saudi targets, and the first known Shahed-136 surfaced in Yemen by September 2020. Houthi-launched drones and missiles probe Saudi air defenses, primarily Patriot air defense systems, to reveal vulnerabilities that they can then exploit. Iranian drone performance in the Yemen conflict almost certainly has fed back into future development cycles.

This feedback cycle makes Russia’s use of Iranian drone technology worrisome. The drones themselves are unlikely to yield strategic shifts in the Ukraine war. The Russian military is attacking civilian and infrastructure targets with drones to break the will of the Ukrainian people, but these attacks seem to have only further inured Ukrainians to Russian brutality. The Ukrainian military is shooting down more than 70 percent of the Shahed-136 drones, using anti-drone techniques developed on the fly. Defensive layers include radar to identify potential drone threats, fighter jet patrols, ground-fired anti-aircraft missiles and even machine-gun fire. The U.S. and NATO supplied Ukraine with anti-drone systems, including the mobile VAMPIRE system, to aid in defense against Russian attacks.

While the U.S. and NATO will reap the benefits of the Ukrainian military’s experience, so, too, will Iran. Iranians operating the drones from Crimea have front-row seats and can report back which drone attacks have penetrated which defenses, and where gaps in any defense systems may exist. Iran’s next generation of drones will be that much more difficult to stop.

The variety of ways in which the Ukrainian military has thwarted Russian drone attacks is a testament to the array of defenses at its disposal. But it also speaks to the ad hoc nature of the response, revealing vulnerabilities to increasingly sophisticated — and field-tested — Iranian technology, and it exposes an asymmetry in defending against the threat. Scrambling fighter jets to shoot down drones as the U.S. did in September is not a sustainable response. Nor, as the Saudis have learned, is firing million-dollar Patriot missiles.

The U.S. and NATO must commit to advancing their anti-drone capabilities and slowing Iran’s drone program. The Defense Department’s initial steps to develop a strategy and the technologies to support it are positive but remain insufficient as modern warfare moves faster than defense procurement cycles. Congress could help. Funding the military’s efforts to address this growing threat is one way. Another is focusing on the Iranian drone procurement network and those who operate the drones. Sanctioning entities within this network will make it harder for Iran to obtain necessary components. So, too, would ensuring the proper authorities to attack the production cycle through cyber or other means are in place.

Iran’s drone threat is rising, and it’s only a matter of time until the U.S. military, not the Ukrainians, will need to defend against it.

Katherine Zimmerman is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and an adviser to its Critical Threats Project.

Cleary Waldo is a master’s candidate at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program.